An Ex Post Evaluation of Ohio’s Great Miami Water Quality Trading Program1

Newburn, David A. and Richard T. Woodward, 2011. An Ex Post Evaluation of Ohio’s Great Miami Water Quality Trading Program. Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 48(1): 156‐169. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2011.00601.x Abstract: Market‐based approaches to address water quality problems have resulted in only limited success, especially in trading programs involving both point and nonpoint sources. We analyze one of the largest point‐nonpoint trading programs – the Great Miami Trading Program in Ohio, administered by the Miami Conservancy District (MCD). Our evaluation focuses on the economic and institutional aspects of the program, including cost effectiveness, efficiency of bidding, transaction costs, trading ratios, and innovation. We use a unique dataset consisting of all bids from agricultural nonpoint sources and interviews of soil and water conservation district (SWCD) agents in the watershed. We find that the MCD’s reliance on county‐level SWCD offices to recruit and advise farmers has been essential to achieve relatively high rates of farmer participation. Additionally, the MCD is able to partly free ride on the administrative costs that SWCD offices receive to assist federal conservation programs, which is helpful to lower costs for a fledgling trading program. However, the involvement of SWCD offices reduced the potential cost savings from the reverse auction structure because some agents were able to learn about the threshold price over the six rounds of bidding and help farmers bid strategically. Overall, the program structure serves as an effective model for future trading programs in other regions that seek to involve agricultural nonpoint sources.     

Point‐Nonpoint Trading – Can It Work?1

Ribaudo, Marc O. and Jessica Gottlieb, 2011. Point‐Nonpoint Trading – Can It Work? Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 47(1):5‐14. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2010.00454.x Abstract: Water quality trading between point and nonpoint sources is of great interest as an alternative to strict command and control regulations on point sources for achieving water quality goals. The expectation is that trading will reduce the costs of water quality protection, and may speed compliance. The United States Environmental Protection Agency has issued guidance to the States on developing point‐nonpoint trading programs, and United States Department of Agriculture is encouraging farmer participation. However, existing point‐nonpoint trading programs have resulted in very few trades. Supply side and demand side impediments seem to be preventing trades from occurring in most trading programs. These include uncertainty over the number of discharge allowances different management practices can produce, high transactions costs of identifying trading partners, baseline requirements that eliminate low‐cost credits, the reluctance of point sources to trade with unfamiliar agents, and the perception of some farmers that entering contracts with regulated point sources leads to greater scrutiny and potential future regulation. Many of these problems can be addressed through research and program design.     

Economic and Ecological Rules for Water Quality Trading1

Horan, Richard D. and James S. Shortle, 2011. Economic and Ecological Rules for Water Quality Trading. Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 47(1):59‐69. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2010.00463.x Abstract: Emissions trading in textbook form uses markets to achieve pollution targets cost‐efficiently. This result is accomplished in markets that regulators can implement without knowing pollution abatement costs. The theoretical promise of emissions trading, along with real‐world success stories from air emissions trading, has led to initiatives to use trading for water pollution control. Yet, trading, particularly when it involves nonpoint sources of pollution, requires significant departures from the textbook concept. This paper explores how features of water quality problems affect the design of markets for water pollution control relative to textbook emissions markets. Three fundamental design tasks that regulators must address for pollution trading to achieve an environmental goal at low cost are examined: (1) defining the point and nonpoint commodities to be traded, (2) defining rules governing commodity exchange, and (3) setting caps on the commodity supplies so as to achieve an environmental target. We show that the way in which these tasks are optimally addressed for water quality markets differs significantly from the textbook model and its real‐world analogs. We also show that the fundamental appeal of emissions trading is lost in the case of realistic water quality markets, as market designs that reduce the costs of achieving water quality goals may no longer be implementable without the regulatory authority having information on abatement costs.     

Achieving Nutrient Water Quality Goals: Bringing Market‐Like Principles to Water Quality Management*1

Abstract: Market‐like trading programs for water quality management begin with enforceable limits on the amount of the pollutant allowed in a watershed. Properly designed market‐like trading programs then create incentives for dischargers to reduce nutrient control costs over time by making pollution prevention innovations. However, the structure of the Clean Water Act can be a barrier to establishing market‐like trading programs. First, we describe the general features and advantages of market‐like trading programs. Then we offer practical suggestions for bringing market‐like design concepts to nutrient trading programs within the existing legal and regulatory setting.     

