Should the federal government subsidize industrial pollution control investment?

Tax-exempt financing of industrial pollution control equipment has increased rapidly in recent months. This method of subsidizing pollution abatement is known to be highly inefficient. If tax-exempt industrial revenue bonds were replaced by a more efficient subsidy the net financial benefits to polluting industries could probably be about doubled without any extra cost to American taxpayers. Increased utilization of an inefficient subsidy device and the international energy crisis make this a propitious time for tax experts and economists to re-examine the question, should industrial pollution control investments be subsidized?     

A note on optimal taxation of environmental spillovers

This note addresses the question of what policy the government should adopt when industrial pollution can be reduced partially by the imposition of effluent taxes and partially by a publicly operated waste treatment plant.In the case of increasing returns to public abatement, an effluent tax set at marginal user cost will not generate enough revenue to finance the facility. The key issue is that of finding additional revenue the most efficiently. Here, this question is dealt with in the framework of commodity taxation, with consideration given to the possibility that both effluent and commodity taxes derived on efficiency grounds might be quite regressive.     

Do environmental regulations disproportionately affect small businesses? Evidence from the Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures survey

This paper examines whether the impact of environmental regulations differs by the size of the business. We consider the net effect of statutory, enforcement, and compliance asymmetries by estimating the relationship between plant size and pollution abatement expenditures, using establishment-level data on U.S. manufacturers from the Census Bureau's Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) survey and from its Annual Survey of Manufactures and Census of Manufactures. We model establishments' pollution abatement operating costs (PAOC) per unit of economic activity as a function of establishment size, industry, state, and year. Our results show that PAOC intensity increases with establishment and firm size.     

Do environmental regulations disproportionately affect small businesses? Evidence from the Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures survey

This paper examines whether the impact of environmental regulations differs by the size of the business. We consider the net effect of statutory, enforcement, and compliance asymmetries by estimating the relationship between plant size and pollution abatement expenditures, using establishment-level data on U.S. manufacturers from the Census Bureau's Pollution Abatement Costs and Expenditures (PACE) survey and from its Annual Survey of Manufactures and Census of Manufactures. We model establishments' pollution abatement operating costs (PAOC) per unit of economic activity as a function of establishment size, industry, state, and year. Our results show that PAOC intensity increases with establishment and firm size.     

Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes

Assuming expected profit maximization, the behavior of the firm under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards is examined. Among other results, it is found that cost subsidies can reduce the size of violation and amount of wastes, and that the shape of the expected penalty function determines the direction of the firm response to tighter standards. Under imperfectly enforceable pollution taxes, it is found, among other results, that the firm's actual level of wastes is independent of proportional changes in the expected penalty for pollution tax evasion, and that the marginal cost of actual waste reduction equals the unit tax on reported wastes. Some normative aspects of the results are discussed.     

Ancillary benefits of reduced air pollution in the US from moderate greenhouse gas mitigation policies in the electricity sector

Actions to slow atmospheric accumulation of greenhouse gases also would reduce conventional air pollutants yielding “ancillary” benefits that tend to accrue locally and in the near-term. Using a detailed electricity model linked to an integrated assessment framework to value changes in human health, we find a tax of $25 per metric ton of carbon emissions would yield NO_x-related health benefits of about $8 per metric ton of carbon reduced in the year 2010 (1997 dollars). Additional savings of $4–$7 accrue from reduced investment in NO_x and SO₂ abatement in order to comply with emission caps. Total ancillary benefits of a $25 carbon tax are $12–$14, which appear to justify the costs of a $25 tax, although marginal benefits are less than marginal costs. At a tax of $75, greater total benefits are achieved but the value per ton of carbon reductions remains roughly constant at about $12.     

Optimal quasi-market choice in the presence of pollution externalities

When the relationship between emissions and ambient pollution is known, it is possible to implement a program to achieve economically efficient pollution levels, even when the control agency knows nothing about the victim's valuation of pollution damages or about emission abatement costs. Unlike a Pigouvian tax, the program provides the correct incentives for entry and exit whether or not marginal damages from a firm's emissions vary over the range of these emissions. Through the provision of “missing” markets, sizable revenues are raised while allocative distortions are corrected.     

