Competitive investment in clean technology and uninformed green consumers

In a market where consumers and the regulatory authorities are not fully informed about the actual production technology or environmental performance of firms that engage in strategic competition, I study the effect of environmental consciousness of consumers on firms׳ incentive to invest in cleaner technology. Firms compete in prices and may signal their environmental performance to uninformed consumers through prices. I also analyze the effect of an expected liability on firms in this setting. Compared to full information, incomplete information generates higher strategic incentive to invest in cleaner technology particularly when consciousness and/or expected liability are not too high. Requiring mandatory disclosure of technology or environmental performance may discourage such investment. Even though consumers and the regulator are uninformed, competition has a positive effect (relative to monopoly) on the incentive to invest.     

Investment in cleaner technology and signaling distortions in a market with green consumers

I analyze the pricing and investment behavior of a firm that signals the environmental attributes of its production technology through its price to uninformed environmentally conscious consumers. I then analyze the effect of change in environmental regulation on the signaling outcome and the firm's ex ante incentive to invest in cleaner technology. When regulation is weak, a firm signals cleaner technology through higher price; in this case, the firm earns lower profit when it has cleaner technology and thus, has no incentive to invest in cleaner technology. The price charged by the clean firm declines sharply beyond a critical level of regulation. When regulation is sufficiently stringent, the firm with cleaner technology charges lower price but earns higher signaling profit, and ex ante the firm has positive incentive to invest in cleaner technology. With weak regulation, the incentive of the firm to directly disclose its environmental performance rather than signal it through price is increasing in the level of regulation; the opposite holds when regulation is sufficiently stringent.     

Investment in cleaner technology and signaling distortions in a market with green consumers

I analyze the pricing and investment behavior of a firm that signals the environmental attributes of its production technology through its price to uninformed environmentally conscious consumers. I then analyze the effect of change in environmental regulation on the signaling outcome and the firm's ex ante incentive to invest in cleaner technology. When regulation is weak, a firm signals cleaner technology through higher price; in this case, the firm earns lower profit when it has cleaner technology and thus, has no incentive to invest in cleaner technology. The price charged by the clean firm declines sharply beyond a critical level of regulation. When regulation is sufficiently stringent, the firm with cleaner technology charges lower price but earns higher signaling profit, and ex ante the firm has positive incentive to invest in cleaner technology. With weak regulation, the incentive of the firm to directly disclose its environmental performance rather than signal it through price is increasing in the level of regulation; the opposite holds when regulation is sufficiently stringent.     

Market interactions,farmers' choices,and the sustainability of growing advanced biofuels: a missing perspective?

Advanced biofuels such as cellulosic ethanol are of great interest in the USA. With agriculture being the major source of feedstock for advanced biofuels, how farmers would respond to markets and policy incentives in providing such feedstock can directly affect sufficient and sustainable supply of advanced biofuels and their environmental sustainability. In this study, we developed an economic model to examine farmers' production choices in a context where agricultural markets are linked to energy markets. We identified the economic conditions under which farmers could maximize their profits by converting current grain cropland to grow cellulosic biomass crops. An empirical illustration showed that with current technology, farmers are unlikely to grow switchgrass as a dedicated energy crop instead of corn on cropland. The biofuel incentives in the 2008 Farm Bill can improve the competitiveness of switchgrass, but may stimulate corn production as well, with corn residues as an alternative feedstock for advanced biofuels. The continuous, possibly expanding, corn production in future raises the same issues for advanced biofuels as for corn grain-based ethanol. To assure the environmental sustainability of advanced biofuel production, further research is needed to help design environmental policies alongside existing biofuel initiatives.     

Community pressure for green behavior

The desire to avoid rousing community hostility may encourage firms to behave in an environmentally responsible manner. Firms may engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) to maintain community support and/or to regain the support of a community where it has been lost. It has been conjectured that such ‘informal regulation’ could effectively replace formal intervention in some settings, and usefully complement it in others. We explore these conjectures with mixed results. Informal regulation is necessarily less efficient than a well-designed formal alternative and the pattern of green behavior induced by the threat of community hostility may increase or decrease welfare. The existence of community pressure may increase or decrease the optimal calibration of a formal intervention (in this case an environmental tax) and may complement or detract from the incentives generated by an optimally calibrated tax.     

