A safety counterculture challenge to a “safety climate”

This case study is about a small group of workmen caught in a common dilemma regarding work safety. They must work safely and maintain production within a pathological organization that does not meaningfully reward participation or communication. They do so as a group and socially construct danger, injury and safety for themselves. They constitute a functioning counterculture and challenge the safety climate contrived by managers. Although limited in scope, the study suggests that we can learn from the details of their interactions with their work environment, with one another, and with their managers.     

How do organizational practices relate to perceived system safety effectiveness? Perceptions of safety climate and co-worker commitment to safety as workplace safety signals

Introduction: Integrating safety climate research with signaling theory, we propose that individual perceptions of safety climate signal the importance of safety in the organization. Specifically, we expect that three work-related organizational practices (training effectiveness, procedure effectiveness, and work pressure) relate to the broader risk control system in the workplace via individual perceptions of safety climate as a broad management signal. Further, we expect this broad management signal interacts with a local environmental signal (co-worker commitment to safety) to amplify or diminish perceived system safety effectiveness. Method: In a field study of oil and gas workers (N = 219; Study 1), we used mediation modeling to determine the relationships between work-related organizational practices, perceived safety climate, and perceived safety system effectiveness. In a field study of railway construction workers (N = 131; Study 2), we used moderated mediation modeling to explore the conditional role of co-worker commitment to safety. Results: We found that training effectiveness, procedure effectiveness, and work pressure predicted perceived system safety effectiveness indirectly via perceived safety climate (Studies 1 and 2) and that these indirect paths are influenced by co-worker commitment to safety (Study 2). Conclusions: Findings suggest that perceived safety climate is driven in part by work practices, and that perceived safety climate (from managers) and co-worker commitment to safety (from the local environment) interact to shape workplace safety system effectiveness. Practical applications: The insight that training, procedures, and work pressure are meaningful predictors of perceived safety climate as a signal suggests that organizations should be cognizant of the quality of work-related practices for safety. The insight we offer on the competing versus complimentary nature of managerial safety signals (perceived safety climate) and co-worker safety signals (co-worker commitment to safety) could also be used by safety personnel to develop safety interventions directed in both areas.     

Leading indicators of system safety – Monitoring and driving the organizational safety potential

An indicator can be considered any measure – quantitative or qualitative – that seeks to produce information on an issue of interest. Safety indicators can play a key role in providing information on organizational performance, motivating people to work on safety and increasing organizational potential for safety. We will describe the challenges of monitoring and driving system safety. Currently, the same lead indicators are used – explicitly or implicitly – for both purposes. The fact that the selection and use of safety performance indicators is always based on a certain understanding (a model) of the sociotechnical system and safety is often forgotten. We present a theoretical framework for utilizing safety performance indicators in safety–critical organizations that incorporates three types of safety performance indicators – outcome, monitor and drive indicators. We provide examples of each type of indicator and discuss the application of the framework in organizational safety management. We argue that outcome indicators are lag indicators since outcomes always follow something; they are the consequences arising from multiple other situational and contextual factors. Monitor and drive indicators are lead indicators. The main function of the drive indicators is to direct the sociotechnical activity in the organization by motivating certain safety-related activities. Monitor indicators provide a view on the dynamics of the organization: the practices, abilities, skills and motivation of the personnel – the organizational potential for safety. We conclude that organizations should better acknowledge the significance of monitor and drive indicators in safety management.     

Are safety investigations pro-active?

This paper elaborates on the debate whether safety investigations are obsolete and should be replaced by more modern safety assessment approaches. Despite their past performance, in particular in aviation, accident investigations are criticized for their reactive nature and the lack of learning potential they provide. Although safety management systems are considered a modern method with a more prospective potential, they too are hard to judge by their quantitative performance. Instead of measuring both concepts along the lines of their output, this contribution explores the origin, context and notions behind both approaches. Both approaches prove to be adaptive to new developments and have the ability to shift their focus towards learning and cognition. In assessing their potential, accident investigations prove to cover a specific domain of application in the risk domain of low probability and major consequences, fulfilling a mission as public safety assessor. In order to make optimal use of their analytic and diagnostic potential, investigations should mobilize more complex and sophisticated scientific theories and notions, in particular of a non-linear nature. Consequently, they are neither reactive, nor proactive, but provide a specific approach to safety issues.     

