Environmentally Virtuous Agriculture: How and When External Goods and Humility Ethically Constrain (or Favour) Technology Use

This paper concerns virtue-based ethical principles that bear upon agricultural uses of technologies, such as GM crops and CRISPR crops. It does three things. First, it argues for a new type of virtue ethics approach to such cases. Typical virtue ethics principles are vague and unspecific. These are sometimes useful, but we show how to supplement them with more specific virtue ethics principles that are useful to people working in specific applied domains, where morally relevant domain-specific conditions recur. We do this while still fulfilling the need for principles and associated practical reasoning to flexibly respect variation between cases. Second, with our more detailed approach we criticize and improve upon a commonly discussed principle about ecosystemic external goods that are crucial for human flourishing. We show this principle is far more conservative than appreciated, as it would prohibit many technology uses that are uncontroversially acceptable. We then replace this principle with two more specific ones. One identifies specific conditions in which ecosystem considerations are against a technology use, the other identifies favorable conditions. Third, we uncover a humility-based principle that operates within an influential “hubris argument” against uses of several biotechnologies in agriculture. These arguments lack a substantive theory of the nature of humility. We clarify such a theory, and then use it to replace the uncovered humility-based principle with our own more specific one that shifts focus from past moral failings, to current epistemic limits when deciding whether to support new technologies.     

Environmentalism and Public Virtue

Much of the literature addressing environmental virtue tends to focus on what might be called “personal virtue”—individual actions, characteristics, or dispositions that benefit the individual actor. There has, in contrast, been relatively little interest in either “virtue politics”—collective actions, characteristics, or dispositions—or in what might be called “public virtues,” actions, characteristics, or dispositions that benefit the community rather than the individual. This focus, however, is problematic, especially in a society that valorizes individuality. This paper examines public virtue and its role in environmental virtue ethics. First, I outline different types of virtue in order to frame the discussion of public virtues and, in particular, a subclass of virtues I will refer to as political virtue. Second, I focus on practical problems and address the inadequacy of personal virtue for effecting social change and, therefore, for addressing most environmental crises. Finally, I argue that public and political virtues are necessary, if under emphasized, conditions for the flourishing of the individual, and that they are important complements to more traditional environmental virtues.     

Biophilia as an Environmental Virtue

Beginning with E. O. Wilson’s notion of biophilia, our “innate tendency to focus on life and life-like processes,” I construct an environmental virtue with the same name that meets certain criteria an environmental virtue should meet. I argue that this virtue can have its status as a virtue by its contribution to human flourishing, while having care for live nature as its target, and care about live nature as its affective content. I explore its characteristics as both an individual and a collective virtue, and finally show how cultivation of it might serve to unite various communities in the cause of preserving biodiversity.     

Beyond “Second Animals”: Making Sense of Plant Ethics

Concern for what we do to plants is pivotal for the field of environmental ethics but has scarcely been voiced. This paper examines how plant ethics first emerged from the development of plant science and yet also hit theoretical barriers in that domain. It elaborates on a case study prompted by a legal article on “the dignity of creatures” in the Swiss Constitution. Interestingly, the issue of plant dignity was interpreted as a personification or rather an “animalization of plants.” This sense of irony makes sense when one realizes that on scientific grounds the plant is a “second animal,” i.e., it differs from the animal in degree of life or some ethically-relevant criterion but not in nature. From the point of view of ethics however, plants should be defended for what they are by nature and not by comparison to external references: the ethical standing of plants cannot be indexed to animals. It is thus reckoned that to circumvent this odd fetishism, the plant ethics can only be adequately addressed by changing the theory of plant science. Common sense tells us this: plants and animals belong to radically different fields of perception and experience, a difference that is commonly captured by the notion of kingdom. In this paper we remind the ethical conversation that plants are actually incommensurable with animals because they are unsplit beings (having neither inside nor outside), i.e., they live as “non-topos” in an undivided, unlimited, non-centered state of being. It is concluded that the unique ontology of plants can only be addressed through a major change from object-thinking to process-thinking and a move from ego-centric to “peri-ego” ethics.     

