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基于演化博弈的应急医疗物资质量保障策略研究*
引用本文:宋英华,桑小艳,王喆,徐弘倩.基于演化博弈的应急医疗物资质量保障策略研究*[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2022,18(5):31-39.
作者姓名:宋英华  桑小艳  王喆  徐弘倩
作者单位:(1.武汉理工大学 中国应急管理研究中心,湖北 武汉430070;2.武汉理工大学 安全科学与应急管理学院,湖北 武汉430070)
基金项目:* 基金项目: 国家重点研发计划项目(2018YFC080700);教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(20YJC630154);中央高校基本科研业务费项目(2020-YB-043,2021VI035)
摘    要:为保障突发公共卫生事件时应急医疗物资质量,满足医院物资需求,运用演化博弈理论构建政府、公立医院和医疗物资供应商三方博弈主体决策模型,并求解各方决策的纯策略纳什均衡解和混合策略纳什均衡解,探讨常态化和非常态化下三方博弈主体合作机制的动态演化过程。研究结果表明:减少政府监管成本并加大对医疗物资供应商的奖惩力度对供应商诚信销售效果不明显;减少供应商诚信销售成本、增加其隐性收益、加大医院投诉概率,可促使供应商诚信销售,同时提升政府公信力,最终三方博弈主体策略均收敛。研究结果可为突发公共卫生事件中保障医疗物资质量提出对策与建议。

关 键 词:应急医疗物资  质量保障  三方博弈  演化博弈  纳什均衡

Research on quality assurance strategy of emergency medical materials based on evolutionary game
SONG Yinghua,SANG Xiaoyan,WANG Zhe,XU Hongqian.Research on quality assurance strategy of emergency medical materials based on evolutionary game[J].Journal of Safety Science and Technology,2022,18(5):31-39.
Authors:SONG Yinghua  SANG Xiaoyan  WANG Zhe  XU Hongqian
Affiliation:(1.China Research Center for Emergency Management,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan Hubei 430070,China;2.School of Safety Science and Emergency Management,Wuhan University of Technology,Wuhan Hubei 430070,China)
Abstract:In order to ensure the quality of emergency medical materials during the public health emergencies and meet the demand of hospital materials in the current epidemic,the evolutionary game theory was used to construct the decision-making model of tripartite game subjects including the government,public hospitals and medical materials suppliers,and the pure strategy Nash equilibrium solution and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium solution of each party’s decision-making were solved,and the dynamic evolution process of the cooperation mechanism of the tripartite game subjects under normal and abnormal conditions was discussed.The results showed that reducing the cost of government supervision and increasing the intensity of reward and punishment for medical materials suppliers had no obvious effect on the honest sales of suppliers.However,reducing the cost of suppliers’ honest sales,increasing their hidden benefits and increasing the probability of hospital complaints could not only promote the suppliers’ honest sales,but also enhance the government’s credibility.Eventually,all the strategies of the tripartite game subjects converged.The research results can provide countermeasures and suggestions for ensuring the quality of medical materials in the public health emergencies.
Keywords:emergency medical materials  quality assurance  tripartite game  evolutionary game  nash equilibrium
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