A Note on Environmental Federalism: Interpreting Some Contradictory Results

This paper reconciles some conflicting interpretations of recent literature on interjurisdictional environmental regulatory competition.[6], [7]present a model in which competition to attract investment by lowering environmental standards leads to a Pareto-optimal equilibrium. [3]; and [4]describe a model in which such competition can result in a suboptimal Nash equilibrium. While it would be possible to draw opposite policy implications from the two models regarding the appropriate degree of environmental federalism, such a conclusion would be incorrect. This paper reconciles the different results by showing that they depend in large part on monopoly profits and tax exporting, not the nature of the pollution externality or environmental federalism.     

An environmental tax-shift with indirect desirable effects

Imposing environmental taxation on external costs of energy will not only affect the environmental impact of the energy sector itself, but it will tend to decrease environmental damage from other sectors of the economy as well. We have assessed the effects of a shift of taxation from taxing labour to taxation of external costs caused in the energy sector. Several examples give results compatible with the hypothesis that the changing price relation between labour and energy resulting from such a tax shift will make re-use, repairs and recycling increasingly competitive and thus tend to decrease mining as well as waste production. Likewise, less energy-intensive commodities and services in general would become increasingly competitive, and would tend to decrease the environmental load further. These environmentally desirable effects are beyond the taxed external effects of the energy sector itself and occur as an indirect effect of the increased relative price of energy.     

Community pressure for green behavior

The desire to avoid rousing community hostility may encourage firms to behave in an environmentally responsible manner. Firms may engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR) to maintain community support and/or to regain the support of a community where it has been lost. It has been conjectured that such ‘informal regulation’ could effectively replace formal intervention in some settings, and usefully complement it in others. We explore these conjectures with mixed results. Informal regulation is necessarily less efficient than a well-designed formal alternative and the pattern of green behavior induced by the threat of community hostility may increase or decrease welfare. The existence of community pressure may increase or decrease the optimal calibration of a formal intervention (in this case an environmental tax) and may complement or detract from the incentives generated by an optimally calibrated tax.     

Plant vintages, grandfathering, and environmental policy

Environmental regulations that grandfather existing plants, by not holding them to the same strict standards as new plants, may have the unintended consequence of retarding new investment. If new plants are cleaner, then this effect may increase pollution in the short run. I develop a dynamic model of a facility’s decisions over scrapping and abatement, which depend on capital depreciation, profitability shocks, and environmental policy. Using data from fossil fuel fired boilers at electric power plants, I estimate the structural parameters of the model and assess the impact of grandfathering in the Clean Air Act on sulfur dioxide emissions. Counterfactual policy simulations show that an increase in the stringency of performance standards would have led to a decrease in investment in new boilers. However, this does not lead to increased emissions, since there is less investment in dirtier coal boilers as compared to relatively cleaner oil or natural gas boilers.     

Providing the Spark: Impact of financial incentives on battery electric vehicle adoption

To overcome adoption barriers and promote battery electric vehicles (BEVs) as an energy efficient consumer transportation option, a number of states offer subsidies to consumers for BEVs. We use a national data set of vehicle registrations and state-level financial incentives to assess the impact of vehicle purchase subsidies on adoption using both difference-in-differences and synthetic controls methods. We find that incentives offered as direct purchase rebates generate increased levels of new BEV registrations at a rate of approximately 8 percent per thousand dollars of incentive offered. Between 2011 and 2015, vehicle rebate incentives are associated with an increase in overall BEV registrations of approximately 11 percent. Our findings indicate incentives offered as state income tax credits do not have a statistically significant effect on BEV adoptions, though we caution this may be a result of limited temporal variation in BEV incentives across our sample. Responses to rebate incentives do not differ significantly by the make of the vehicle purchased (i.e., Tesla and non-Tesla vehicles). We combine our results with recent assessments of marginal environmental costs of electric vehicle charging and measure net welfare effects of BEV subsidy programs. Our analysis indicates these programs are not welfare-improving if only considering benefits associated with avoided emissions. Additional benefits associated with long-term market growth, production cost savings, network externalities, or accelerated innovation could substantially impact the net welfare outcomes.     