Where to focus? Insights from safety personnel and external safety consultants on lessons learned about safety climate interventions – A qualitative approach

Introduction: Safety climate is important for promoting workplace safety and health. However, there is a dearth of empirical research on the effective ways of planning, designing, and implementing safety climate interventions, especially regarding what is going to be changed and improved. To address this gap, the present study sought to extract a comprehensive pool of compiled suggestions for safety climate intervention based on qualitative interviews with professionals in occupational safety and health management from potentially hazardous industries. Method: A series of systematic semi-structured interviews, guided by a comprehensive sociotechnical systems framework, were conducted with company safety personnel (n = 26) and external safety consultants (n = 15) of 21 companies from various industries. The taxonomy of five work system components of the sociotechnical systems approach served as overarching themes, representing different areas of improvement in an organization for occupational safety and health promotion, with an aim of enhancing safety climate. Results: Of the 36 codes identified, seven codes were based on the theme of external environment work system, four were based on the theme of internal environment work system, five were based on the theme of organizational and managerial structure work system, 14 codes were based on the theme of personnel subsystem, and six were based on the theme of technical subsystem. Conclusions: Safety climate intervention strategies might be most commonly based upon the principles of human resource management (i.e., codes based on the personnel subsystem theme and organizational and managerial structure work system theme). Meanwhile, numerous attributes of external/internal environment work system and technical subsystem can be jointly improved to bolster safety climate in a holistic way. Practical Applications: More systematic and organized management of safety climate would be available when various interrelated codes pertinent to a given context are carefully considered for a safety climate intervention.     

Impact of safety attitude,safety knowledge and safety leadership on chemical industry workers’ risk perception based on Structural Equation Modelling and System Dynamics

In chemical industry, major accidents occur occasionally. Past research has demonstrated that risk perception was relevant to safety as it might affect the behavior, which could exert influence on the probability of accidents. It is important to adjust workers' risk perception to reduce accidents in chemical industry. To achieve this goal, some key influencing factors of workers’ risk perception of were identified from 3 aspects including safety attitude, safety knowledge and safety leadership. This was accomplished by gathering empirical data from 287 workers employed in 6 Chemical plants in Jiangsu, China. The model of influencing factors of risk perception for workers was established based on Structural Equation Modelling (SEM), and the path coefficients and weights were analyzed by the SEM. On that basis, the System Dynamics (SD) model of risk perception for workers was established. The study findings revealed safety attitude and safety leadership have a direct positive impact on perception of risk probability and perception of risk severity, safety knowledge has a direct positive impact on perception of risk severity, while safety knowledge has no direct positive impact on perception of risk probability. The findings of the study can provide theoretical supports and method guidance for adjusting the risk perception of workers in chemical industry.     

The relationship between patient safety climate and occupational safety climate in healthcare – A multi-level investigation

IntroductionPatient safety climate/culture is attracting increasing research interest, but there is little research on its relation with organizational climates regarding other target domains.The aim of this study was to investigate the relationship between patient safety climate and occupational safety climate in healthcare.MethodThe climates were assessed using two questionnaires: Hospital Survey on Patient Safety Culture and Nordic Occupational Safety Climate Questionnaire. The final sample consisted of 1154 nurses, 886 assistant nurses, and 324 physicians, organized in 150 work units, within hospitals (117 units), primary healthcare (5 units) and elderly care (28 units) in western Sweden, which represented 56% of the original sample contacted.ResultsWithin each type of safety climate, two global dimensions were confirmed in a higher order factor analysis; one with an external focus relative the own unit, and one with an internal focus. Two methods were used to estimate the covariation between the global climate dimensions, in order to minimize the influence of bias from common method variance. First multilevel analysis was used for partitioning variances and covariances in a within unit part (individual level) and a between unit part (unit level). Second, a split sample technique was used to calculate unit level correlations based on aggregated observations from different respondents. Both methods showed associations similar in strength between the patient safety climate and the occupational safety climate domains.ConclusionsThe results indicated that patient safety climate and occupational safety climate are strongly positively related at the unit level, and that the same organizational processes may be important for the development of both types of organizational climate.Practical applicationsSafety improvement interventions should not be separated in different organizational processes, but be planned so that both patient safety and staff safety are considered concomitantly.     