Efficiency of pollution taxation and market structure

This paper looks at the performance of a uniform pollution tax in achieving a given level of pollution abatement at least cost. It is shown that market structure is an important consideration in this performance and that in general least-cost abatement will not result from a pollution tax uniformly applied. The pattern of pollution taxes that will achieve least-cost abatement when differing degrees of market power exist among polluters is developed and discussed.     

Pigou meets Mirrlees: On the irrelevance of tax distortions for the second-best Pigouvian tax

This paper extends the Mirrlees (1971) model of optimal income redistribution with optimal corrective taxes to internalize consumption externalities. Using general utility structures and exploring both linear and non-linear taxes, it is demonstrated that the optimal second-best tax on an externality-generating good should not be corrected for the marginal cost of public funds, since it equals one in the optimal tax system. In the optimum, distortions of income taxes are equal to marginal redistributional gains. If the government does not have access to a non-distortionary marginal source of finance, the marginal cost of public funds can be either larger or smaller than one depending on subjective preferences for income redistribution. The optimal second-best corrective tax is then either higher or lower than the Pigouvian level. The findings in this paper generalize and amend prior results based on representative-agent models, shedding new light on the weak double-dividend hypothesis, and on the welfare gains of recycling revenue from environmental taxes.     

Can pollution tax rebates protect low-wage earners?

Pollution taxes are believed to burden low-income households that spend a greater than average share of income on pollution-intensive goods. Some proposals offset that effect by returning revenue to low-income workers via reduced labor tax. We build analytical general equilibrium models with both high-skilled and low-skilled labor, and we solve for the change in real net wage of each group. Decomposition shows the separate effects of the tax rebate, higher product prices, and the changes in relative wage rates. We also include numerical examples. Even though the pollution tax injures both types of labor, in most cases we find that returning all of the revenue to low-skilled workers is still not enough to offset higher product prices. Changes in relative wage rates may further hurt low-skilled labor. Protecting low-income workers is possible in this model only if they are defined as those below a relatively low wage threshold, but we discuss many possible elaborations of this model that could affect those results.     

Markets and environmental management with a storable pollutant

Lee [J. Environ. Econ. Manag., in press] investigates possibilities where pollutants may be stored for a period of time and later released into the environment when adverse effects are minimal. The treatment and storage of pollutants before their release into the environment is a crucial part of many abatement programs. Surprisingly, emission charges will not induce optimal abatement when storage is possible. This occurs because the firms' response to the dynamic tax is indeterminant. We suggest alternative controls, whereby rights to emit pollutants are sold competitively and demonstrate that markets provide incentives for the optimal generation-storage-emission of pollution by firms. In deriving this result an important difference between markets and taxes is revealed. With markets there is still indeterminacy at the firm level, but the aggregate response of all firms is dictated by market forces that insure pollution is reduced by some desired amount.     

Environmentally Sensitive Productivity Analysis of the Canadian Pulp and Paper Industry, 1959-1994: An Input Distance Function Approach

This study employs a parametric input distance function that incorporates both desirable and undesirable outputs to provide a more complete representation of the production technology from which environmentally sensitive productivity and efficiency measures can be generated. This framework also generates pollution abatement cost estimates that are useful for policy making. An input-based Malmquist index of productivity growth that appropriately credits the producer not only for increases in marketable or desirable outputs but also for the production of improved environmental quality through pollution abatement activities is derived from the input distance function. The method was applied to time series data from the Canadian pulp and paper industry. Our shadow price estimates indicate that the marginal cost to producers of pollution control has been rising. The main conclusion of this study is that productivity improvement, from the social viewpoint, has been stronger than conventional measures would suggest.     

Pollution Taxes and Pollution Abatement in an Oligopoly Supergame

This paper investigates the effects of an emissions tax on the incentives for oligopolists to acquire alternative pollution abatement technologies. The analysis is conducted in terms of a repeated game and it is demonstrated that there are circumstances in which the firms may reject the option of acquiring the pollution abatement equipment, even when this lowers their production costs.     