Who Loves Mosquitoes? Care Ethics,Theory of Obligation and Endangered Species

The focus of this paper is on normative ethical theories and endangered species. To be exact, I examine two theories: the theory of obligation and care ethics, and ask which is better-suited in the case of endangered species. I argue that the aretic, feminist-inspired ethics of care is well-suited in the case of companion animals, but ill-suited in the case of endangered species, especially in the case of “unlovable” species. My argument presupposes that (1) we now live an era where human disturbances to planetary ecosystems are triggering a sixth mass species extinction, and (2) widespread interventions will be needed to save many species from extinction.     

An Agrarian Imaginary in Urban Life: Cultivating Virtues and Vices Through a Conflicted History

This paper explores the influence and use of agrarian thought on collective understandings of food practices as sources of ethical and communal value in urban contexts. A primary proponent of agrarian thought that this paper engages is Paul Thompson and his exceptional book, The Agrarian Vision. Thompson aims to use agrarian ideals of agriculture and communal life to rethink current issues of sustainability and environmental ethics. However, Thompson perceives the current cultural mood as hostile to agrarian virtue. There are two related claims of this paper. The first argues that contrary to Thompson’s perception of hostility, agrarian thought is popularly and commercially mobilized among urban populations. To establish this claim I extend Charles Taylor’s notion of a social imaginary and suggest that urban agriculture can be theorized as an agrarian imaginary. Entwined with the first claim is the second, that proponents selectively use agrarian history to overemphasis a narrative of virtue while ignoring or marginalizing historical practices of agrarian violence, exclusion and dispossession. I do not discount or deny the significance of agrarian virtue. By situating agrarian thought within a clearer virtue ethics framework and acknowledging potential manifestation of agrarian vice, I suggest that the idea of agrarian virtue is strengthened.     

The Edge of “Animal Rights”

A central task of environmental ethics, which have been arising since 1960s, is to extend the objects of moral concern beyond the individuals of Homo sapiens. (Here, it involves the issue of the boundary of environmental ethics. In a narrow sense, an environmental ethic must grant moral concern to holistic environmental objects (such as ecosystems). On the other hand, if we broadly define the environmental ethic as an ethic that shows moral concern not limited to Homo sapiens and its individuals only, then, these “generalized” environmental ethics include Peter Singer’s “animal liberation” and Tom Regan’s “animal rights”. In this article, the term “environmental ethic” refers to an environmental ethic in a generalized sense.) All the objects deserving moral concern constitute the moral community. The trajectory and boundary of this extension are different among different schools. Compared to other schools, Tom Regan’s “animal rights” has a relatively smaller moral community, making it more “conservative” at first sight. Meanwhile, the rights view, like other schools, faces the question regarding the edge of moral concern. This question consists of two sub-questions: (1) where is the boundary of the moral community and (2) how ought we to treat the objects of moral concern near the boundary? Given the closeness of Regan’s theory to traditional ethics (regarding the boundary of the moral community), this study is mainly focused on analyzing the edge of moral concern within the framework of the theory of animal rights. Further, I investigate the similarities and differences in the boundary of moral concern among various schools of environmental ethics. The comparative analysis demonstrates a subtle relation between science and moral philosophy, and reveals a similar form of a metaphysical premise adopted by all environmental ethics. This research helps to clarify the moral concern of environmental ethics, which is an essential prerequisite for establishing a new ethic, and therefore helps to consolidate the reference of environmental ethics to environmental management.     

Legal and Ethical Apprehensions Regarding Relational Object. The Case of Genetically Modified Fish

This paper is the result of a contribution between ethics and law, which will be used as thought-process tools, to address the complex issue of legal and ethical statuses of GM fish. To find answers, we propose to consider this issue from a wider angle, looking at the relations between the human, animal, and living worlds. We show that it is possible to construct other forms of intellectual logic that, without setting these worlds in opposition, do not lapse into relativism where boundaries are blurred. In this sense, we submit the hypothesis that ordered pluralism should help us to move past a mere Man–Animal relationship to reveal the entire complexity of relationships within mankind and between mankind and other (non-human) worlds alongside it and to which it belongs: the animal and living worlds. With this new logic, “animal ethics” and “animal law” are re-embedded into a set of relationships. This logic emerges from a new consideration: the nature of the contemporary objects we are dealing with. We shall call objects like genetically modified fish “relational objects” in the sense that in order to be apprehended, they utilize a set of relationships of which there are just as many as the dimensions forming them, not as predicates but as primary constituents. Experimentally, in the case of GM fish, we translate this by proposing to typologize legal and ethical considerations induced by multiple relations connected to this object. According to the type of relationship in question, the GM fish will not have the same status; it is a changing object that must be suitably apprehended.     

