The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly

We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant with a model of optimal, possibly firm-specific, emissions taxes and their enforcement under incomplete information about firms’ abatement costs, enforcement costs, and pollution damage. We argue that optimality requires an enforcement strategy that induces full compliance by every firm, except possibly when a regulator can base the probabilities of detecting individual violations on observable correlates of violators’ actual emissions. Moreover, optimality requires discriminatory taxes, except when a regulator is unable to use observable firm-level characteristics to gain some information about the variation in firms’ abatement costs or monitoring costs.     

Ancillary benefits of reduced air pollution in the US from moderate greenhouse gas mitigation policies in the electricity sector

Actions to slow atmospheric accumulation of greenhouse gases also would reduce conventional air pollutants yielding “ancillary” benefits that tend to accrue locally and in the near-term. Using a detailed electricity model linked to an integrated assessment framework to value changes in human health, we find a tax of $25 per metric ton of carbon emissions would yield NO_x-related health benefits of about $8 per metric ton of carbon reduced in the year 2010 (1997 dollars). Additional savings of $4–$7 accrue from reduced investment in NO_x and SO₂ abatement in order to comply with emission caps. Total ancillary benefits of a $25 carbon tax are $12–$14, which appear to justify the costs of a $25 tax, although marginal benefits are less than marginal costs. At a tax of $75, greater total benefits are achieved but the value per ton of carbon reductions remains roughly constant at about $12.     

Averting expenditure and the cost of pollution

The paper considers the relationship between the willingness to pay for environmental quality and averting expenditures—that is, the costs of measures undertaken in efforts to counteract the consequences of pollution. The models used assume perfect mobility among locations with different levels of environmental quality. The major results are: (1) Averting expenditures are not in general a good measure of willingness to pay; (2) averting expenditures are not always even a lower bound on willingness to pay; (3) even when averting expenditures are a lower bound, the difference between the level of such expenditures and willingness to pay cannot be attributed to the unavertible “aesthetic” consequences of pollution.     

Plant vintage, technology, and environmental regulation

We use data on productivity and pollution abatement costs at individual pulp and paper mills to test whether the impact of environmental regulation on productivity differs by plant vintage and technology. Plants with higher pollution abatement costs have significantly lower productivity levels. This relationship differs greatly based on a plant's technology, with productivity at integrated mills being greatly affected by abatement costs, while the impact at non-integrated mills is negligible. Plant vintage does not seem to matter, with older and newer plants showing similar impacts. Reported abatement costs appear to substantially understate the true costs of abatement. Accounting for the impact of technology differences makes some difference in the estimated overall impact of environmental regulation.     

‘Optimal’ pollution abatement—whose benefits matter, and how much?

We examine the determinants of environmental regulatory activity (inspections and enforcement actions) and levels of air and water pollution for 409 US pulp and paper mills, using data for 1985–1997. We focus on the benefits to the surrounding population from pollution abatement. Plants with larger benefits emit less pollution, as do those with more kids and elders nearby. Plants in poor areas emit more pollution, though (surprisingly) we find less pollution in minority areas. Out-of-state neighbors seem to count less than in-state ones, although this effect diminishes if the bordering state's Congressional delegation is strongly pro-environment. We use ‘spatially lagged’ instrumental variables to control for the potential endogeneity of which individuals choose to locate near the plant. The results for regulatory activity are noticeably less significant than the emissions results.     

Trade''s Dynamic Solutions to Transboundary Pollution

This study develops a differential game to examine the effects of trade liberalization on transboundary water pollution. Water pollution is due to wastewater emissions from countries in a shared waterway along the U.S.–Mexico border with available data of pollution abatement costs, public health damages, and trade benefits. Noncooperative and cooperative games are examined with changes in trade policy and public health damages. Results show trade liberalization leads Mexico to curtail pollution in both games. Cooperation and trade liberalization limit emissions from both countries and curtail strategic behavior of the United States from Mexico's pollution control efforts in the noncooperative game.     

Transferable discharge permits and economic efficiency: The fox river

Recent emphasis on reforms of environmental regulation has led to suggestions for strategies which maintain environmental standards but allow the needed flexibility and cost effectiveness. The transferable discharge permit (TDP) is one such strategy for water pollution control recently adopted in Wisconsin. In this article, the potential for substantial cost savings from trading TDPs is demonstrated using data on the Fox River in Wisconsin. A simulation model of water quality (Qual-III) and a linear programming model of abatement costs determine the optimum pattern of discharge. Reaching that optimum from proposed pollution abatement orders is shown to be feasible. Varying conditions of flow and temperature can be accommodated using trade coefficients which can be accurately estimated through interpolation. The calculations demonstrate the value and feasibility of flexible regulations governing water pollution abatement.     