ADDRESSING TOTAL PHOSPHORUS IMPAIRMENTS WITH WATER QUALITY TRADING1

ABSTRACT: Water quality trading is a voluntary economic process that provides an opportunity for dischargers to reduce the costs associated with meeting a discharge limitation. Trading can provide a cost effective solution for point sources (i.e., wastewater treatment plants) to meet strict effluent limitations set in response to total maximum daily loads (TMDLs). A successful trading program often depends on first determining the trading suitability of a pollutant for a particular watershed. A simple technical approach has been developed to identify sub‐watersheds within the Raritan River Basin, New Jersey, where water quality trading could provide a cost effective and scientifically feasible method for addressing total phosphorus impairments. The methodology presented will serve as a model to conduct similar analyses in other watersheds. The Raritan River Basin was divided into 12 subwatershed‐based study areas. Point‐nonpoint source trading opportunities were examined for each study area by examining the point and nonpoint source total phosphorus loading to impaired water bodies. Of the 12 subwatersheds examined, four had a high potential for implementing a successful trading program. Since instream phosphorus concentrations are closely related to soil erosion, an additional analysis was performed to examine soil erodibility. Recommendations are presented for conducting an economic analysis following the feasibility study.     

Evidence Supporting Cap and Trade as a Groundwater Policy Option for Reducing Irrigation Consumptive Use1

Thompson, Christopher L., Raymond J. Supalla, Derrel L. Martin, and Brian P. McMullen, 2009. Evidence Supporting Cap and Trade as a Groundwater Policy Option for Reducing Irrigation Consumptive Use. Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 45(6):1508‐1518. Abstract: In the American West water is becoming an increasingly scarce resource. Obligations to bordering states, endangered species protection, and long‐term resource sustainability objectives have created a need for most western states to reduce the consumption of irrigation water. In Nebraska specifically, the Nebraska Department of Natural Resources (NDNR) and local Natural Resource Districts (NRDs) are meeting a large part of this need by using a regulatory approach, commonly called groundwater allocation. The cost of allocation, which occurs in the form of reduced economic returns to irrigation, could be greatly reduced by using an integrated cap and trade approach. Much like environmental cap and trade programs which are used to reduce the cost of limiting environmental pollution, the trading of capped groundwater allocations can reduce the cost of limiting water use. In an analysis of a typical case in the Nebraska Republican Basin, we found that the impact of a water market to trade groundwater allocations depended on the size of the allocation and on the characteristics of the land and irrigation systems involved in the trade. Potential economic benefits from trade ranged from US$0 to US$120 per 1,000 cubic meters traded, from US$25 to US$250 per 1,000 cubic meters of reduction in consumptive use, and from US$16 to US$50 per hectare of irrigated land in the region. The highest benefits occurred at relatively high allocations, which capped withdrawals at 65‐75% of the expected unrestricted pumping level. These gains from trade would be split between buyers and sellers based on the negotiated selling price.     

Where Did the Agricultural Nonpoint Source Trades Go? Lessons from Virginia Water Quality Trading Programs

Governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and agricultural organizations promote water quality trading programs as an innovative policy to engage agricultural producers in conservation activities. Cost analyses suggest regulated sources can reduce compliance costs by purchasing agricultural nonpoint source credits. Yet, such “point‐nonpoint” trades are rare. This article assesses the demand for agricultural nonpoint sources in well‐developed nutrient trading programs in Virginia for industrial and municipal wastewater treatment plants, municipal stormwater programs, and land developers. Evidence suggests nutrient trading programs in Virginia will not stimulate investments in pollutant reduction practices on working agricultural lands. The lack of demand for agricultural nonpoint source credits can be attributed to a substantial degree to the design features and incentives present in multiple overlapping regulatory programs. The legal setting that dampens regulated source demand for nonpoint source credits in Virginia is broadly representative of conditions found elsewhere in the United States.     

A Watershed Approach to Improve Water Quality: Case Study of Clean Water Services’ Tualatin River Program1

Cochran, Bobby and Charles Logue, 2011. A Watershed Approach to Improve Water Quality: Case Study of Clean Water Services’ Tualatin River Program. Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 47(1):29‐38. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2010.00491.x Abstract: Over the last five years, Clean Water Services developed and implemented a program to offset thermal load discharged from its wastewater facilities to the Tualatin River by planting trees to shade streams and augmenting summertime instream flows. The program has overcome challenges facing many of the nation’s water quality trading programs to not only gain consensus on the frameworks needed to authorize trading, but also provide a broad range of ecosystem services. This paper compares the Tualatin case study with some of the commonly cited factors of successful trading programs.     

