A rising tide raises all boats: Regional promotion of process safety through joint government/industry management

With the development of increasingly complex processes and technologies in chemical and manufacturing industries, Process Safety Management (PSM) has been globally recognized as the primary tool for operating companies to reduce process accidents on their industrial sites and the risks posed to their employees and surrounding communities. Yet, industrial facilities are often interdependent and collocated with others. Recognizing this, regional authorities are also applying PSM principles to reduce the cumulative incidents associated with high density industrial areas and the multiplicative risks posed to broader communities. This paper compares Strathcona County Emergency Service (SCES) in Alberta, Contra Costa County Health Service Hazard Material Programs (CCCHSHMP) in California, and Technical Standards & Safety Authority (TSSA) in Ontario and their PSM systems to provide practical recommendations to improve SCES's system. Four aspects of PSM are considered: regulation and guidance, auditing and inspection, annual performance indicators, and public participation. Based on the results of this comparison, we recommend that SCES develop comprehensive PSM regulations based on CSA Z767-17 PSM including clear instructions for assessing technologies and methodologies for consequence analysis. Both worst-case scenarios and alternative scenarios need to be considered as well as the domino effect of primary accidents. Furthermore, regular audits and inspections will ensure compliance with PSM regulations while helping the design of planning, performing, and following-up strategies to ensure effectiveness. In addition, we suggest the use of lagging and leading performance indicators to evaluate the performance of the PSM program. Finally, we recommend using advisory councils or commissions to increase public participation and ensure the representation of stakeholders' perspectives with the PSM system.     

Enhancing regional process safety management

As industrial operations expand, major incidents continue to affect people, damage facilities, and impact the environment. In the last 20 years, about 50% of these incidents occurred in facilities that had implemented some form of Process Safety Management (PSM) and 50% came about in smaller facilities that did not include such planning (Demichela et al., 2004). The objective of this article is to use PSM principles to create practical recommendations at the regional level, to complement those previously developed for singular facilities. This article compares Strathcona County Emergency Service (SCES) in Alberta with Technical Standards & Safety Authority (TSSA) in Ontario, with respect to safety, facility licensing, permit requirements, risk assessment procedures and land use planning aspects to determine PSM enhancements for SCES. Furthermore, for a better overview, two supplemental provincial organisations in Alberta, namely Alberta Boiler Safety Association (ABSA) and Safety Codes Council (SCC), were also considered. We proposed that SCES could develop more detailed facility-specific licensing procedures, auditing, and inspection. SCES could also provide details of accredited organisations that carry out inspections and audits on their behalf. When reviewing the quantitative risk assessment processes for SCES and TSSA, we recommend that SCES should update their probability data sources used in their cumulative risk assessment study. Based on the authors’ experience and gathered data, the use of additional facility practices such as safety management system, internal audits, and checklists can enhance incident prevention.     

Factors contributing to US chemical plant process safety incidents from 2010 to 2020

Process safety incidents can result in injuries, fatalities, environmental impacts, facility damage, downtime & lost production, as well as impacts on a company's and industry's reputation. This study is focused on an analysis of the most commonly reported contributing factors to process safety incidents in the US chemical manufacturing industry. The database for the study contained 79 incidents from 2010 to 2019, partly investigated by the Chemical Safety Board (CSB). To be included in the study, the CSB archive of incident investigations were parsed to include only incidents which occurred at a company classified as 325 in the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS), assigned to businesses that participate in chemical manufacturing. For each incident, all of the identified contributing factors were catalogued in the database. From this list of identified contributing factors, it was possible to name the ‘top three’ contributing factors. The top three contributing factors cited for the chemical manufacturing industry were found to be: design; preventive maintenance; and safeguards, controls & layers of protection. The relationship between these top contributing factors and the most common OSHA citations was investigated as well. The investigation and citation history for NAICS 325 companies in the Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) citations database was then analysed to assess whether there was any overlap between the top reported contributing factors to process safety events and the top OSHA citations recorded for the industry. A database consisting of the inspection and citation history for the chemical manufacturing industry identified by NAICS code 325 was assembled for inspections occurring between 2010 and 2020 (August). The analysis of the citation history for the chemical manufacturing industry specifically, identified that the list of the top contributing factors to process safety incidents overlapped with the most common OSHA violations. This finding is relevant to industry stakeholders who are considering how to strategically invest resources for achieving maximum benefit – reducing process safety risk and simultaneously improving OSHA citation history.     