Human Habitat,Space and Place

This article is a conceptual contribution on how to make human habitat more sustainable. Taking Heidegger’s conception of “dwelling” as a starting point, a new form of understanding the organization of the city as a human habitat is proposed. It is argued that human habitat is today in crisis and that such crisis has its roots in a spatial understanding of human dwelling, disregarding its temporal-historical dimension. For long time, the city has been considered as a physical “place” and its organization—the urban planning—has been addressed in terms of “locating” (building). Many of the challenges in organizing habitat are the result of reducing the organization of the city to the organization of physical space. One of these is the conflict between preservation and development, a central issue in approaching sustainability. The aim of this article is to propose a new perspective on the organization of human dwelling, which overcomes the spatial-based conception of habitat and involves its temporal dimension. The meaning of human “habitat” as a historical process for developing “habits” will be recovered, and the implications for organization of the city considered. Human habitat is above all an ethical space (ethos), constituted in a spatial–temporal process of developing learning and capabilities. This habitat can be shared and developed infinitely so that a pathway is opened for overcoming the logic of competition and the conflict between sustainability and development. Finally, three forms of the human habitat as an “ethical space” are proposed.     

BIODIVERSITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: A PERSONAL REFLECTION1

ABSTRACT: A forester shares personal reflections on biodiversity, finding he must deal with the question of “What is biodiversity?” before dealing with “What is biodiversity good for?” Even before that, the complexity of the scientific and social aspects of biodiversity must be looked at to set a context. The author believes that biodiversity has scientific, recreational, wildness, natural history, and spiritual values and contributes to sustainability and productivity. Aesthetic values also are found to be very important, and the author concludes “that biodiversity has values that are worth protecting, even in the face of scientific uncertainty.” Personal reflection on environmental issues is necessary to fully understand what one believes, and to be an active participant in issues of environmental ethics.     

Techno-environmental risks and ecological modernisation in “double-risk” societies: reconceptualising Ulrich Beck’s risk society thesis

By utilising a relatively underused framework developed by Maurie J. Cohen (1997. Risk society and ecological modernisation alternative visions for post-industrial nations. Futures, 29 (2), 105–119), this theoretical paper joins two of the most debated theories of environmental politics – ecological modernisation (EM) and Ulrich Beck’s risk society thesis – into a unified framework and problematises some of their implicit assumptions to theoretically introduce the notion of a “double-risk” society. In addition, it explains the differences between the traditional “Risk Society” theorised by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck and the newly introduced concept of a “double-risk” society. The arguments put forward in this paper provide some fresh perspectives facilitating the study of the techno-environmental risks and other ecological problems faced by “double-risk” societies. Theoretically, this paper adds to both EM theory and the risk society thesis as the generalisability of their existing versions is limited precisely because they fail to address some important social changes at the global structural level.     

Species Extinction and the Vice of Thoughtlessness: The Importance of Spiritual Exercises for Learning Virtue

In this paper, I present a sample spiritual exercise—a contemporary form of the written practice that ancient philosophers used to shape their characters. The exercise, which develops the ancient practice of the examination of conscience, is on the sixth mass extinction and seeks to understand why the extinction appears as a moral wrong. It concludes by finding a vice in the moral character of the author and the author’s society. From a methodological standpoint, the purpose of spiritual exercises is to create a habit of thoughtfulness in the writer, and by way of teaching, to suggest one to the reader. Such a habit is important, at least, because virtue is a habit. In other words, there can be no learning of virtue itself without habituation into it. Accordingly, I frame the sample spiritual exercise with a deliberately controversial objection to contemporary academic virtue ethics and with a justification for why the spiritual exercise is important for taking virtue ethically. And I end the paper with some further remarks explaining the form of the exercise and its relevance to doing philosophy. In this way, the paper makes and illustrates a methodological point about virtue ethics based on a meta-ethical assumption about virtue as a habit, and it does this by focusing on a pressing environmental problem in the twenty-first century.     