Sociopolitical Conditions for Successful Water Quality Trading in the South Nation River Watershed,Ontario, Canada1

O’Grady, Dennis, 2011. Sociopolitical Conditions for Successful Water Quality Trading in the South Nation River Watershed, Ontario, Canada. Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 47(1):39‐51. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2010.00511.x Abstract: The South Nation River watershed has a regulated water quality trading program. Legally, wastewater dischargers must not discharge any increased loading of phosphorus (P) into receiving waters. New wastewater systems are now choosing trading instead of traditional P removal technology, and point source dischargers are buying P credits from rural landowners, primarily farmers. These credits are generated by constructing nonpoint source pollution control measures. Mathematical formulae are used to calculate the credits of P removed by each measure. A successful trading program requires several conditions, including community agreement, legislative backing, credit and cost certainty, simplified delivery and verification, written instruments, and legal liability protection. South Nation Conservation, a community‐based watershed organization, is the broker handling the transactions for these P credits. The program is run by a multi‐stakeholder committee, and all project field visits are done by farmers and not paid professionals. An independent evaluation showed higher opinions for the broker and regulatory agency, and most farmers were willing to, or had already, recommended the program to other farmers.     

Water Quality Model Uncertainty Analysis of a Point‐Point Source Phosphorus Trading Program1

Kardos, Josef S. and Christopher C. Obropta, 2011. Water Quality Model Uncertainty Analysis of a Point‐Point Source Phosphorus Trading Program. Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 47(6):1317–1337. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2011.00591.x Abstract: Water quality modeling is a major source of scientific uncertainty in the Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) process. The effects of these uncertainties extend to water quality trading programs designed to implement TMDLs. This study examines the effects of water quality model uncertainty on a nutrient trading program. The study builds on previous work to design a phosphorus trading program for the Nontidal Passaic River Basin in New Jersey that would implement the watershed TMDL for total phosphorus (TP). The study identified how water quality model uncertainty affects outcomes of potential trades of TP between wastewater treatment plants. The uncertainty analysis found no evidence to suggest that the outcome of trades between wastewater treatment plants, as compared with command and control regulation, will significantly increase uncertainty in the attainment of dissolved oxygen surface water quality standards, site‐specific chlorophyll a criteria, and reduction targets for diverted TP load at potential hot spots in the watershed. Each simulated trading scenario demonstrated parity with or improvement from the command and control approach at the TMDL critical locations, and low risk of hot spots elsewhere.     

A Recourse‐Based Interval Fuzzy Programming Model for Point‐Nonpoint Source Effluent Trading under Uncertainty

In this study, a recourse‐based interval fuzzy programming (RIFP) model is developed for tackling uncertainties expressed as fuzzy, interval, and/or probabilistic forms in an effluent trading program. It can incorporate preregulated water‐pollution control policies directly into its optimization process, such that an effective linkage between environmental regulations and economic implications (i.e., penalties) caused by improper policies due to uncertainty existence can be provided. The RIFP model is applied to point‐nonpoint source effluent trading of the Xiangxi River in China. The efficiency of trading efforts between water quality improvement and net system benefit under different degrees of satisfying discharge limits is analyzed. The results are able to help support (1) formulation of water‐pollution control strategies under various economic objectives and system‐reliability constraints, (2) selection of the desired effluent trading pattern for point and nonpoint sources, and (3) generation of tradeoffs among system benefit, satisfaction degree, and pollutant mitigation under multiple uncertainties. Compared with the traditional regulatory approaches, the results demonstrate that the water‐pollution control program can be performed more cost‐effectively through trading than nontrading.     