Managing process chemicals,technology and equipment information for pilot plant based on Process Safety Management standard

Injuries, accidents or even fatalities while working in pilot plant are reported worldwide. The OSHA Laboratory Standard and Hazard Communication Standard have been used as a guideline to manage safety of laboratories and pilot plant. In spite of the implementation of these standards, incidents which result in injuries and property loss are continuously occurring. The implementation of OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) Standard in pilot plant is expected to further reduce the risks of accidents. This paper presents a new system for managing process chemicals, technology and equipment information in pilot plant and the concept is developed based on Process Safety Information (PSI) element of PSM 29 CFR 1910.119(d). It provides organized strategies to manage documentations, communicate information, and written program for maintaining, revising and updating related information. Process and Instrumentation Diagram (P&ID) is used as a foundation for data management. Implementation of this system at the CO₂ Hydrocarbon Absorption System pilot plant as a case study is examined and discussed.     

Application of social network theory to prioritizing Oil & Gas industries protection in a networked critical infrastructure system

As a typical process industry, the Oil & Gas industries play a key role within a networked critical infrastructure system in terms of their interconnection and interdependency. While the tight coupling of infrastructures increases the efficiency of infrastructure operations, interdependency between infrastructures may cause cascading failure of infrastructures. The interdependency between critical infrastructures gives rise to an infrastructure network. In this paper, we apply social network analysis, an analytical tool used by social scientists, to study human interactions and to analyze characteristics of the critical infrastructure network. We identify Oil & Gas, Information & Communication Technologies (ICT), and Electricity as three infrastructures that are most relied upon by other infrastructures, thus these may cause the greatest cascading failure of the infrastructures. Among the three, we further determine that Oil & Gas and Electricity are the more vulnerable infrastructures. As a result, priority toward critical infrastructure protection should be given to the Oil & Gas and Electricity infrastructures since they are most relied upon but at the same time depend more on other infrastructures.     

The effectiveness of U.S. OSHA process safety management inspection – A preliminary quantitative evaluation

This study attempted to evaluate the inspection effectiveness of the U.S. OSHA process safety management (PSM) standard using statistical correlation test. A total of 6578 citations of past 1277 OSHA PSM inspections from 1992 to 2006 were quantitatively compared with the findings of the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) investigations on root and contributing causes of 19 major chemical accidents. Nonparametric Spearman's coefficient of rank correlation tests showed a moderately strong agreement between OSHA PSM inspection citations and CSB findings at p < .01 significant level, and the degree of agreement increased with time. These results suggested that past OSHA PSM inspections had cited the problems that were the accident root causes, and the effectiveness of PSM citations has been improved as more inspections were conducted since the standard promulgation. However, factors such as standard coverage, inspection frequency, inspection resources allocation, and inspection strategy, were critical for effective PSM standard enforcement and implementation. Future studies should include more aspects of PSM citations and CSB accident investigation data for better evaluation of inspection effectiveness. The results may be valuable to the PSM enforcement policy makers.     

The effective control of major industrial accidents by the Major Industrial Accident Prevention Centers (MAPC) through the Process Safety Management (PSM) grading system in Korea

This paper examines effectiveness of a regulatory enforcement organization (Major industrial Accident Prevention Center, MAPC), and a grading system for implementation of the Process Safety Management (PSM) regulation in Korea. A lot of chemical installations have been built in Korea since the 1960s. The frequent occurrence of major industrial accidents had made people's concerns grow. The Korean government enacted PSM regulations in 1996 in order to curb these accidents.However, a key question is how to make sure companies comply with the PSM regulations. In order to improve company’ compliance with PSM regulations the Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOEL) responsible for the regulation introduced a grading management system in 2001 and then established special supervisory centers for enforcement of PSM regulations in 2005. This paper reviews the role and effectiveness of the system in term of PSM enforcement. The author found that the grade-based approach has encouraged employers to implement the requirements of the PSM regulations. MAPCs play an effective role in enhancing enforcement performance. Although the more chemical plants have been established in Korea, the fewer major industrial accidents have occurred since the introduction of the system. The results may be useful for the policy maker to build an effective and efficient enforcement system.     

