Risk aversion and CO2 regulatory uncertainty in power generation investment: Policy and modeling implications

We consider a simulation of risk-averse producers when making investment decisions in a competitive energy market, who face uncertainty about future regulation of carbon dioxide emissions. Investments are made under regulatory uncertainty; then the regulatory state is revealed and producers realize returns. We consider anticipated taxes, grandfathered permits and auctioned permits and show that some anticipated policies increase investment in the relatively dirty technology. Beliefs about the policy instrument that will be used to price carbon may be as important as certainty that carbon will be priced. More generally, a failure to consider risk aversion may bias policy analysis for the power sector.     

Emissions Trading with Shares and Coupons when Control over Discharges Is Uncertain

Two important decisions in designing markets for tradable emissions permits are whether to allow banking of permits (coupons) and whether to allow trading in entitlements to future permits (shares). Banking is predicted to reduce price instability when firms trade in a reconciliation market after the quantity of emissions has been determined. Tradable shares are a common feature in proposals for emissions trading in Canada. We conduct a laboratory experiment to investigate how bankable coupons and tradable shares affect efficiency and prices under uncertainty. Cognitive demands on the subjects are reduced by computerized advice on the optimal allocation of coupons across periods and the implied marginal values of coupons and shares. Banking, share trading, and uncertainty conditions are introduced in a complete factorial design with three observations per cell. High efficiencies are observed across all treatments. Uncertainty in the control of emissions leads to substantial price instability when banking is not allowed. Banking virtually eliminates the instability, but reduces the efficiency of the market institution. Share trading reduces trading volumes, increases price stability, and improves efficiency.     

Enforcement and price controls in emissions trading

This paper examines how enforcement affects the structure and performance of emissions trading programs with price controls under uncertainty about firms' abatement costs. The analysis highlights how an enforcement strategy can cause abatement-cost risk to be transmitted to enforcement costs via the price of permits. When this occurs, accommodating the effect of abatement-cost risk with an optimal policy results in higher expected emissions and lower expected permit price than their second-best optimal values. However, it is possible to design an enforcement strategy that shields enforcement costs from abatement-cost risk by tying sanctions directly to permit prices. This enforcement strategy stabilizes enforcement effort, the optimal permit supply and price controls are independent of enforcement costs, and the policy produces the second-best optimal outcome.     

Tell the truth or not? The montero mechanism for emissions control at work

We experimentally test the truth-telling mechanism proposed by Montero (2008) for eliciting firms' abatement costs. We compare this mechanism with two well-known alternative allocation mechanisms, free and costly allocation of permits at the Pigouvian price. Controlling for the number of firms and the firms' maximal emissions, we find that, in line with the theoretical predictions, firms over-report their maximal emissions under free allocation of permits and under-report these under costly allocation of permits. Under Montero's mechanism, by contrast, firms almost always report their maximal emissions truthfully. However, in terms of efficiency, the difference between Montero's mechanism and costly allocation disappears with industries including more than one firm.     

The Economics of Pollution Permit Banking in the Context of Title IV of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments

This paper presents a model of the collective emission permit banking behavior of electricity-generating units affected by Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. A rigorous treatment of the constraint that pollution permits cannot be borrowed from future allocations is introduced. This approach enables an analysis of the impact of future changes in electricity demand, regulations, and technologies on the present permit price and emissions level. The effect of uncertainty on the banking behavior is also explored.     

Leisure/Labor Tradeoffs: The Backward-Bending Labor Supply in Fisheries

Economists have understood that the open-access nature of fishing grounds can cause the long-run fishery supply to bend backward. There is also increasing speculation that fishermen respond to falling output price either by increasing or decreasing effort, depending on the circumstances. This suggests a short-run backward-bending supply of fishing labor. A dynamic, utility-theoretic model of fishermen's behavior is developed to address this possibility. The model highlights both contemporaneous and intertemporal trade-offs between labor and leisure. The model is tested and the results indicate that the short-run labor supply in fisheries may exhibit backward-bending properties. In addition, changes in current prices may trigger changes in expectations of future prices, causing potentially greater counterintuitive behavior. These results challenge many traditional regulatory strategies (e.g., output taxes) that address problems of open access.     

The environment as a factor of production

This paper uses firm-level data about electric utilities to develop an empirical model of how electric utilities use and bank SO₂ pollution permits under the Acid Rain Program. The empirical model considers emissions, fuels, and labor as variable inputs with quasi-fixed stocks of permits and capital. Consequently, substitution possibilities between the environment and other production factors can be measured and tested. The results reveal substantial substitution between emissions, permit stocks, capital, fuel, and labor. The empirical findings also indicate that firms bank permits primarily as a hedge against uncertainty and for other firm-specific reasons. Overall, the results suggest that cap-and-trade approaches can reduce the cost of meeting environmental goals by providing a mechanism for addressing regulatory and market risks and by signaling an appropriate price for factor use, especially irreversible capital investments.     