Oil Exploration under Climate Treaties

In this paper we focus on how an international climate treaty will influence the exploration of oil in non-OPEC countries. We present a numerical intertemporal global equilibrium model for the fossil fuel markets. The international oil market is modelled with a cartel (OPEC) and a competitive fringe on the supply side, following a Nash–Cournot approach. An initial resource base for oil is given in the non-OPEC region. However, the resource base changes over time due to depletion, exploration, and discovery. When studying the effects of different climate treaties on oil exploration, two contrasting incentives apply. If an international carbon tax is introduced, the producer price of oil will drop compared to the reference case. This gives an incentive to reduce oil production and exploration. However, the oil price may increase less rapidly over time, which gives an incentive to expedite production and exploration. In fact, in the case of a rising carbon tax we find the last incentive to be the strongest, which means that an international climate treaty may increase oil exploration in non-OPEC countries for the coming decades and reduce OPEC's market share.     

Household Location Choices: Implications for Biodiversity Conservation

Abstract: Successful conservation efforts require understanding human behaviors that directly affect biodiversity. Choice of household location represents an observable behavior that has direct effects on biodiversity conservation, but no one has examined the sociocultural predictors of this choice relative to its environmental impacts. We conducted a case study of the Teton Valley of Idaho and Wyoming (U.S.A.) that (1) explored relationships between sociodemographic variables, environmental attitudes, and the environmental impact of household location choices, (2) assessed the potential for small household sizes in natural areas to multiply the environmental impacts of household location decisions, and (3) evaluated how length of residency predicted the environmental attitudes of people living in natural areas. We collected sociodemographic data, spatial coordinates, and land‐cover information in a survey of 416 households drawn from a random sample of Teton Valley residents (95% compliance rate). Immigrants (respondents not born in the study area) with the lowest education levels and least environmentally oriented attitudes lived in previously established residential areas in disproportionately high numbers, and older and more educated immigrants with the most environmentally oriented attitudes lived in natural areas in disproportionately high numbers. Income was not a significant predictor of household location decisions. Those living in natural areas had more environmental impact per person because of the location and because small households (<3 people/household) were 4 times as likely in natural areas as large households. Longer residency in natural areas predicted less environmentally oriented attitudes, suggesting that living in natural areas does not foster more concern for nature. Because populaces are rapidly aging, growing more educated, and potentially growing more environmentally oriented, these patterns are troubling for biodiversity conservation. Our results demonstrate a need for environmentalists to make household location decisions that reflect their environmental attitudes and future research to address how interactions between education level, environmental attitudes, population aging, and household location choices influence biodiversity conservation.     

Environmental Policy and International Trade when Governments and Producers Act Strategically

Some environmentalists express concern that trade liberalization may damage the environment by giving governments incentives to relax environmental policies to give domestic producers a competitive advantage. Support for such concern may be given by models of imperfectly competitive trade where there may be “rent-shifting” incentives for governments to relax environmental policies. But there are also incentives for producers to act strategically, e.g., through their investment in R&D, and in this paper I extend the literature on strategic environmental policy by allowing for strategic behavior by producers as well as governments. I show that (i) allowing for producers to act strategically on balance reduces the incentive for governments to act strategically; (ii) allowing governments to act strategically increases the incentive for producers to act strategically; (iii) welfare is lower when both parties act strategically; and (iv) strategic behavior by producers and governments is greater when governments use emission taxes than when they use emission standards.     

Learning abatement costs: On the dynamics of the optimal regulation of experience goods

We study the introduction of new technologies when their costs are subject to idiosyncratic uncertainty and can only be fully learned through individual experience. We set up a dynamic model of clean experience goods that replace old polluting consumption options and show how optimal regulation evolves over time. In our base setting where social and private learning incentives coincide, the optimal tax on the polluting consumption is increasing over time. We show, however, that if social and private learning incentives diverge because the private discount rate exceeds the social discount rate, it may be optimal to temporarily increase the tax rate beyond net marginal external damages to induce more learning before reducing the tax rate to the steady state level. Alternatively, one could complement the tax with subsidies for first-time users which can be phased out over time. Similar results apply if consumers have biased expectations. We therefore give a rationale for introductory subsidies on new, clean technologies and non-monotonic tax paths from a perspective of consumer learning.     

