Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control: Reply

Our paper (Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control, J. Environ. Econom. Management 17, 247–265 (1989)) concluded that firms will most actively search for new abatement technology under taxes and auctioned permits. However, Marin (Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control: Comment, J. Environ. Econom. Management, 21, 297–300 (1991)) argues that we overstated the efficacy of auctioned permits: that we used an unrealistic assumption which might affect our findings; that auctions may misallocate permits and are administratively burdensome; and that innovation detection is difficult under this regime. Here we show that our results are largely unchanged when the assumption questioned by Marin is relaxed. We also argue that he overstates the other concerns.     

Spatial economic theory of pollution control: Reflections on a paradox

In their analyses of the impact of pollution taxation on the location of polluting decisions, U. K. Mathur (J. Environ. Econom. Management 3, 16–28 (1976)) and S. S. Gokturk (J. Reg. Sci. 19, 461–467 (1979)) obtained the result that a tax increase on urban pollution concentration may not succeed in pushing the polluting firm away from the urban center. In this paper is shown that the sufficient condition for success in this case depends upon the specification of the production and pollution emissions technology and may be the opposite to the one posited by Mathur and has more intuitive appeal.     

Markets and environmental management with a storable pollutant

Lee [J. Environ. Econ. Manag., in press] investigates possibilities where pollutants may be stored for a period of time and later released into the environment when adverse effects are minimal. The treatment and storage of pollutants before their release into the environment is a crucial part of many abatement programs. Surprisingly, emission charges will not induce optimal abatement when storage is possible. This occurs because the firms' response to the dynamic tax is indeterminant. We suggest alternative controls, whereby rights to emit pollutants are sold competitively and demonstrate that markets provide incentives for the optimal generation-storage-emission of pollution by firms. In deriving this result an important difference between markets and taxes is revealed. With markets there is still indeterminacy at the firm level, but the aggregate response of all firms is dictated by market forces that insure pollution is reduced by some desired amount.     

Sellers' Hedging Incentives at EPA's Emission Trading Auction

Cason (1993, J. Environ. Econom. Management25, 177–195, doi:10.1006/jeem 1993.1041) argued that the auction which the EPA used in order to start the market for sulfur allowances may reduce the efficiency of the market since it gives sellers an incentive to understate their valuation. In this paper we show that the sellers' incentives are even more perverse than Cason suggested when we take into account that sellers can also submit a bid. We show that sellers have an incentive to set their asking price equal to 0 while simultaneously hedging their bets by submitting a positive bid.     

Total Factor Productivity Change in the New England Groundfish Fishery: 1964–1993

We develop estimates of total factor productivity (TFP) change in the New England groundfish fishery from 1964 to 1993, using a procedure similar to Squires' (1992, Rand J. Econom.23(2), 221–236) method, which extends standard TFP measurement by including the effect of fluctuations in stock abundance. The results indicate that TFP increased on average by 4.4% per year from 1964 to 1993. A higher average rate of increase occurred between 1964 and 1982, possibly due to new technologies (e.g., fishfinders). TFP declined at 0.33% annually from 1983 to 1993 due to stringent output and effort control measures.     

Trade and Transboundary Pollution: Spatial Separation Reconsidered

Copeland and Taylor (1999, J. Int. Econ.47, 137–168) show that trade allows the spatial separation of two incompatible industries. Concentrating the polluting industry in one country eliminates its degenerative effects in the other. This paper extends the analysis by allowing for transboundary pollution. Thus specialization has indirect repercussions on the level of pollution in the other country. We show (i) how cross-national differences in exposure to pollution emissions can generate comparative advantage and (ii) under what condition the resulting trading pattern combined with transboundary pollution can increase pollution exposure with negative effects on productivity and welfare in both countries.     

Incentives and prices in an emissions trading scheme with updating

Emissions trading schemes where allocations are based on updated baseline emissions give firms less incentive to reduce emissions for a given quota (or allowance) price. Nevertheless, according to Böhringer and Lange [On the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission allowances, Europ. Econ. Rev. 49 (2005) 2041–2055], such allocation schemes are cost-effective if the system is closed and allocation rules are identical across firms. In this paper, we show that the cost-effective solution may be infeasible if marginal abatement costs grow too fast. Moreover, if a price cap or banking/borrowing is introduced, the abatement profile is no longer the same as in the case with an auction (or lump-sum allocation). In addition, we show that with allocation based on updated emissions, the quota price will always exceed marginal abatement costs, possibly misguiding policy makers and investors about abatement costs. Numerical simulations indicate that the quota price most likely will be several times higher than marginal abatement costs, unless a significant share of allowances is auctioned.     

