Transferable discharge permits and economic efficiency: The fox river

Recent emphasis on reforms of environmental regulation has led to suggestions for strategies which maintain environmental standards but allow the needed flexibility and cost effectiveness. The transferable discharge permit (TDP) is one such strategy for water pollution control recently adopted in Wisconsin. In this article, the potential for substantial cost savings from trading TDPs is demonstrated using data on the Fox River in Wisconsin. A simulation model of water quality (Qual-III) and a linear programming model of abatement costs determine the optimum pattern of discharge. Reaching that optimum from proposed pollution abatement orders is shown to be feasible. Varying conditions of flow and temperature can be accommodated using trade coefficients which can be accurately estimated through interpolation. The calculations demonstrate the value and feasibility of flexible regulations governing water pollution abatement.     

The abatement of major pollutants in air and water by environmental catalysis

This review reports the research progress in the abatement of major pollutants in air and water by environmental catalysis. For air pollution control, the selective catalytic reduction of NO _x (SCR) by ammonia and hydrocarbons on metal oxide and zeolite catalysts are reviewed and discussed, as is the removal of Hg from flue gas by catalysis. The oxidation of Volatile organic compounds (VOCs) by photo- and thermal-catalysis for indoor air quality improvement is reviewed. For wastewater treatment, the catalytic elimination of inorganic and organic pollutants in wastewater is presented. In addition, the mechanism for the procedure of abatement of air and water pollutants by catalysis is discussed in this review. Finally, a research orientation on environment catalysis for the treatment of air pollutants and wastewater is proposed.     

Optimal Institutional Arrangements for Transboundary Pollutants in a Second-Best World: Evidence from a Differential Game with Asymmetric Players

This paper uses a dynamic model with asymmetric players to explore the question: In a second-best world, should environmental regulations for transboundary pollutants be carried out locally or centrally? We find that combined payoffs are larger with decentralized control if payoffs are sufficiently heterogeneous and initial pollution stocks are sufficiently small. This result is obtained because the central authority applies one shadow price to pollution (i.e., it uses uniform standards), whereas local authorities use different shadow prices, and therefore different standards.     

Emission standards and price distortion

A simple model is presented which demonstrates that emission standards can either reduce or increase the distortions inherent in preregulatory relative prices. This model is used in conjunction with data for controlling air pollution in the St. Louis airshed under a least-cost set of emission standards. By applying a heuristic formula, it is concluded that this set of standards is distortion neutral. Although there is reason to believe that conventional emission standards are distortion reducing, it is clear that Pigouvian fees achieve technical efficiency in abatement as well as the elimination of price distortion.     

Plant vintage, technology, and environmental regulation

We use data on productivity and pollution abatement costs at individual pulp and paper mills to test whether the impact of environmental regulation on productivity differs by plant vintage and technology. Plants with higher pollution abatement costs have significantly lower productivity levels. This relationship differs greatly based on a plant's technology, with productivity at integrated mills being greatly affected by abatement costs, while the impact at non-integrated mills is negligible. Plant vintage does not seem to matter, with older and newer plants showing similar impacts. Reported abatement costs appear to substantially understate the true costs of abatement. Accounting for the impact of technology differences makes some difference in the estimated overall impact of environmental regulation.     

Prices vs quantities with multiple pollutants

We examine the choice of policy instruments (price, quantity or a mix of the two) when two pollutants are regulated and firms' abatement costs are private information. Whether abatement efforts are complements or substitutes is key determining the choice of policies. When pollutants are complements, a mixed policy instrument with a tax on one pollutant and a quota on another is sometimes preferable even if the pollutants are identical in terms of benefits and costs of abatement. Yet, if they are substitutes, the mixed policy is dominated by taxes or quotas.     

The effects on electricity prices in england and wales of notional sulphur dioxide emission standards for power stations

Reducing emissions of sulphur dioxide from the electricity industry in England and Wales would require application of abatement technology and raise electricity prices through increases in marginal supply costs. Capital and operating costs of alternative abatement techniques and their application under possible long-term investment and retirement plans for the industry are discussed. An approximate halving of projected emissions is found to have an effect of the order of 5% on prices under the existing tariff structure. Reductions of up to one-fifth are found to have an effect of under 1% on electricity prices.     