Exploring Nontraditional Participation as an Approach to Make Water Quality Trading Markets More Effective

Water quality trading (WQT) has the potential to be a low‐cost means for achieving water quality goals. WQT allows regulated wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs) facing discharge limits the flexibility to either reduce their own discharge or purchase pollution control from other WWTPs or nonpoint sources (NPSs) such as agricultural producers. Under this limited scope, programs with NPSs have been largely unsuccessful at meeting water quality goals. The decision to participate in trading depends on many factors including the pollution control costs, uncertainty in pollution control, and discharge limits. Current research that focuses on making WQT work tends to identify how to increase participation by traditional traders such as WWTPs and agricultural producers. As an alternative, but complementary approach, we consider whether augmenting WQT markets with nontraditional participants would help increase the number of trades. Determining the economic incentives for these potential participants requires the development of novel benefit functions requiring not only economic considerations but also accounting for ecological and engineering processes. Existing literature on nontraditional participants in environmental markets tends to center on air quality and only increasing citizen participation as buyers. Here, we consider the issues for broadening participation (both buyers and sellers) in WQT and outline a multidisciplinary approach to begin evaluating feasibility.     

LAWS AND PROGRAMS FOR CONTROLLING NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION IN FOREST AREAS1

ABSTRACT: Recent federal legislation strengthened nonpoint source pollution regulations and helped to support and standardize pollution control efforts. A comprehensive review of current state and federal programs for forest areas reveals a substantial increase in agency water quality protection activities. These new efforts emphasize monitoring to assess the use and effectiveness of best management practices (BMPs). Recent monitoring reveals that BMP use is increasing and that such use typically maintains water quality within standards. However, information is generally lacking about the cost effectiveness of BMP programs. Carefully designed and executed monitoring is the key to better specification of BMPs and more cost effective water quality protection. (KEY TERMS: water quality; nonpoint source pollution; water law; watershed management; forestry; best management practices.)     

Clean Water State Revolving Fund Loans and Landowner Investments in Agricultural Best Management Practices in Iowa1

Arbuckle, Jr., J. Gordon, 2012. Clean Water State Revolving Fund Loans and Landowner Investments in Agricultural Best Management Practices in Iowa. Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 1‐9. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752‐1688.2012.00688.x Abstract: Clean Water State Revolving Fund (CWSRF) loan programs for water quality have traditionally funded infrastructure projects at the community, municipality, or state level. They are increasingly being used to support individual landowner adoption of agricultural best management practices (BMPs) for nonpoint source pollution abatement. In 2005, the Iowa CWSRF initiated the Local Water Protection Program (LWPP) to increase the scope, scale, and rate of agricultural BMP establishment. This research examines the effectiveness of that program through a comparison of survey data from LWPP participants and state cost‐share recipients who were eligible for loans, but did not take them. Loan recipients’ assessments of the program were overwhelmingly positive, with near‐universal satisfaction with both the loan product and process. Results of statistical analyses indicate that loan recipients invested substantially more in conservation than nonrecipients. Evidence suggests that by helping program participants to overcome financial constraints, loans are facilitating larger and accelerated investments in conservation. Although findings indicate that conservation loans can play an important role in funding conservation, loan recipients also still depend on cost‐share. Loans are not necessarily a substitute for traditional forms of conservation funding, but rather another tool that landowners and conservation professionals can employ to facilitate investments in BMPs.     

COST‐EFFECTIVE POINT‐NONPOINT TRADING: AN APPLICATION TO THE SUSQUEHANNA RIVER BASIN1

ABSTRACT: Point‐nonpoint trading has been suggested as a relatively efficient approach for reducing nutrient pollution in the Chesapeake Bay and elsewhere. However, relatively little economic research has examined the design of trading programs involving nonpoint sources. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the economics of several fundamental design choices for point‐nonpoint trading programs. The Susquehanna River Basin (SRB) in Pennsylvania as an example, although many of the insights should generally apply to other regions as well.     

Management of Water Shortage in the Colorado River Basin: Evaluating Current Policy and the Viability of Interstate Water Trading1

Wildman, Richard A., Jr. and Noelani A. Forde, 2012. Management of Water Shortage in the Colorado River Basin: Evaluating Current Policy and the Viability of Interstate Water Trading. Journal of the American Water Resources Association (JAWRA) 48(3): 411-422. DOI: 10.1111/j.1752-1688.2012.00665.x Abstract: The water of the Colorado River of the southwestern United States (U.S.) is presently used beyond its reliable supply, and the flow of this river is forecast to decrease significantly due to climate change. A recent interim report of the Colorado River Basin Water Supply and Demand Study is the first acknowledgment of these facts by U.S. federal water managers. In light of this new stance, we evaluate the current policy of adaptation to water shortages in the Colorado River Basin. We find that initial shortages will be borne only by the cities of Arizona and Nevada and farms in Arizona whereas the other Basin states have no incentive to reduce consumptive use. Furthermore, the development of a long-term plan is deferred until greater water scarcity exists. As a potential response to long-term water scarcity, we evaluate the viability of an interstate water market in the Colorado River Basin. We inform our analysis with newly available data from the Murray-Darling Basin of Australia, which has used interstate water trading to create vital flexibility during extreme aridity during recent years. We find that, despite substantial obstacles, an interstate water market is a compelling reform that could be used not only to adapt to increased water scarcity but also to preserve core elements of Colorado River Basin law.     