Averting behavior and the benefits of reduced soiling

The individual's choice of cleaning frequency is examined theoretically under assumptions more general than those of previous authors. The individual is assumed to maximize utility over “cleanliness” and a general commodity, where cleanliness is determined by frequency of cleaning and ambient pollution. Allowance is made for the possibility that the cost per cleaning episode is positively affected by pollution and negatively affected by the frequency of cleaning. The present framework is used to make comparisons and comments regarding the assumptions and results of Watson and Jaksch [J. Environ. Econ. Manag.9 (1982), 248–262] and Courant and Porter [J. Environ. Econ. Manag.8 (1981), 321–329].     

Losses from effluent taxes and quotas under uncertainty

Recent theoretical papers by Adar and Griffin (J. Environ. Econ. Manag.3, 178–188 (1976)), Fishelson (J. Environ. Econ. Manag.3, 189–197 (1976)), and Weitzman (Rev. Econ. Studies41, 477–491 (1974)) show that,different expected social losses arise from using effluent taxes and quotas as alternative control instruments when marginal control costs are uncertain. Key assumptions in these analyses are linear marginal cost and benefit functions and an additive error for the marginal cost function (to reflect uncertainty). In this paper, empirically derived nonlinear functions and more realistic multiplicative error terms are used to estimate expected control and damage costs and to identify (empirically) the mix of control instruments that minimizes expected losses.     

Non-renewable resource prices: Deterministic or stochastic trends?

In this paper, we examine temporal properties of 11 natural resource real price series from 1870 to 1990. Recent studies by Ahrens and Sharma [Trends in natural resource commodity prices: deterministic or stochastic? J. Environ. Econom. Manage. 33(1997)59–74], Berck and Roberts [Natural resource prices: will they ever turn up? J. Environ. Econom. Manage. 31(1996)65–78], and Slade [Grade selection under uncertainty: least cost last and other anomalies, J. Environ. Econom. Manage. 15(1988)189–205], among others, find that many non-renewable resource prices have a stochastic trend. We revisit this issue by employing a Lagrangian multiplier unit root test that allows for two endogenously determined structural breaks with and without a quadratic trend. Contrary to previous research, we find evidence against the unit root hypothesis for all price series. Our findings support characterizing natural resource prices as stationary around deterministic trends with structural breaks. We additionally show that both pre-testing for unit roots with breaks and allowing for breaks in the forecast model can improve forecast accuracy. Overall, the results in this paper are important in both a positive and normative sense; without an appropriate understanding of the dynamics of a time series, empirical verification of theories, forecasting, and proper inference are potentially fruitless.     

A note on permits, standards, and technological innovation

Montero (J. Environ. Econom. Manage. 44 (2002) 23) contrasts the incentives to invest in new abatement technologies under different regulatory instruments and argues that one needs to consider the induced output effects that derive from lower abatement costs. Montero shows that, once one takes into account these effects on output, command-and-control instruments can generate stronger incentives to innovate than market-based instruments. This result rests on strategic output effects under command-and-control. However, he maintains that, under perfectly competitive conditions, market-based instruments will continue to weakly dominate command-and-control regulation. This note clarifies two issues raised by Montero. First, I use Montero's approach to show that in fact performance (concentration) standards will generate greater incentives to innovate than market-based instruments in perfectly competitive markets. One does not require strategic effects to get this result. Second, Montero abstracts from production costs and concentrates solely on abatement costs. He implicitly assumes that marginal production costs are constant. I show that some of Montero's results change once increasing marginal production costs are considered. When marginal costs are increasing, the benefit of additional output is tempered and market-based instruments again look more favorable.     

Transitional politics: emerging incentive-based instruments in environmental regulation

This paper proposes a positive theory of environmental instrument choice. We study a democratic society that seeks to lower the level of pollution from industrial sources to a pre-specified target. The target can be implemented by one of three instruments: [S]: uniform emission standards; [P]: tradeable permits; and [T]: emission taxes. The conflict of interest between special-interests, representing polluters, and the electorate is resolved by an elected politician. We characterize when each of the three policy instruments is chosen in political equilibrium and show that the transition, observed in many countries, from [S] to either [P] or [T] can be understood as a natural consequence of increasingly ambitious environmental targets.     