Toward Consensus-Based Actions that Balance Invasive Plant Management and Conservation of At-Risk Fauna

Limiting the spread of invasive plants has become a high priority among natural resource managers. Yet in some regions, invasive plants are providing important habitat components to native animals that are at risk of local or regional extirpation. In these situations, removing invasive plants may decrease short-term survival of the at-risk taxa. At the same time, there may be a reluctance to expand invaded habitats to benefit at-risk species because such actions may increase the distribution of invasive plants. Such a dilemma can result in “management paralysis,” where no action is taken either to reduce invasive plants or to expand habitats for at-risk species. A pragmatic solution to this dilemma may be to develop an approach that considers site-specific circumstances. We constructed a “discussion tree” as a means of initiating conversations among various stakeholders involved with managing habitats in the northeastern USA to benefit several at-risk taxa, including New England cottontails (Sylvilagus transitionalis). Major components of this approach include recognition that expanding some invaded habitats may be essential to prevent extirpation of at-risk species, and the effective control of invasive plants is dependent on knowledge of the status of invasives on managed lands and within the surrounding landscape. By acknowledging that management of invasive plants is a complex issue without a single solution, we may be successful in limiting their spread while still addressing critical habitat needs.     

The Epistemic Demands of Environmental Virtue

To lead an environmentally virtuous life requires information—about morality, environmental issues, the impacts of our actions and commitments, our options for alternatives, and so on. On the other hand, we are finite beings with limited time and resources. We cannot feasibly investigate all of our options, and all environmental issues (let alone moral issues, more broadly). In this paper I attempt to provide initial steps towards addressing the epistemic demands of environmental virtue. In the first half of the paper I provide rules of thumb with respect to (1) how to prioritize our investigations into various issues, and (2) what kinds of information we should seek with respect to these issues, and the levels of epistemic justification we ought to attain. In the second half of the paper, I turn to a modified virtue ethics, appealing to the attitudes of virtuous ideal observers to provide characterizations of morally justified and morally non-culpable actions. I then apply these latter concepts in assessing agents, their actions and projects (with respect to environmental virtue), in light of their investigative efforts, and given their particular circumstances.     

Response to “The Problem of the Question About Animal Ethics” by Michal Piekarski

In this brief article we reply to Michal Piekarski’s response to our article ‘Facing Animals’ published previously in this journal. In our article we criticized the properties approach to defining the moral standing of animals, and in its place proposed a relational and other-oriented concept that is based on a transcendental and phenomenological perspective, mainly inspired by Heidegger, Levinas, and Derrida. In this reply we question and problematize Piekarski’s interpretation of our essay and critically evaluate “the ethics of commitment” that he offers as an alternative.     

Facing Animals: A Relational,Other-Oriented Approach to Moral Standing

In this essay we reflect critically on how animal ethics, and in particular thinking about moral standing, is currently configured. Starting from the work of two influential “analytic” thinkers in this field, Peter Singer and Tom Regan, we examine some basic assumptions shared by these positions and demonstrate their conceptual failings—ones that have, despite efforts to the contrary, the general effect of marginalizing and excluding others. Inspired by the so-called “continental” philosophical tradition (in particular Emmanuel Levinas, Martin Heidegger, and Jacques Derrida), we then argue that what is needed is a change in the rules of the game, a change of the question. We alter the (pre-) normative question from “What properties does the animal have?” to “What are the conditions under which an entity becomes a moral subject?” This leads us to consider the role of language, personal relations, and material-technological contexts. What is needed then in response to the moral standing problem, is not more of the same—yet another, more refined criterion and argumentation concerning moral standing, or a “final” rational argumentation that would be able to settle the animal question once and for all—but a turning or transformation in both our thinking about and our relations to animals, through language, through technology, and through the various place-ordering practices in which we participate.     