The safety barometer: How safe is my plant today? Is instantaneously measuring safety level utopia or realizable?

During the last decade, serious accidents have continued to occur in the process industry. Apparently the scenarios of various undesired events leading to those accidents are still not sufficiently controlled. The key question is how potentially hazardous situations develop, what processes form the basis for this development, and how to control them? Safety level is not static but depends on many risk factors that change in presence and intensity over location and time. Safety level is dependent not only on technical process parameters that have immediate effects on the ‘frequency’ or probability of catastrophic consequences, but also depends on equipment integrity degradation, operational and management quality, attitudes, and cultural processes which may change over a prolonged time. The time and human interaction aspects make dynamic risk assessment complex. This paper will outline a conceptual approach using in addition to the regular process parameter signals received, also weak and slowly changing signals from various safety indicators, enabling to keep track of the risk factors. In theory this could lead to obtaining an instantaneous safety level ‘measure’ making possible forecast alarming for an imminent event to occur. Such concept could be regarded as a ‘writing’ safety barometer, or barograph. However, there are quite a number of problems to be solved which in the paper will be discussed.     

Self-directed workteams and safety: a winning combination?

The organization of work into self-directed work teams (SDWT) has considerably changed the power structure within companies. In addition to carrying out the work, SDWT members make decisions that are traditionally the jurisdiction of first line supervisors. This exploratory research examines the impact of this type of group empowerment on the management of health and safety in twelve factories in Quebec. As expected, the management of health and safety is greatly modified when self-directed work teams are implemented. These teams play a major role in the planning, implementation and monitoring of corrective measures on the shop floor. Staff and management provide support and advice to the work teams, but make fewer and fewer decisions themselves. Peer pressure, when perceived as legitimate, is likely to positively influence the safety attitudes and behaviours of team members. Furthermore, the safety performance of these organizations is actually better than average. However, our respondents were concerned about the growing lack of health and safety leadership displayed by some managers. They worry about the definition of roles, integration of occupational health and safety (OHS) concerns and adoption of OHS measures by less mature work teams. Peer pressure is not always seen as legitimate, thereby causing tension. Finally, our respondents were concerned about the stress and health difficulties that may be related to group decision-making and added responsibilities.     

Is the effect of quantified road safety targets sustainable?

Recent studies have shown that the setting of road safety targets is associated with a substantial reduction in road fatalities in the short-term. Although such targets may not themselves be responsible for the reduction in fatalities, they serve as a useful measure of the intention and commitment of road authorities to formulate timely road safety measures that lead to the achievement of the target. A quantified target is regarded as one of the key components of a road safety strategy. However, few studies have examined the degree of commitment and attention of road authorities to such targets in the long-term. In this study, we revisit the effectiveness of the quantified road safety targets set by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, but with a different method, time scale, and group of comparison countries. We not only evaluate the associations between quantified targets and road fatality levels, but also measure the changes in the time-series trends in road fatalities over the long-term. The results indicate that all seven treatment countries analyzed experienced desirable changes in the time-series trend in road fatalities during the period under study, which implies an increase in road safety improvement over time.     

Shopping online for children: Is safety a consideration?

Introduction: There has been a significant increase in online purchasing and product safety problems have been identified in e-commerce. This study examines consumer behavior and safety perceptions among parents purchasing child products online. Method: A mixed methods approach, including focus groups and a survey with parents, identified key characteristics and behaviors. Cluster analysis was used to determine different population segments (including “Informed,” “Uninformed,” and “Infrequent” consumer groups) based on their frequency of online shopping and search for product information. “Safe” and “Unsafe” behavior groups were identified related to their search for safety information on child products. Logistic regression analysis was used to study the effects of consumer type groups and demographic variables on the chances of being a safer consumer. Results: Findings indicate that child product safety considerations are not a priority for parents when shopping online. Only 62% of the survey respondents indicated that they search for information prior to buying a child product online, of which only 13% of the respondents noted that they search for information on product safety. Risky consumer behaviors were identified including the purchase of imitation products (counterfeit or knockoff products) and autonomous checks for product safety in lieu of safety standards. The logistic regression analysis found that being an “Uninformed Consumer” increases the odds of an individual being an “Unsafe Consumer” by 8.4 times (χ²(11) = 97.33, p < .001). Practical Applications: Design of a social marketing campaign that targets these different population segments to change perceptions and promote safe online purchasing is recommended.     