Risk assessment and risk reduction of an acrylonitrile production plant

Reducing accident occurrence in petrochemical plants is crucial, thus appropriately allocating management resources to safety investment is a vital issue for corporate management as international competition intensifies. Understanding the priority of safety investment in a rational way helps achieve this objective.In this study, we targeted an acrylonitrile plant. First, Dow Chemical's Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI) identified the reaction process as having the greatest physical risk. We evaluated the severity of accidents in the reaction process using the Process Safety Metrics advocated by the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS); however, this index does not express damages a company actually experience. To solve this problem, we proposed a new metric that adds indirect cost to CCPS metrics. We adopted fault tree analysis (FTA) as a risk assessment method. In identifying top events and basic events, we attempted to improve the completeness of risk identification by considering accidents from the past, actual plant operation and equipment characteristics, natural disasters, and cyber-attacks and terrorist attacks. Consequently, we identified the top events with high priority in handling because of serious accidents as fire/explosion outside the reactor, fire/explosion inside the reactor, and reactor destruction. The new CCPS evaluation index proposed in this study found that fire and explosion outside the reactor has the highest severity. We considered the creation of the fault tree (FT) diagram of the top event, estimating the occurrence probability, and identifying the risk reduction part and capital investment aimed at risk reduction. As an economically feasible selection method for risk reduction investment, using the difference in loss amounts before and after safety investments indicated investment priority.     

基于层次分析法的石油污染土壤修复植物评价

为解决石油污染土壤原位修复时出现的修复植物选取工作量大、耗时长等问题,采用层次分析法和优劣解距离法建立了一套石油污染土壤修复植物评价体系,结合四川长宁页岩气井场现状,在使用层次分析法确定了各指标权重的基础上,利用优劣解距离法对初始备选植物进行排序;并利用权重敏感性分析和室内试验校核。结果表明,排序与试验结果基本一致,该评价体系具有可行性。     

Understanding the patterns and characteristics of Natech events in China

With the frequent occurrence of natural disasters, natural hazard triggered technological accident (Natech) risk has attracted extensive attention from academia and industry. Natech events have the characteristics of various inducements and consequences, cascading chain reactions, and complex spatial interleaving, which leads to serious consequences. The Natech event is constantly threatening China's industrial safety production. However, the systematic analysis of Natech events in China is still lacking. The study counted 288 cases in the past 20 years and constructed Natech databases. Based on the theory of risk chain and risk system, a systematic horizontal and vertical analysis was developed for the first time. It aims to understand the characteristics of Natech events in terms of temporal and spatial, hazard factors, industry and risk material, consequences and hazard. In the results, Natech events showed a fluctuating trend. The southwest region (28.13%) and the middle Yellow River region (21.18%) belong to the critical control areas. China's industries were seriously affected by the disasters of meteorological (43.75%) and secondary, especially in the Chemical & Petrochemical and manufacturing. 64.58% of Natech events caused environmental pollution, and 13.19% of Natech events caused major or above consequences. Oil (31.25%) and hazardous chemicals (28.47%) were the main substances causing pollution, fire and explosion, which need to be controlled. The research preliminarily clarifies the risk chain and characteristics of Natech events, which provided the basis for Natech risk assessment.     

Maintenance-related major accidents: Classification of causes and case study

The potential for major accidents is inherent in most industries that handle or store hazardous substances, for e.g. the hydrocarbon and chemical process industries. Several major accidents have been experienced over the past three decades. Flixborough Disaster (1974), Seveso Disaster (1976), Alexander Kielland Disaster (1980), Bhopal Gas Tragedy (1984), Sandoz Chemical Spill (1986), Piper Alpha Disaster (1988), Philips 66 Disaster (1989), Esso Longford Gas Explosion (1998), Texas City Refinery Explosion (2005), and most recently the Macondo Blowout (2010) are a few examples of accidents with devastating consequences.Causes are being exposed over time, but in recent years maintenance influence tends to be given less attention. However, given that some major accidents are maintenance-related, we intend to concentrate on classifying them to give a better insight into the underlying and contributing causes.High degree of technological and organizational complexity are attributes of these industries, and in order to control the risk, it is common to deploy multiple and independent safety barriers whose integrity cannot be maintained without adequate level of maintenance. However, maintenance may have a negative effect on barrier performance if the execution is incorrect, insufficient, delayed, or excessive. Maintenance can also be the triggering event.The objectives of this article are: (1) To investigate how maintenance impacts the occurrence of major accidents, and (2) To develop classification schemes for causes of maintenance-related major accidents.The paper builds primarily on model-based and empirical approaches, the latter being applied to reports on accident investigation and analysis. Based on this, the Work and Accident Process (WAP) classification scheme was proposed in the paper.     