Budget-Balancing Incentive Mechanisms

A. P. Xepapadeas [J. Environ. Econom. Management20, 113-26, 1991] developed a pollution abatement incentive mechanism that both reduces the information requirements of a regulator and is "budget-balancing," drawing only on the social gains from pollution abatement to encourage firm compliance. This paper demonstrates that, contrary to Xepapadeas, the budget-balancing system of random penalties cannot be used to induce compliance with the regulator′s objectives if firms are risk neutral. However, the mechanism can be successfully applied if firms are sufficiently risk averse [E. Rasmusen, RAND J. Econom.18, 428-435, 1987].     

Dynamic incentive regulation of diffuse pollution

Diffuse pollution from agriculture and extractive industries reduces air and water quality and contributes to climate change. We consider a setting in which a regulator must incentivize unobserved abatement given that firms have limited liability, and when they can enter and exit. We demonstrate that a simple dynamic incentive scheme can solve this difficult regulatory problem: firms pay a constant tax and receive rebates following periods of low pollution. We apply the model to water pollution from a fracking operation and simulate the contract to explore the volatility of the firm's payments and the costs of limited liability.     

The Optimal Allocation of Conservation Funds

This paper presents a framework to evaluate alternative designs of conservation programs and their implications for the allocation of conservation funds. We show that the efficient allocation of conservation funds must consider two important “pooling” effects—cumulative effects and interrelationships among alternative environmental benefits. Ignoring the cumulative effects of environmental benefits may cause conservation funds to be overly dispersed geographically and, as a result, may result in minimum environmental benefits when the budget is small. Ignoring the interrelationships among alternative environmental benefits may result in not only misallocation of conservation funds among geographical areas, but also incorrect resources being targeted for conservation practices. Implications of these results for the design of conservation programs are discussed.     

Pollution control in a simplified general-equilibrium model with production externalities

Pollution externalities of the producer-producer type are considered in a positive two-sector model with stationary capital and labor. By assumption, output from the polluting sector can be diverted to pollution abatement. Environmental authorities attempt to control the level of pollution to some minimum “acceptable” standard by requiring polluters to depollute through the mechanism of a uniform tax on production. Following discussion of short-run considerations, the stability of the tax-adjustment scheme is examined and the dynamic nature of growth paths in the economy is explored.     

Trading rules and the environment: Does equal treatment lead to a cleaner world?

In this paper, we consider a three-stage game in the context of a competing exporters model to compare and contrast the effects of discriminatory and uniform (Most Favored Nation, MFN) tariffs on countries’ choice over environmental standards for varying degrees of pollution spillovers. Because of the presence of punishment effects and stronger own and cross-tariff effects, we find that discrimination yields higher standards than MFN (and free trade) independently of the extent of pollution spillovers. When pollution is local and incentives to free ride on other countries’ abatement efforts are weak, we show, however, that welfare is larger under MFN than under discrimination. In a dynamic setting, we consider the impact of symmetric and asymmetric treatments on the sustainability of an international environmental agreement (IEA) and obtain that multilateral cooperation is easier to sustain under discrimination than under MFN (or free trade).     

Parental altruism and the value of avoiding acute illness: are kids worth more than parents?

A model describing parents’ preferences to relieve their own and their children's acute illnesses is estimated using stated-preference data. Estimated marginal rates of substitution (MRS) between child and parent illness are about two, indicating that parents value children's illness attributes twice as highly as their own. The MRS is larger for younger children, falls toward unity as the child approaches adulthood, and appears to reflect parental altruism rather than parent–child differences in initial health or illness costs. Intra-family allocations may compensate for chronic health impairments. Parents’ willingness to pay to avoid own or child illness increases with income, declines with fertility, increases at a decreasing rate with duration and number of symptoms, and depends on perceived discomfort and activity restrictions. Current methods of assessing morbidity benefits of environmental regulations may understate substantially the value of children's health, particularly in African-American families.     

Pollution Taxes and Pollution Abatement in an Oligopoly Supergame

This paper investigates the effects of an emissions tax on the incentives for oligopolists to acquire alternative pollution abatement technologies. The analysis is conducted in terms of a repeated game and it is demonstrated that there are circumstances in which the firms may reject the option of acquiring the pollution abatement equipment, even when this lowers their production costs.     