Alternative transportation fuel standards: Welfare effects and climate benefits

This paper develops an integrated model of the fuel and agricultural sectors to analyze the welfare and greenhouse gas emission (GHG) effects of the existing Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), a Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) and a carbon price policy. The conceptual framework shows that these policies differ in the incentives they create for the consumption and mix of different types of biofuels and in their effects on food and fuel prices and GHG emissions. We also simulate the welfare and GHG effects of these three policies which are normalized to achieve the same level of US GHG emissions. By promoting greater production of food-crop based biofuels, the RFS is found to lead to a larger reduction in fossil fuel use but also a larger increase in food prices and a smaller reduction in global GHG emissions compared to the LCFS and carbon tax. All three policies increase US social welfare compared to a no-biofuel baseline scenario due to improved terms-of-trade, even when environmental benefits are excluded; global social welfare increases with a carbon tax but decreases with the RFS and LCFS due to the efficiency costs imposed by these policies, even after including the benefits of mitigating GHG emissions.     

Towards sustainability: Objectives,strategies and barriers for cleaner production in China

The paper explores the objectives, strategies and barriers to cleaner production (CP) implementation in China. Successful demonstration projects in China have shown that CP is a strategy for reducing pollution and costs, increasing competitiveness and achieving an integrated balance between economic and environmental benefits. As such, it is an inevitable choice and important contribution to sustainable development. However, it has not progressed enough as a strategy for continuous improvement since its effects are limited to industrial sectors or regions. CP implementation can be assisted by further popularization, policy system improvement, perception and awareness raising and technology innovation. These dimensions are the key tasks and incentives for all levels of government, enterprises and social organizations in moving toward sustainability.     

Energy taxes and endogenous technological change

This paper studies the effects of a tax on energy use in a growth model where market structure is endogenous and jointly determined with the rate of technological change. Because this economy does not exhibit the scale effect (a positive relation between TFP growth and aggregate R&D), the tax has no effect on the steady-state growth rate. It has, however, important transitional effects that give rise to surprising results. Specifically, under the plausible assumption that energy demand is inelastic, there may exist a hump-shaped relation between the energy tax and welfare. This shape stems from the fact that the reallocation of resources from energy production to manufacturing triggers a temporary acceleration of TFP growth that generates a √-shaped time profile of consumption. If endogenous technological change raises consumption sufficiently fast and by a sufficient amount in the long run, and households are sufficiently patient, the tax raises welfare despite the fact that—in line with standard intuition—it lowers consumption in the short run.     

Pollution Taxes and Pollution Abatement in an Oligopoly Supergame

This paper investigates the effects of an emissions tax on the incentives for oligopolists to acquire alternative pollution abatement technologies. The analysis is conducted in terms of a repeated game and it is demonstrated that there are circumstances in which the firms may reject the option of acquiring the pollution abatement equipment, even when this lowers their production costs.     

Tax evasion and optimal environmental taxes

This paper introduces a new argument to the debate about the role of environmental taxes in modern tax systems. Some environmental taxes, particularly taxes on gasoline or electricity, are more difficult to evade than taxes on labor or income. When the tax base is shifted in a revenue-neutral manner toward these environmental taxes, the result is a net reduction in the amount of tax evasion. Using a carbon tax as a motivating example, the “tax evasion effect” is shown to sharply reduce the welfare cost of controlling emissions. A simple computable general equilibrium model suggests that the impact of considering tax evasion can be large: costs are lowered by 28% in the United States, by 89% in China, and by 97% in India. In countries with high levels of pre-existing tax evasion, a carbon tax will pay for itself through improvements in the efficiency of the tax system.     

A note on permits, standards, and technological innovation

Montero (J. Environ. Econom. Manage. 44 (2002) 23) contrasts the incentives to invest in new abatement technologies under different regulatory instruments and argues that one needs to consider the induced output effects that derive from lower abatement costs. Montero shows that, once one takes into account these effects on output, command-and-control instruments can generate stronger incentives to innovate than market-based instruments. This result rests on strategic output effects under command-and-control. However, he maintains that, under perfectly competitive conditions, market-based instruments will continue to weakly dominate command-and-control regulation. This note clarifies two issues raised by Montero. First, I use Montero's approach to show that in fact performance (concentration) standards will generate greater incentives to innovate than market-based instruments in perfectly competitive markets. One does not require strategic effects to get this result. Second, Montero abstracts from production costs and concentrates solely on abatement costs. He implicitly assumes that marginal production costs are constant. I show that some of Montero's results change once increasing marginal production costs are considered. When marginal costs are increasing, the benefit of additional output is tempered and market-based instruments again look more favorable.