The environment as a factor of production

This paper uses firm-level data about electric utilities to develop an empirical model of how electric utilities use and bank SO₂ pollution permits under the Acid Rain Program. The empirical model considers emissions, fuels, and labor as variable inputs with quasi-fixed stocks of permits and capital. Consequently, substitution possibilities between the environment and other production factors can be measured and tested. The results reveal substantial substitution between emissions, permit stocks, capital, fuel, and labor. The empirical findings also indicate that firms bank permits primarily as a hedge against uncertainty and for other firm-specific reasons. Overall, the results suggest that cap-and-trade approaches can reduce the cost of meeting environmental goals by providing a mechanism for addressing regulatory and market risks and by signaling an appropriate price for factor use, especially irreversible capital investments.     

Emissions trading systems with cap adjustments

Emissions Trading Systems (ETSs) with fixed caps lack provisions to address systematic imbalances in the supply and demand of permits due to changes in the state of the regulated economy. We propose a mechanism which adjusts the allocation of permits based on the current bank of permits. The mechanism spans the spectrum between a pure quantity instrument and a pure price instrument. We solve the firms׳ emissions control problem and obtain an explicit dependency between the key policy stringency parameter—the adjustment rate—and the firms׳ abatement and trading strategies. We present an analytical tool for selecting the optimal adjustment rate under both risk-neutrality and risk-aversion, which provides an analytical basis for the regulator׳s choice of a responsive ETS policy.     

Do you not like Pigou, or do you not understand him? Tax aversion and revenue recycling in the lab

Tax-aversion reduces the likelihood that price rationing can be a politically viable tool for environmental protection. We examine the case of the classic Pigouvian tax to control a negative externality, and consider how recycling the revenues, labeling of the tax and information about its purpose affects the support for taxation. We test the support for taxation within a single-price market experiment, in which purchases by some buyers impose external costs on others. Observing behavior consistent with tax-aversion, we also find that recycling the revenues to more narrowly targeted groups seems to increase support for taxation. In the absence of narrow revenue recycling, labeling a Pigouvian instrument as a ‘tax’ may significantly lower the likelihood of voter support.     

Comparing policies to confront permit over-allocation

Instability in cap-and-trade markets, particularly with respect to permit price collapses, has been an area of concern for regulators. To that end, several policies, including hybrid price-quantity mechanisms and the newly introduced “market stability reserve” (MSR) systems, have been introduced and even implemented in some cases. I develop a stochastic dynamic model of a cap-and-trade system, parameterized to values relevant to the European Union׳s Emission Trading System (EU ETS) to analyze the performance of these policies aimed at adding stability to the system or at least at reducing perceived over-allocations of permits. Results suggest that adaptive-allocation mechanisms such as a price collar or MSR can reduce permit over-allocations and permit price volatility in a more cost-effective manner than simply reducing scheduled permit allocations. However, it is also found that the performance of these adaptive allocation policies, and in particular the MSR, are greatly affected by assumed discount rates and policy parameters.     

Price perceptions in water demand

Economists advocate for using the price mechanism to manage water scarcity, but complex nonlinear rate structures prevalent in markets for municipal water obscure price signals. We conduct a randomized field experiment that jointly elicits knowledge about the cost of water and examines the impact of improved information on demand by linking a survey to water billing records. Half of our sample of 30,000 single family homeowners are randomly sent an invitation to a survey that asks questions about the water bill and the costs of water-use activities (e.g. the cost of taking a shower), and subsequently provides personalized accurate information. Results show that consumers have poor information about the marginal price of water and overestimate the costs of using water. Respondents are relatively better informed about their total bill and water consumption. In aggregate, respondents increase water use in response to the survey, potentially due to learning that water is cheaper than they previously thought. Increased consumption is concentrated among low users who are more likely to over-estimate the costs of using water.     

Fishing quota markets

In 1986, New Zealand responded to the open-access problem by establishing the world's largest individual transferable quota (ITQ) system. Using a 15-year panel dataset from New Zealand that covers 33 species and more than 150 markets for fishing quotas, we assess trends in market activity, price dispersion, and the fundamentals determining quota prices. We find that market activity is sufficiently high in the economically important markets and that price dispersion has decreased. We also find evidence of economically rational behavior through the relationship between quota lease and sale prices and fishing output and input prices, ecological variability, and market interest rates. Controlling for these factors, our results show a greater increase in quota prices for fish stocks that faced significant reductions, consistent with increased profitability due to rationalization. Overall, this suggests that these markets are operating reasonably well, implying that ITQs can be effective instruments for efficient fisheries management.     