Baseline requirements can hinder trades in water quality trading programs: Evidence from the Conestoga watershed

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) are promoting point/nonpoint trading as a way of reducing the costs of meeting water quality goals. Farms can create offsets by implementing management practices such as conservation tillage, nutrient management and buffer strips. To be eligible to sell offsets or credits, farmers must first comply with baseline requirements. USEPA guidance recommends that the baseline for nonpoint sources be management practices that are consistent with the water quality goal. A farmer would not be able to create offsets until the minimum practice standards are met. An alternative baseline is those practices being implemented at the time the trading program starts, or when the farmer enters the program. The selection of the baseline affects the efficiency and equity of the trading program. It has major implications for which farmers benefit from trading, the cost of nonpoint source offsets, and ultimately the number of offsets that nonpoint sources can sell to regulated point sources. We use a simple model of the average profit-maximizing dairy farmer operating in the Conestoga watershed in Pennsylvania to evaluate the implications of baseline requirements on the cost and quantity of offsets that can be produced for sale in a water quality trading market, and which farmers benefit most from trading.     

POINT‐NONPOINT SOURCE WATER QUALITY TRADING: A CASE STUDY IN THE MINNESOTA RIVER BASIN1

ABSTRACT: Contrary to the general trend of only a few actual trades occurring within point‐nonpoint source water quality trading programs in the United States, two trading projects in the Minnesota River Basin, created under the provisions of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits, have generated five major trades and numerous smaller ones. In this paper, these two projects are described to illustrate their origins, implementation, and results. It was found that several factors contributed to the relatively high number of trades in these projects, including the offsetting nature of the projects (hence a fixed number of credits that the point sources were required to obtain), readily available information on potential nonpoint source trading partners, and an effectively internal trading scheme used by one of the two projects. It was also found that long term structural pollution control measures, such as streambank stabilization, offered substantial cost savings over point source controls. Estimates of transaction costs showed that the total costs of the trading projects were increased by at least 35 percent after transaction costs were taken into account. Evidence also showed that in addition to pollution reduction, these two trading projects brought other benefits to the watershed, such as helping balance environmental protection and regional economic growth.     

Policy Utopias for Nutrient Credit Trading Programs with Nonpoint Sources

A promising program to address water contamination from nutrients is water quality trading (WQT), whereby entities with high abatement costs purchase credits from entities with lower abatement costs. The concept has found some success with point source water pollution, but very few trades have occurred in over 50 programs in the United States (U.S.) that have focused on nonpoint sources (NPSs). To understand why success has been slow, we identified three environments needed for programs to succeed: physical, economic, and institutional. We estimate that only 5% of watersheds in the U.S. currently listed as nutrient impaired provide a viable physical environment for trading nitrogen; 13% are suitable for phosphorus. Economic and institutional challenges would shrink that domain even further. Therefore, we find places with the ideal physical, economic, and institutional environments necessary for feasible WQT programs are virtual policy utopias — rare places with ideal environments. Fortunately, a growing literature provides the tools necessary to identify where these policy utopias are and to expand that domain through a better understanding about how to manage WQT programs more effectively.     

STRATEGIES TO CONTROL NONPOINT SOURCE WATER POLLUTION1

ABSTRACT: Strategies for controlling nonpoint sources of water pollution are discussed in terms of three representative states and eighteen regional agencies. The programs in Virginia, New York, and Wisconsin are seen to exhibit control options which range from voluntary action to strict regulation. Four conclusions are drawn from the analysis. First, nonpoint sources of pollution are a major component of the overall water pollution problem in the three states. Second, technical controls are generally available to solve the problems. Third, existing controls programs are not necessarily technologically sound or cost effective. Finally, existing control programs are capable of instituting solutions to the problems if and only if specified actions take place within the respective states and regions in the future. Critical research needs are identified which will assist states and regions in developing cost effective programs to control nonpoint source pollution.