Incentives to diffuse advanced abatement technology under environmental liability law

Polluting firms with advanced abatement technology at their disposal have incentives or disincentives to share this technology with other polluting firms. The ‘direction’ and extent of those incentives depends on the liability rule applicable and the way technical change impacts marginal abatement costs. We establish that incentives for diffusion are socially optimal under strict liability and socially suboptimal under negligence if technical change lowers marginal abatement costs for all levels of abatement. Negligence may, however, induce better diffusion incentives than strict liability if technical change decreases (increases) marginal abatement costs for low (high) levels of abatement.     

Cost-effective environmental policy: implications of induced technological change

Cost-effective environmental policy generally requires that all emission sources are faced with the same tax. In this paper I discuss how the existence of induced technological change may alter this result, if at least some of the effect is external to the firm. Focusing on Learning by doing (LBD) effects in abatement activities, it is shown that emission sources with external learning effects should be faced with a higher tax than emission sources with only autonomous technological change. By using simple numerical simulations, it is further investigated to what degree a cost-effective climate policy differs from a free quota market, under various assumptions about learning effects, diffusion of technology and environmental targets. The results indicate that optimal taxes may be significantly higher in the industrial world than in the developing world. Moreover, the industrial world's share of global abatement may be much higher in a cost-effective solution than in a free quota market. The global cost savings of a fully flexible implementation of the Kyoto Protocol are further questioned, as potential spillover effects of technological growth in the industrial world are not internalised in the market.     

Instrument Choice When Regulators and Firms Bargain

We compare outcomes with an emissions tax and an emissions standard when a firm and regulator engage in cooperative bargaining over the stringency of the regulation. Bargaining is motivated by giving the firm a choice of abatement technologies. If the firm's preferred technology differs from the regulator's, the first-best outcome is not an equilibrium of the traditional noncooperative game in which the regulator is a Stackelberg leader. The regulator may therefore choose to offer the firm a more lenient regulation if it agrees to switch technologies. We find that the resulting bargaining outcomes differ for a tax and a standard even though information is symmetric, and we identify conditions under which each instrument yields lower social costs.     

城市大气污染治理规划方法

本文介绍了用于治理发展中国家城市大气污染的规划方法。它通过对城市大气污染的现状进行定量分析，确定主要污染分担源。用基础削减量、平权削减量、源强和经济优化削减量综合确定城市削减排放总量以及分配排放量的削减方案和筹集削减排放量的经费。     

Dynamic incentive regulation of diffuse pollution

Diffuse pollution from agriculture and extractive industries reduces air and water quality and contributes to climate change. We consider a setting in which a regulator must incentivize unobserved abatement given that firms have limited liability, and when they can enter and exit. We demonstrate that a simple dynamic incentive scheme can solve this difficult regulatory problem: firms pay a constant tax and receive rebates following periods of low pollution. We apply the model to water pollution from a fracking operation and simulate the contract to explore the volatility of the firm's payments and the costs of limited liability.     

The efficiency value of effluent tax revenues

The concept of the efficiency value of effluent tax revenues is developed. It is defined as the reduction in excess burden resulting from the substitution of these revenues for current or future resource distorting tax revenues, such as those raised from federal corporate and personal income taxes. The annual efficiency value of revenues raised by national effluent taxes on two major air pollutants is estimated to range from $0.63 to $3.05 billion, if substituted for federal personal income tax revenue, and from $1 to $4.87 billion, if substituted for corporate income tax revenue, expressed in 1982 dollars. Thus previous estimates of the efficiency gain from substitution of an effluent tax scheme for current pollution regulation policy have been too low, because the efficiency value of the tax revenues has been excluded.     

Pollution taxes and standards: A continuum of quasi-optimal solutions

A generalized second-best problem, involving a perfectly competitive industry which produces a pollution type of externality, is examined. The pollution tax is allowed to assume an arbitrary value (possibly zero), while a pollution standard, set as a ratio of pollution to output, is determined by a first-order optimizing condition. The general condition for a set of quasi-optimal solutions includes the Pareto-optimal solution as a special case. It is also found that when the pollution tax is below the optimal level, the usual implication is that the standard should be set so that the marginal cost of pollution reduction exceeds the marginal external damage.