Demand for environmental quality information and household response: Evidence from well-water arsenic testing

Access to information about environmental quality may facilitate low-cost preventive measures that protect human health. In this paper, we study the demand for information about environmental quality and the behavioral response to the information provided. With a field experiment conducted in Bihar (India), we estimate the price sensitivity of demand for diagnostic testing of drinking water wells for arsenic of natural origin – a serious threat to the health of tens of millions of villagers across South and Southeast Asia. Demand is substantial but sensitive to price; uptake falls from 68% to 31% of households over our price range (Rs. 10 to Rs. 50). We further assess how households respond to information regarding the contamination level in their wells. About one-third of households with unsafe wells switch to a safer water source. Finally, we demonstrate that households that received adverse test outcomes are more likely to selectively forget test results, and proactively remove evidence of their wells' arsenic status.     

What do consumers believe about future gasoline prices?

A full understanding of how gasoline prices affect consumer behavior frequently requires information on how consumers forecast future gasoline prices. We provide the first evidence on the nature of these forecasts by analyzing two decades of data on gasoline price expectations from the Michigan Survey of Consumers. We find that average consumer beliefs are typically indistinguishable from a no-change forecast, justifying an assumption commonly made in the literature on consumer valuation of energy efficiency. We also provide evidence on circumstances in which consumer forecasts are likely to deviate from no-change and on significant cross-consumer forecast heterogeneity.     

绿色消费认知和意愿的行为学调查与分析

绿色消费是解决当前中国环境污染的重要战略组成部分,本文研究了对上海市开展的关于绿色消费1200余份调查问卷。研究结果显示:1)人们环境意识和绿色消费意愿普遍提高,98%的受访者愿意为保护环境做出自身行为的改变。2)绿色消费认知参差不齐。对绿色产品的认知渠道不多,绿色产品的标签知晓率低于30%。3)绿色消费意愿强烈但支付能力还有限,82%的消费者愿意购买绿色产品,但支付不能超过同类普通商品10%的额外费用。研究结果还表明:绿色消费与性别、年龄、职业以及学历等具有相关关系。     

Durable goods and long-run electricity demand: Evidence from air conditioner purchase behavior

I estimate a dynamic structural model of demand for air conditioners, the most energy-intensive home appliance in the US. The model explores the links between demand for durable goods and expected changes in key attributes: energy efficiency and price. I incorporate expectations explicitly as a feature of the choice setting, and use parameter estimates from the model to calculate durable good demand elasticities with respect to energy efficiency, electricity price, and price of the durable itself. These estimates fill a large gap in the literature, and also shed light on consumer behavior in this setting. Results indicate that consumers are forward-looking and value the stream of future savings derived from energy efficiency.     

Unintended consequences of price controls: An application to allowance markets

Price controls established in a cap-and-trade allowance market are intended to reduce cost uncertainty by constraining allowance prices between a ceiling and floor; however, they could provide opportunities for strategic actions by firms that would lower government revenue and increase emissions. In particular, when the ceiling price is supported by introducing new allowances into the market, firms could choose to buy allowances at the ceiling price, regardless of the prevailing market price, in order to lower the equilibrium price of all allowances. Those purchases could either be transacted by firms intending to manipulate the market price or be induced through the introduction of inaccurate information about the cost of emissions abatement. Theory and simulations using allowance elasticity estimates for U.S. firms suggest that the manipulation could be profitable under the stylized setting and assumptions evaluated in the paper, although in practice many other conditions will determine its use.     

The case for international emission trade in the absence of cooperative climate policy

We evaluate the efficacy of international trade in carbon emission permits when countries are guided strictly by their national self-interest. To do so, we construct a calibrated general equilibrium model that jointly describes the world economy and the strategic incentives that guide the design of national abatement policies. Countries’ decisions about their participation in a trading system and about their initial permit endowment are made non-cooperatively; so a priori it is not clear that permit trade will induce participation in international abatement agreements or that participation will result in significant environmental gains. Despite this, we find that emission trade agreements can be effective; that smaller groupings pairing developing and developed-world partners often perform better than agreements with larger rosters; and that general equilibrium responses play an important role in shaping these outcomes.     

Oligopoly meets oligopsony: The case of permits

This paper derives market equilibria (in demand functions and in bidding strategies) between oligopolists and oligopsonists in a market with intermediates and no competition in final markets. To the best of my knowledge, this theme has not been explored, despite two observations: Firstly, the commonly applied framework of non-competitive and competitive fringe firms has implausible properties for the limit of purely strategic players. Secondly, real world cases correspond at least potentially to such strategic interactions, e.g., non-competitive players selling and buying permits (CO₂ and SO₂). The major implications are that these non-competitive markets are characterized by a kind of double marginalization (on the demand and the supply side) resulting in too little trade and wrong price signals.