Trust and distrust in safety leadership: Mirror reflections?

Although research shows that employees’ trust and distrust in management influences their safety behavior, less is known about how these attitudes develop. Based on two-factor models of trust, we hypothesize that distinct trustworthiness qualities precede the development of employees’ trust and distrust in their supervisors. Eighty-five UK construction employees responded to a paired comparison test of trustworthiness qualities, which provided 56 and 53 consistent rankings for trust and distrust, respectively. Consistent with our hypotheses, integrity (measured through honesty) was found to be the most important attitude in the development of both trust and distrust, while a reversed ordering of importance emerged for ability (measured through competence) and benevolence (measured through concern) in the development of trust and distrust. In all cases, only a small number of qualities were most important in the development of each attitude. We discuss how safety initiatives that focus on trust might gain by addressing the qualities that we identify.     

Should 'Cyrus the Centipede' take a hike? Effects of exposure to a pedestrian safety program on children's safety knowledge and self-reported behaviors

INTRODUCTION: We report the first evaluation of the popular "Cyrus the Centipede" child pedestrian safety program. METHOD: A pre-test/post-test control versus experimental condition design was used to assess Cyrus' impact on third graders' pedestrian safety knowledge, and self-reported pedestrian behaviors. RESULTS: Although some beneficial effects were observed, the program was not reliably effective. In particular, the impact of exposure to Cyrus was strongly influenced by the individual teacher who delivered it, likely due to the highly unstructured nature of the curriculum. SUMMARY: We suggest that: (a) the effectiveness and reliability of such programs be demonstrated before they are widely adopted; and (b) programs that focus on training children in actual or simulated traffic environments may be more effective than those that primarily focus on teaching safety facts and rules.     

Tanks A Lot – Trevor: For enduring process safety contributions

Trevor Kletz has left an indelible mark on worldwide chemical process safety. He generously shared his insight for decades and I have been fortunate to have spent my process safety career in the shadow of Trevor Kletz’s influence. In the early 1980s I purchased one of the first commercially available process safety awareness training modules. The module was entitled the “Hazards of Over and Under Pressurizing Tanks,” developed by Trevor, and distributed by the Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE). The module contained a collection of short case histories and each incident provided a message on fundamentals. It was an easy to use module with a couple of dozen vivid 35 mm slides and focused on the frail nature of tanks.This paper, “Tanks A Lot – Trevor” mimics the IChemE approach of three decades ago and could serve as an introductory awareness lesson for the newbie or trainee who desires to learn about the frail nature of tanks. But most likely, it will serve as a reminder to the seasoned reader of things he or she has previously seen or worse yet, experienced.Storage tanks in chemical plants, oil refineries, related distribution terminals and pressure vessels associated in these industries are vital components and a major investment within their facilities. These essential vessels come in all sizes and many shapes and are built to various codes. They may hold large inventories of hazardous materials.Tanks can and do very safely contain a wide variety of raw materials, intermediates and finished products for years. If the tank or its accessories are poorly designed, abused by operations or are neglected with respect to effective inspection and basic maintenance, bad things can happen.This paper includes a few tank system fundamentals as well as case histories of failures in design, operation, inspection and maintenance. Previous vessel incidents must be understood.     

Dustiness in workplace safety and explosion protection – Review and outlook

Behavior of dust/air mixtures is very complex and difficult to predict since it depends on material properties as well as boundary conditions. Without other influences airborne particles deposit due to gravity but the time it takes for total deposition as well as easiness of resurrection depends very much on the specific dust sample and the boundary conditions. It still lacks a complete understanding of all interacting reasons and one approach is using experimentally determined characteristics, one is named dustiness.Dustiness is the tendency of dust to form clouds and to stay airborne. Dustiness is determined with two basic principles, which are light attenuation and ratio of filled-in and measured mass. Assessment of dustiness of industrial powders has been done for a long time regarding work place safety. Dustiness is used there to determine inhalable fraction and to evaluate health risks. Lately it became interesting in dust explosion protection as well. Dustiness could be used to optimize determination of zones, adaption of venting area and/or for positioning of suppression systems.Dustiness can be useful in many ways but is not a physical property of dusts, therefore it depends on material properties such as density, particle size distribution, shape and water content as well as boundary conditions or determination method. This makes it very difficult to compare dustiness for different techniques and apparatuses and determination method as well as results should be considered carefully. This work gives an overview of existing standards, recent research and suggests improvements to the new dustiness as proposed for dust explosion protection.     