Patriotism as an Environmental Virtue

Define “patriotism” as love for one’s country and devotion to its well-being. This essay contends that patriotism thus defined is a virtue and that environmentalism is one of its most important manifestations. Patriotism, as devotion to particular places and people, can occur at various levels, from the local to the national. Knowing and caring about particular places and people and working to protect them is good for us and good for them and hence a good thing overall. Knowing and caring and working less on behalf of more remote places and people is also good, since it allows us to focus our efforts, act effectively, and do more good in the world. Philosophical analyses of patriotism by Alasdair MacIntyre and Martha Nussbaum are complemented by the more “down to earth” understanding of the virtue presented here. While patriotism’s dangers are undeniable, so are the dangers stemming from lack of patriotism. The proper answer to bad patriotism is not cosmopolitanism, but good patriotism: the kind illustrated by environmental activists.     

The Ethics of Assisted Colonization in the Age of Anthropogenic Climate Change

This paper examines an issue that is becoming increasingly relevant as the pressures of a warming planet, changing climate and changing ecosystems ramp up. The broad context for the paper is the intragenerational, intergenerational, and interspecies equity implications of changing the climate and the value orientations of adapting to such change. In addition, the need to stabilize the planetary climate by urgent mitigation of change factors is a foundational ethical assumption. In order to avoid further animal and plant extinctions, or at the very least, their increased vulnerability to becoming rare and endangered; the systematic assisted colonization of “at risk” species is being seriously considered by scientists and managers of biodiversity. The more practical aspects of assisted colonization have been covered in the conservation biology literature; however, the ethical implications of such actions have not been extensively examined. Our discussion of the value issues, using a novel case study approach, will rectify the limited ethical analysis of the issue of assisted colonization of species in the face of climate change pressures. Beyond sustainability ethics, both animal and environmental ethical approaches will be used and intrinsic versus instrumental value orientations in the literature shall form the basis of our discussion. After the application of all the ethical approaches to the case studies, we conclude that without mitigation and the prospect of a future stable climate, assisted colonization will be involved in an inherently unethical process and a “move and lose it” outcome. With mitigation, there is wide-ranging ethical support for assisted colonization.     

Taming the Unruly Side of Ethics: Overcoming Challenges of a Bottom-Up Approach to Ethics in the Areas of Food Policy and Climate Change

Here, I investigate the challenges involved in addressing ethical questions related to food policy, food security, and climate change in a public engagement atmosphere where “experts” (e.g., scientists and scholars), policy-makers and laypersons interact. My focus is on the intersection between food and climate in the state of Alaska, located in the circumpolar north. The intersection of food security and climate represents a “wicked problem.” This wicked problem is plagued by “unruliness,” characterized by disruptive mechanisms that can impede how ethical issues in policy-making are broached. Unruliness is exacerbated by conditions of engagement that can be characterized as occurring in a “fog.” In this fog, interlocutors encounter both moral and epistemological conundrums. In considering how to mitigate unruliness, a bottom-up approach is recommended. I discuss “taming” strategies for addressing these ethical concerns; modest suggestions on what should be taken into count when confronting issues of science and ethics within the context of promoting greater deliberative discourse regarding food security issues at more local levels. My recommendations are made in light of developments in food policy in Alaska and may be instructive for other regions pursuing cold climate agricultural expansion, for example.     

Ryder’s Painism and His Criticism of Utilitarianism

As a member of the British Oxford Group, psychologist Richard Ryder marked the beginning of the modern animal rights and animal welfare movement in the seventies. By introducing the concept “speciesism.” Ryder contributed importantly to the expansion of this movement. Surprisingly little attention has been paid to Ryder’s moral theory, “painism”, that aims to resolve the conflict between the two predominant rival theories in animal ethics, the deontological of Tom Regan and the utilitarian of Peter Singer. First, this paper examines the kernel and historical sources of Ryder’s painist theory, linking it to the work of John Rawls and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Second, it examines Ryder’s critique of utilitarianism. It is argued that his critique of Singer’s use of the word “sentience” is unconvincing and that his critique of utilitarian aggregation as not taking a full account of the metaphysical separateness of persons, has already been countered and dealt with. Finally this paper looks at some of the counterintuitive implications of Ryder’s theory and argues that utilitarianism might have more resources for dealing with its own alleged counterintuitive implications than Ryder acknowledges.