An Equilibrium Framework for Global Pollution Problems

The paper analyzes global pollution problems from the point of view of the benefit approach to the allocation of public costs. Special attention is paid to the possibility that the optimum abatement vector may have negative elements. An appropriate cost-share equilibrium is defined and characterized, and conditions under which the equilibrium is beneficial to all parties are derived. An implementation mechanism whose Nash equilibrium yields positive abatement levels under appropriate conditions is described.     

Trade''s Dynamic Solutions to Transboundary Pollution

This study develops a differential game to examine the effects of trade liberalization on transboundary water pollution. Water pollution is due to wastewater emissions from countries in a shared waterway along the U.S.–Mexico border with available data of pollution abatement costs, public health damages, and trade benefits. Noncooperative and cooperative games are examined with changes in trade policy and public health damages. Results show trade liberalization leads Mexico to curtail pollution in both games. Cooperation and trade liberalization limit emissions from both countries and curtail strategic behavior of the United States from Mexico's pollution control efforts in the noncooperative game.     

河流中的BOD模型及其应用

本文将入流点源或主要支流作为一条新河段 并将分布水源的影响范围视为整条河流,既可避免S—P方程无法反映沿河污染排放态的缺陷.又可解决BOD修正模型计算繁杂的缺陷.建立在此基础上的各种BOD分布模型,具有较好的回归性和可操作性,反映了有机物随时间和空间的迁移转化.这些模式的提出,可为评价和选择污染物控制方案,制订排放标准,提供一个定量的科学依展     

On marketable air-pollution permits: The case for a system of pollution offsets

After examining the properties of several alternative forms of marketable permit systems for the control of air pollution, this paper proposes a system of pollution offsets as the most promising approach. Under the pollution-offset scheme, sources of emissions are free to trade emissions permits subject to the constraint of no violations of the predetermined air-quality standard at any receptor point. The paper shows that the pollution-offset system has the capacity to achieve the predetermined standards of air quality at the minimum aggregate abatement cost, while making comparatively modest demands both on the sources and on the administering agency.     

Robust technology policy against emission leakage: The case of upstream subsidies

Asymmetric regulation of a global pollutant between countries can alter the competitiveness of industries and lead to emissions leakage, which hampers countries’ welfare. In order to limit leakage, governments consider supporting domestic trade-exposed firms by subsidizing their investments in abatement technology. The suppliers of such technologies tend to be less than perfectly competitive, particularly when both emissions regulations and advanced technologies are new. In this context of twin market failures, we consider the relative effects and desirability of subsidies for abatement technology. We find a more robust recommendation for upstream subsidies than for downstream subsidies. Downstream subsidies tend to increase global abatement technology prices, reduce pollution abatement abroad and increase emission leakage. On the contrary, upstream subsidies reduce abatement technology prices, and hence also emissions leakage.     

Pollution Taxes and Pollution Abatement in an Oligopoly Supergame

This paper investigates the effects of an emissions tax on the incentives for oligopolists to acquire alternative pollution abatement technologies. The analysis is conducted in terms of a repeated game and it is demonstrated that there are circumstances in which the firms may reject the option of acquiring the pollution abatement equipment, even when this lowers their production costs.     

Markets and environmental management with a storable pollutant

Lee [J. Environ. Econ. Manag., in press] investigates possibilities where pollutants may be stored for a period of time and later released into the environment when adverse effects are minimal. The treatment and storage of pollutants before their release into the environment is a crucial part of many abatement programs. Surprisingly, emission charges will not induce optimal abatement when storage is possible. This occurs because the firms' response to the dynamic tax is indeterminant. We suggest alternative controls, whereby rights to emit pollutants are sold competitively and demonstrate that markets provide incentives for the optimal generation-storage-emission of pollution by firms. In deriving this result an important difference between markets and taxes is revealed. With markets there is still indeterminacy at the firm level, but the aggregate response of all firms is dictated by market forces that insure pollution is reduced by some desired amount.     

