Studying organisational cultures and their effects on safety

How do organisational cultures influence safety? To answer this question requires a strategy for investigating organisational culture. By far the most widely used research strategy is the perception survey. An alternative is for researchers is to immerse themselves in one or more organisations, making detailed observations about activities and drawing inferences about the nature of the organisation’s culture (the ethnographic method). A third technique makes use of the wealth of material that is assembled by inquiries into major accidents. This paper describes how this material can be used to provide insights into organisational cultures. It draws on specific examples from the author’s own work as well as the cultural analysis carried out by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. It concludes with some additional suggestions for carrying out research on safety-relevant aspects of organisational culture.     

The “social-physiology” of safety. An integrative approach to understanding organisational psychological mechanisms behind safety performance

This paper aims at contributing to a comprehensive perspective on occupational safety by integrating research on different specific organisational psychological concepts found to contribute to different types of organisational performance, and apply these to an occupational safety context. A second aim was to present perspectives on how occupational safety may be promoted within an organization. The following mechanisms are suggested. A leadership style promoting co-operation, inspiring, fostering group goals, as well as providing individualized support and empowering workers may intrinsically be expected to comprise rich and open communication and thus support the development of high-quality interactions between managers and employees. Such interaction and communication may promote the development of mutual trust, and the development of a good workgroup climate. Trust, in turn, may further promote communication and interaction. Mutual trust, high-quality relations, and a strong group climate may promote workers’ motivation and intentions to contribute to the organisational goals. Managers successful in demonstrating true and consistent priority of workers’ safety may promote the development of workers’ trust but also convince that safety is a prime organisational goal. This may promote workers’ motivation to behave safely. Trustful relations characterized by empowerment and participation are then likely also to support the realization of safety intentions into safe behavior.     

Workplace and organisational factors in accident analysis within the Food Industry

This paper focuses on the causes of accidents at work in the Food Industry Sector and it covers both immediate and systemic causation factors, using data collected in Portugal. In the first part, accident data is analysed by looking at harmonised variables within the Eurostat recording system, allowing a portrait of the accidents occurred and their immediate causes. To complement the study, a second part was designed to deepen the insight into underlying factors, as well as the relevant organisational conditions; this complementary part comprised an in-depth analysis of 30 accidents, carried out in the field by visiting several enterprises of the sector and conducting interviews with the injured people and their managers. For eliciting and analysing this information, the WAIT method was applied together with its classification schemes. The results are presented and discussed, showing the usefulness of certain new Eurostat variables, such as the deviation and the contact. However, they also demonstrate that the current variables are not yet sufficient to clarify accident mechanisms on which to build up knowledge and develop better prevention strategies. The authors argue for the need of more detailed information and propose an additional variable, associated with the deviation, aimed at promoting the inclusion of specific underlying factors within the local workplace environment.     

解决电梯箱内的视频设备被干扰的技术途径

电梯作为建筑物必不可少的运载工具,在电梯箱内安装视频设备已日益成为普遍而有效的监控方法.但是,电梯箱内的视频监控设备遭到电磁干扰（EMI）,轻则导致监视器显示的图像不清晰,或出现黑白杠、木纹状滚动,重则出现大面积网纹干扰,以至显示紊乱,形不成图像和同步信号,甚至控制失灵,是令安防业十分头痛的老大难问题.     

解决电梯箱内的视频设备被干扰的技术途径

电梯作为建筑物必不可少的运载工具,在电梯箱内安装视频设备已日益成为普遍而有效的监控方法.但是,电梯箱内的视频监控设备遭到电磁干扰(EMI),轻则导致监视器显示的图像不清晰,或出现黑白杠、木纹状滚动,重则出现大面积网纹干扰,以至显示紊乱,形不成图像和同步信号,甚至控制失灵,是令安防业十分头痛的老大难问题.     

Accident in a French dynamite factory: An example of an organisational investigation

The 27th of March 2003, an explosion caused the death of four employees in a Nitrochimie pyrotechnic plant, at Billy Berclau, in the north of France. Following the accident, the ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development appointed INERIS to perform an investigation. According to the terms of reference, the investigation would cover technical (origins of the explosion, extent of damages) as well as organisational issues, as defined by SEVESO II safety management system requirements. This paper has a threefold purpose. It intends first to illustrate with an empirical case the current trend in safety auditing and accident investigation, targeting organisational factors, alongside human factors. There are not so many published cases of accidents analysed with an organisational perspective. Secondly, it shows that it is possible to investigate organisational dimensions (through articulation of safety engineering, safety management and human and social sciences) within reasonable time frames and a reasonable amount of resources. By focusing on key actors and asking appropriate questions related to key dimensions, investigating organisational accidents might not necessarily imply spending much more resources than other steps such as damage assessment, chronological construction or identification of technical scenarios, although there are also some prerequisite conditions needed to achieve this. Finally this paper should be seen as a technical communication beyond the pyrotechnic industry.     

Accident models and organisational factors in air transport: The need for multi-method models

Event analysis is needed to learn and improve safety. In air transport, ‘occurrences’ are routinely reported by pilots and air traffic controllers, and in-flight data analysis systems automatically monitor aircraft system behaviour and capture parameter threshold exceedances. The safety analyst of a large airline has to analyse dozens of occurrences each day. To understand why events happened the analyst has to go beyond the given information and make causal inferences. The analyst is able to do this for causal factors closely related in time and space to the event itself by applying individual knowledge and expertise. But typically the result of the analysis is ad hoc reaction to each individual event. Systematic analysis is needed to find areas of improvement for factors that are further removed from the event (latent factors). New tools are needed to help the analyst in this respect. There is a need for models that represent possible causal event sequence scenarios that include technical, human, and organisational factors. Building such models is a huge task, and requires the combination of detailed knowledge of all aspects of the system, processing huge amounts of data, a substantial mathematical background and the ability to capture this all in a user friendly software tool to be used by the safety analysts. Experience in Causal Modelling of Air Transportation System (CATS) in the Netherlands and similar projects in FAA and Eurocontrol in aviation shows that this is indeed a formidable task, but it has to be done to further improve safety.     

Exploring the organisational preconditions for occupational accidents in food industry: A qualitative approach

The continuing high frequency of occupational accidents in the Swedish food industry calls for new approaches to better understand the underlying factors. In the present study, 54 accidents involving hand injuries were investigated from the operators’ perspective, to explore the organisational preconditions. In-depth interviews were conducted with operators and their supervisors, and 24 of these interviews were analysed using the grounded theory method. The core category ‘safety as a process’ was identified encompassing the perception of the process of the accident at operative level and organisational preconditions that increased the risk of occupational accidents. These preconditions were open factors: deficiencies in technical/physical environment and work organisation; and concealed factors: insufficient communication and learning, a high level of responsibility in combination with low control, conflicting goals and a gap between procedures and practice. These preconditions lead to risk acceptance, resignation towards improved safety and normalisation of risk. Through the analysis a five-step hypothesis was empirically generated.