Pollution Permits and Sustainable Growth in a Schumpeterian Model

In Chapter 4 of their book (“Endogenous Growth Theory,” MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (1998)), Aghion and Howitt introduce environmental pollution in an aggregate Schumpeterian model and characterize the optimal path. In this paper, we study the equilibria in a decentralized economy compatible with their model. First, we study the trade-off between environmental quality and growth and identify the channels of transmission of environmental policy into growth performance. Then, we compute the levels of the tools which are used to implement the optimum.     

A proposal for improving the measurement of benefits from pollution abatement

Two basic and competing approaches for measuring the benefits of pollution abatement have found support in the recent literature-the property value approach and the health damage function approach. The purpose of this paper is to show that conditions will often exist when the property value approach will not accurately measure all benefits and conditions will always be present that cause the health damage function approach to underestimate benefits. In general, neither approach can stand alone. It is possible, however, that the two approaches can be combined in such a way as to improve the measurement of abatement benefits. We present an approach for combining these two methods and do so by introducing an “information coefficient” that measures the degree of knowledge about pollution effects held by the public. Approaches to estimating the information coefficient are suggested.     

Strategic environmental policy; eco-dumping or a green strategy?

The Porter hypothesis claims that a strong environmental policy best serves the interests of a nation's export industry. While this hypothesis seems to be based on some form of bounded rationality, this paper argues that governments may have good reasons for setting an especially strong environmental policy even though firms are fully rational. If the available abatement technology turns the environment into an “inferior input”, competitiveness is spurred by a strong environmental policy. The government should take advantage of this, and set an especially strict emission quota or an especially high emission tax. The findings in the paper also has consequences for the desirability of international cooperation with respect to national environmental policy. If a strict environmental policy spurs competitiveness, the environment is better protected without cooperation.     

International environmental agreements with consistent conjectures

We introduce consistent conjectures into Barrett (1994) canonical model of international environmental agreements. The existing literature assumes inconsistent Nash conjectures, despite the fact that policymakers recognize that abatement levels are strategic substitutes and increases in abatement generate carbon leakage. With consistent conjectures much of the conventional wisdom is reversed. The non-cooperative abatement level is below the Nash equilibrium. The difference between Nash and consistent conjectures is greatest when benefits are large and costs are small. We find that large coalitions cannot form. However, small coalitions can result in substantial increases in abatement relative to the non-cooperative outcome.     

Prices vs quantities with multiple pollutants

We examine the choice of policy instruments (price, quantity or a mix of the two) when two pollutants are regulated and firms' abatement costs are private information. Whether abatement efforts are complements or substitutes is key determining the choice of policies. When pollutants are complements, a mixed policy instrument with a tax on one pollutant and a quota on another is sometimes preferable even if the pollutants are identical in terms of benefits and costs of abatement. Yet, if they are substitutes, the mixed policy is dominated by taxes or quotas.     

The Value of Using Feasibility Models in Systematic Conservation Planning to Predict Landholder Management Uptake

Understanding the social dimensions of conservation opportunity is crucial for conservation planning in multiple‐use landscapes. However, factors that influence the feasibility of implementing conservation actions, such as the history of landscape management, and landholders’ willingness to engage are often difficult or time consuming to quantify and rarely incorporated into planning. We examined how conservation agencies could reduce costs of acquiring such data by developing predictive models of management feasibility parameterized with social and biophysical factors likely to influence landholders’ decisions to engage in management. To test the utility of our best‐supported model, we developed 4 alternative investment scenarios based on different input data for conservation planning: social data only; biological data only; potential conservation opportunity derived from modeled feasibility that incurs no social data collection costs; and existing conservation opportunity derived from feasibility data that incurred collection costs. Using spatially explicit information on biodiversity values, feasibility, and management costs, we prioritized locations in southwest Australia to control an invasive predator that is detrimental to both agriculture and natural ecosystems: the red fox (Vulpes vulpes). When social data collection costs were moderate to high, the most cost‐effective investment scenario resulted from a predictive model of feasibility. Combining empirical feasibility data with biological data was more cost‐effective for prioritizing management when social data collection costs were low (<4% of the total budget). Calls for more data to inform conservation planning should take into account the costs and benefits of collecting and using social data to ensure that limited funding for conservation is spent in the most cost‐efficient and effective manner.