Process safety challenges for SMEs in China

While process safety regulations and standards have been in place in western countries for more than two decades, China has only recently started to officially embrace these issues with the adoption of its Process Safety Management (PSM) regulation AQ/T 3034-2010 (SAWS, 2010). However, compliance with this regulatory framework requires substantial resources and may therefore appear too complex to be efficiently implemented by small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the chemical sector. This is of particular relevance as about 99% of chemical companies in China are SMEs, accounting for more than 80% of all chemical accidents. To address this issue, additional local regulations and planning activities related to process safety have been implemented in China, including the establishment of hundreds of chemical industry parks. Some of the process safety problems faced by chemical industry parks are identified and discussed in this paper. To help solve these problems, UNEP's “Responsible Production approach for Chemical Hazards Management along the Value-Chain” is introduced in this paper and suggested as a simplified PSM approach targeted specifically at SMEs which, regardless of handling hazardous chemicals in their daily operations, may not have the knowledge or capacity to efficiently implement PSM and may not fall in the scope of the PSM regulation AQ/T 3034-2010. By introducing PSM to SMEs in a more manageable way, relevant steps can be progressively implemented by companies towards full compliance with the current regulatory framework, contributing to increased safety in chemical industry parks in China.     

A comparative analysis of process safety management (PSM) systems in the process industry

The root cause of most accidents in the process industry has been attributed to process safety issues ranging from poor safety culture, lack of communication, asset integrity issues, lack of management leadership and human factors. These accidents could have been prevented with adequate implementation of a robust process safety management (PSM) system. Therefore, the aim of this research is to develop a comparative framework which could aid in selecting an appropriate and suitable PSM system for specific industry sectors within the process industry. A total of 21 PSM systems are selected for this study and their theoretical frameworks, industry of application and deficiencies are explored. Next, a comparative framework is developed using eleven key factors that are applicable to the process industry such as framework and room for continuous improvement, design specification, industry adaptability and applicability, human factors, scope of application, usability in complex systems, safety culture, primary or secondary mode of application, regulatory enforcement, competency level, as well as inductive or deductive approach. After conducting the comparative analysis using these factors, the Integrated Process Safety Management System (IPSMS) model seems to be the most robust PSM system as it addressed almost every key area regarding process safety. However, inferences drawn from study findings suggest that there is still no one-size-fits-all PSM system for all sectors of the process industry.     

Ensuring emergency planning & response meet the minimum Process Safety Management (PSM) standards requirements

When incidents happen and the consequences are not mitigated effectively, one of the indicated failures consists of ineffective emergency planning and response (EPR). EPR is an important aspect of the Process Safety Management (PSM) Standards, and the guidelines are stated in CFR 1910.119 (n) which explains the minimum elements of emergency response and procedures in handling emergency or small releases. Despite its implementation in 1992, CSB finds ineffective EPR system in certain accidents such as the Missouri DPS Enterprise Chlorine Gas Release accident in 2002. DPS EPR failed in planning on location of emergency equipment and accessibility. Many other accidents have occurred throughout the decade and even though organizations have their own EPR system, there are issues in meeting minimum PSM requirements. There also exists the problem of self-regulatory policies practiced by organizations, which might not meet these requirements as well. To help organizations meet these minimum requirements, the purpose of this paper is to present a structured and easy technique to plan and implement EPR as per PSM requirements. A model has been developed based on this technique, and its application has been tested as a case study in a refinery in Malaysia and discussed throughout this report. The results reflected the feasibility of this model as it helped users to track and manage documents efficiently. This technique has the potential to help users to manage EPR better and to reduce adverse impacts to people, environment and assets.     

Migrating an incident reporting system to a CCPS process safety metrics model

A major chemical company established a formal incident investigation and reporting system several years ago. The original system focused heavily on worker-related injuries, illnesses, and near-misses and was used primarily to track statistics reportable to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). This Occupational Injury and Illness (OII) approach has been recognized to be an ineffective tool for measuring, predicting, and preventing process safety incidents. The Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) recently published guidelines on how to establish safety metrics for the measurement and reduction of process safety incidents. The process safety metrics approach relies upon leading and lagging metrics to improve organization process safety. This paper is a case study of the analysis of one organization’s incident database, which represents approximately five years of data from over a dozen facilities. The aim of this investigation was to extract useful process safety metrics from the incident investigation and reporting system, which would be pertinent to the types of process units and process functions at these facilities. This paper will discuss the approach taken to extract process incident information from an OII-based database and present the difficulties of performing an analysis on such a database. This paper provides guidance on how to migrate an existing OII-based reporting system to a program that includes process safety metrics in accordance with industry best practices.     