Affluence,occupational safety and ergonomics: are they interdependent?

The number of fatal occupational injuries (FOI), the number of scientific publications in ergonomics (SP) and the gross domestic product (GDP) of 30 countries were investigated for their mutual dependence. This article shows that, although the ratio of FOI/SP decreases exponentially with a linear increase in the GDP, GDP may be only one of the major influencing factors.     

Availability organisational analysis: Is it a hazard for safety?

This main issue of this article analyses the possible way to use for availability improvement, the organisational analysis methodology initially developed for accident safety investigations. As the last decade examples in the industrial world prove that some organisational weaknesses could either impact safety or availability, we have for purpose to make some important clarifications, with the help of the organisational paradigm, and grounded on our knowledge of safety accidents or local inquiries in hazardous technical complex systems.We will first give our definition of an availability event, by comparison with a safety event and recall what is for us an organisational analysis. Then we will consider the safety organisational paradigm pathogenic factors in wondering if these factors could also be seen as pathogenic factors for availability; or if specific availability pathogenic factors can be inferred from these safety pathogenic factors.In the end we will try to assess the common points and the differences between an availability oriented organisational analysis and a safety oriented one, with a particular attention to possible negative follows-up on safety issues and to the methodology issue.     

For whom does safety pay? The case of major accidents

Government agencies regularly use the argument that ‘safety pays’ as a way of motivating employers to attend to occupational health and safety. This paper looks at the effectiveness of this argument in the case of catastrophic hazards. It suggests that, while it may be true that safety pays in an abstract sense, this is irrelevant unless it can be shown that safety pays for relevant decision makers. All too often it does not. The article illustrates its claims by drawing on the literature on the Zeebrugge, Bhopal and Piper Alpha disasters, as well as on a study of a mine disaster in Australia.     

The insurance market’s influence on investments in safety measures

In a risky process there are three alternative ways to treat the negative consequences of the risk or the accident. We can: (1) take all the consequences when an accidental event occurs, (2) reduce the probability and/or the consequences of an accidental event by safety measures or (3) transfer the consequences of the occurrence to parties better able to carry them (i.e. buying insurance). In safety management a prevailing practice is that access to an insurance market does not affect the investment in safety measures. In this paper we discuss what the consequences are of this common practice in relation to insurance and mandatory safety requirements. We conclude that an overinvestment in safety measures is very likely if insurance is not taken into account. Moreover, mandatory safety measures and insurance can lead to both over- and underinvestment in safety measures.     

Managers’ attitudes towards safety measures in the commercial road transport sector

Safety measures and related costs and benefits have been widely discussed and analysed in academic circles and by the authorities and industrial sectors. The study reported in this paper addresses these aspects from a cognitive based perspective. Risk management is about dealing with the conflict between production and safety. Enterprises which spend too much on safety will meet bankruptcy, and those not concerned with safety measures will meet with severe accidents and related damage. Inspired by James Reason’s theoretical framework, managers (n = 106) of commercial transport enterprises were asked about their attitudes towards safety management, what factors have contributed and their belief that further effort and investments in health, environment and safety (HES) measures will pay off. One half of the managers perceive HES work as too expensive and approximately one quarter assess mandatory HES work as compromising their competitiveness. One third of the managers do not find further safety measures than those already implemented necessary or remunerative. They claim that there are no other alternative ways of doing their activities and that there are no technical measures available that could meet outstanding safety challenges. Managers do acknowledge HES work as important for the reputation of the enterprise. The factor analysis gave five HES attitude factors: (I) concerned with formalities, (II) HES work improves health, environment and safety, (III) HES work is ineffective, (IV) HES regulation is appropriate, and (V) HES work can be improved.