| 基于前景理论的施工安全事故网络舆论监督演化博弈分析* |
| |
| 引用本文： | 杨耀红,曾怡,代静,刘盈.基于前景理论的施工安全事故网络舆论监督演化博弈分析*[J].中国安全生产科学技术,2022,18(1):132-138. |
| |
| 作者姓名： | 杨耀红 曾怡 代静 刘盈 |
| |
| 作者单位： | （华北水利水电大学 水利学院，河南 郑州 450046） |
| |
| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目(51709116);河南省学科创新引智基地项目(GXJD004)。 |
| |
| 摘 要： | 为了对施工安全事故网络舆论实施有效监督，推进国家治理体系和治理能力现代化，基于前景理论，构建政府、承包商和社会公众关于施工安全事故网络舆论监督演化博弈模型，利用系统动力学方法进行数值仿真。结果表明:心理作用对政府、承包商和社会公众在施工生产安全事故发生后的策略选择有较大影响；提高政府发现承包商隐瞒信息的概率及政府对承包商的处罚，能使承包商趋向于选择如实公布信息；减小公众造谣概率和增大公众舆论监督收益，能使公众趋向于选择舆论监督；公众选择网络舆论监督，能促使政府积极主动回应社会关切，促使承包商如实公布信息。
|
| 关 键 词： | 施工安全事故 网络舆论 前景理论 演化博弈 系统动力学 |
Evolutionary game analysis on network public opinion supervision of construction safety accidents based on prospect theory |
| |
| YANG Yaohong,ZENG Yi,DAI Jing,LIU Ying.Evolutionary game analysis on network public opinion supervision of construction safety accidents based on prospect theory[J].Journal of Safety Science and Technology,2022,18(1):132-138. |
| |
| Authors: | YANG Yaohong ZENG Yi DAI Jing LIU Ying |
| |
| Affiliation: | (School of Water Conservancy,North China University of Water Resources and Electric Power,Zhengzhou Henan 450046,China) |
| |
| Abstract: | In order to effectively supervise the network public opinion of construction safety accidents,and promote the modernization of the national governance system and governance capabilities,an evolutionary game model of network public opinion supervision about construction safety accidents for the government,contractors and the social public was constructed based on the prospect theory,and the numerical simulation was carried out by using the system dynamics method.The results showed that psychological effect had greater impact on the strategic choice of government,contractors and social public after the occurrence of construction safety accident.Increasing the finding probability of government for the information concealing of contractors and improving the government penalties on contractors could make the contractors tend to choose publishing information truthfully.Reducing the controlling probability of network operators and the probability of public rumor spreading or increasing the revenue of public opinion supervision could make the public tend to choose the public opinion supervision.The public's choice of network public opinion supervision could encourage the government to proactively respond the social concerns and urge the contractors to publish information truthfully. |
| |
| Keywords: | construction safety accident network public opinion prospect theory evolutionary game system dynamics |
| 本文献已被 维普 等数据库收录！ |
| 点击此处可从《中国安全生产科学技术》浏览原始摘要信息 |
|
点击此处可从《中国安全生产科学技术》下载全文 |