Global process industry initiatives to reduce major accident hazards

In the past 10 years, the vapor cloud explosion at Texas City, the ammonium nitrate explosion in Toulouse, a pipeline disaster in Belgium, and three near total loss events in Norway have highlighted that major accident process safety is still a serious issue. Hopes that PSM or Safety Case regulations would reduce process events by 80% have not proven true. The Baker Panel, convened after Texas City developed a series of recommendations, mainly around leadership, incentives, safety culture and more effective implementation of PSM systems. Many US-based companies are working hard to implement the Baker recommendations. In Europe, an approach built around safety barriers, especially relating to technical safety systems, is being widely adopted.The author’s company has carried out a global survey of process industry initiatives, for both upstream and downstream activities, to identify what the industry itself is planning to enhance process safety in the next 5-10 years. This paper presents a summary of some of the major programs and initiatives as apply to traditional oil majors, newer national oil companies, and the chemical industry. These are a mixture of Baker recommendations, barrier approaches and tighter integration of process safety and asset integrity. While the factor of 10 improvement achieved in occupational safety over the past 20 years seems unattainable for process safety, a factor of 3-4 improvement in the next 20 years does seem possible. This would call for significant effort on the part of operators, but the benefits fully justify the effort.     

石油钻井作业的安全葡萄图管理技术

石油钻井作业是一个高风险行业,其风险具有严重性、突发性、隐蔽性、随机性的特点,是石油石化行业中最主要的事故频发区之一.震惊世界的“12.23”事故以后,在国家和企业安全生产的指导与监督下,事故较以前明显减少,但钻井作业的特点决定了其风险因素不会被消除,只能通过人的因素去预防事故发生.安全葡萄图从人的因素考虑,结合了人体生物节律与葡萄图两者的优点,除了具有葡萄图的特点外,还具有预测性、记录性和选拔性,是安全管理方面的一种新方法.安全葡萄图是一种以人为本的安全管理方法,通过加强人员安全管理来减少和消除事故隐患的目的.该方法简单实用,适合于钻井等高风险行业使用.     

Optimization of HSE in maintenance activities by integration of continuous improvement cycle and fuzzy multivariate approach: A gas refinery

Gas refineries have been continuously focusing on Health, Safety and Environment programs to improve maintenance activities. Several researches have studied on this area with different analysis methods. This study presents an integrated approach for optimization of factors contributing to the implementation of Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) in maintenance activities. HSE managers in each sector answered standard questionnaire whit respect to HES. The methodology is based on fuzzy data envelopment analysis (FDEA) and Deming's continuous improvement cycle. Also, this method is used to rank the relevant performance efficiencies in certain and uncertain conditions of each HSE sectors whit considering HSE in maintenance activities. It corresponds and integrates its registered HSE-MS with OHSAS 18001:2007 and ISO 14001:2004 to evaluate multiple inputs and outputs of over 36 subsidiary HSE divisions with parallel mission and objectives simultaneously. Also, it determines efficient target indices and could assure continuous improvement in the organization. This is the first study that introduces an integrated approach to improve HSE management programs in a gas refinery by a robust and continuous improvement approach.     

Lessons learned for process safety management in China

A number of chemical accidents have occurred in China over the past two decades with significant impact on humans and the environment. It is expected that lessons will have been learned from these accidents that will help industries to reduce the risk that catastrophic chemical accidents occur in future. In fact, to some extent there is evidence that lessons have been learned, to the extent that the Chinese government has substantially strengthened legislation and regulatory standards. Nonetheless, there remains a concern that much more still needs to be done to reduce chemical accidents risks in China. Important progress in this area requires not only government support but a commitment across all hazardous industries to learn from past accidents that may in many cases require establishment or considerable improvement of their safety management systems. To assist small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), in this effort, results of an analysis of common causes of the chemical accidents reported in the Major Accident Information (MAI) website of Chinese State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS) are presented in this paper In particular, inadequate process hazard analysis (PHA), training and emergency response planning (ERP) were identified as the top three process safety management (PSM) elements that contribute to most of the SMEs accidents in China. Seven recommendations are proposed in order to improve the effectiveness of lesson learning for government agencies and SMEs.     

Evaluation of process safety indicators collected in conformance with ANSI/API Recommended Practice 754

At the request of the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB), we examined some of the possible uses of the process safety event metrics proposed by the American Petroleum Institute and published as ANSI/API Recommended Practice 754. We examined many sources to try to estimate what the likely number of Tier 1 and Tier 2 process safety events would be at refineries. Then we calculated the statistical power that would be available to compare rates, both over time and across facilities and firms. As Tier 1 and Tier 2 are defined, it appears that the event frequencies estimated for U.S. refineries (i.e., 0.12 per 100 employees for Tier 1 and 0.26 for Tier 2) would make it unlikely that even two-fold differences in the rates would be statistically significant, except at large refineries with several thousand workers.