珠三角地区POPs农药的污染现状及控制对策

概述了中国及国际社会对持久性有机污染物（Persistent Organic Pollutants,POPs）的关注情况。并通过对POPs农药在珠江三角洲地区（Pearl River Delta Area,PRD）使用情况的调查，以及对珠江三角洲地区POPs农药在各环境介质中的污染现状的文献综述，结合环境污染数据以及POPs农药污染调查工作中得到的数据和信息，对该地区POPs污染的可能原因和环境中可能存在的新近污染源进行了初步探讨。同时也指出了当前珠江三角洲地区在POPs农药削减与淘汰工作中所遭遇到的缺乏完善的管理体系等困难，并针对问题提出了包括加大科研投入，加强基础研究，掌握污染物来源和去向，加强替代药物的研究，建立和实施更严格的环境法规以及标准，加强环境监测能力建设，建立POPs农药污染的信息公开机制等一系列的控制对策。     

A note on permits, standards, and technological innovation

Montero (J. Environ. Econom. Manage. 44 (2002) 23) contrasts the incentives to invest in new abatement technologies under different regulatory instruments and argues that one needs to consider the induced output effects that derive from lower abatement costs. Montero shows that, once one takes into account these effects on output, command-and-control instruments can generate stronger incentives to innovate than market-based instruments. This result rests on strategic output effects under command-and-control. However, he maintains that, under perfectly competitive conditions, market-based instruments will continue to weakly dominate command-and-control regulation. This note clarifies two issues raised by Montero. First, I use Montero's approach to show that in fact performance (concentration) standards will generate greater incentives to innovate than market-based instruments in perfectly competitive markets. One does not require strategic effects to get this result. Second, Montero abstracts from production costs and concentrates solely on abatement costs. He implicitly assumes that marginal production costs are constant. I show that some of Montero's results change once increasing marginal production costs are considered. When marginal costs are increasing, the benefit of additional output is tempered and market-based instruments again look more favorable.     

我国海水水质基准的构建:以三丁基锡为例

我国近岸海域污染形势严峻、污染物种类繁多、生态健康风险复杂,现有的海水水质标准难以满足当前海洋环境污染评价、管理和监控的需求,亟需适宜我国海洋区系特征的海水水质基准作为水质标准修订与制定的理论依据.借鉴美国、欧盟和荷兰等国家水质基准的制定方法,提出了构建我国海水水质基准的思路,并给出了数值型双值基准的数据要求、定值方法和相应的计算模式等.以三丁基锡化合物(TBT)为例,按照论文建立的方法,计算了保护我国海洋水生生物的TBT基准.结果表明:我国TBT化合物海水水质基准高值(HSWC)和海水水质基准低值(LSWC)分别为0.43μg·L-1和0.002μg·L-1,与美国,加拿大和英国等国家的推荐基准值略有不同.研究结果将为我国海水水质基准的制定与研究提供帮助.     

Dynamic incentive regulation of diffuse pollution

Diffuse pollution from agriculture and extractive industries reduces air and water quality and contributes to climate change. We consider a setting in which a regulator must incentivize unobserved abatement given that firms have limited liability, and when they can enter and exit. We demonstrate that a simple dynamic incentive scheme can solve this difficult regulatory problem: firms pay a constant tax and receive rebates following periods of low pollution. We apply the model to water pollution from a fracking operation and simulate the contract to explore the volatility of the firm's payments and the costs of limited liability.     

The optimality and feasibility of uniform air pollution controls

An optimal control problem is developed which minimizes both the social damages of pollution concentrations and the private costs of emission abatement subject to a differential equation relating emissions and concentrations. A specific use of the model is to analyze the optimality and feasibility of uniform controls on emissions and concentrations across an air shed.     

城市大气污染治理规划方法

本文介绍了用于治理发展中国家城市大气污染的规划方法。它通过对城市大气污染的现状进行定量分析，确定主要污染分担源。用基础削减量、平权削减量、源强和经济优化削减量综合确定城市削减排放总量以及分配排放量的削减方案和筹集削减排放量的经费。