Incentives to diffuse advanced abatement technology under environmental liability law

Polluting firms with advanced abatement technology at their disposal have incentives or disincentives to share this technology with other polluting firms. The ‘direction’ and extent of those incentives depends on the liability rule applicable and the way technical change impacts marginal abatement costs. We establish that incentives for diffusion are socially optimal under strict liability and socially suboptimal under negligence if technical change lowers marginal abatement costs for all levels of abatement. Negligence may, however, induce better diffusion incentives than strict liability if technical change decreases (increases) marginal abatement costs for low (high) levels of abatement.     

Reserve and land prices with exploration under uncertainty

Arrow and Chang (J. Econom. Environ. Manag.9, 1–10 (1982) analyze an exploration-extraction model with uncertainty about the distribution of deposits. Reserve prices do not exhibit any rising trend when the unexplored land area is big but, in order to know what happens when the unexplored area is smaller, “a probabilistic analysis not yet performed” (ibid. p. 10) is required. Their conjecture of a rising trend at less than the discount rate is confirmed. However, land prices can be expected to grow faster than reserve prices, which helps discriminate between Arrow and Chang's, and other rationalizations of the failure of resource prices to rise at the discount rate.     

A note on the measurement of agglomeration economies with compensation for urban disamenities

The net agglomeration and disamenities approaches to the measurement of agglomeration economies are merged. The net agglomeration view is represented by a labor demand function derived from Segal (D. Segal, Rev. Econ. Stat. 48, 339–350 (1976)). The disamenities view is represented by an upward-sloping labor supply function derived from Izraeli (O. Izraeli, Urban Stud. 14, 275–290 (1977)). Three cases are simulated. Case I is the benchmark case and assumes a linear homogeneous production function, no agglomeration economies, and no perceived environmental quality differences between cities. Cases II and III combine Segal and Izraeli by introducing agglomeration economies, an upward-sloping labor supply function, and a change in the level of air pollution. The results demonstrate the feasibility of isolating the output of market goods and environmental goods within a common framework.     

The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly

We consider the pricing of a uniformly mixed pollutant with a model of optimal, possibly firm-specific, emissions taxes and their enforcement under incomplete information about firms’ abatement costs, enforcement costs, and pollution damage. We argue that optimality requires an enforcement strategy that induces full compliance by every firm, except possibly when a regulator can base the probabilities of detecting individual violations on observable correlates of violators’ actual emissions. Moreover, optimality requires discriminatory taxes, except when a regulator is unable to use observable firm-level characteristics to gain some information about the variation in firms’ abatement costs or monitoring costs.     

‘Optimal’ pollution abatement—whose benefits matter, and how much?

We examine the determinants of environmental regulatory activity (inspections and enforcement actions) and levels of air and water pollution for 409 US pulp and paper mills, using data for 1985–1997. We focus on the benefits to the surrounding population from pollution abatement. Plants with larger benefits emit less pollution, as do those with more kids and elders nearby. Plants in poor areas emit more pollution, though (surprisingly) we find less pollution in minority areas. Out-of-state neighbors seem to count less than in-state ones, although this effect diminishes if the bordering state's Congressional delegation is strongly pro-environment. We use ‘spatially lagged’ instrumental variables to control for the potential endogeneity of which individuals choose to locate near the plant. The results for regulatory activity are noticeably less significant than the emissions results.     

Pollution control and technological advance: A dynamic model of the firm

The paper extends the static comparison of effluent taxes and effluent standards to a dynamic world in which firms invest resources in improving their abatement technology as well as their production technology. The analysis shows that the two pollution control policies lead to a distinctly different allocation of research and development (R & D) funds between improvement in abatement technology and improvement in production technology. The model also shows that a temporally constant effluent tax leads to an increasing effluent discharge rate for “typical” firms. Other results concern the pattern of output growth and the rate of technological advance.     

Stochastic pollution, costly sanctions, and optimality of emission permit banking

This paper identifies a new economic motive for pollution regulations that allow polluting firms to bank and borrow emission permits over time. When aggregate pollution is stochastic, an intertemporal permit trading regime can provide firms with efficient incentives for pollution abatement without the need for costly government enforcement actions that would otherwise be required.     

Pollution-Controlling Innovation in Oligopolistic Industries: Some Comparisons between Patent Races and Research Joint Ventures

Much of the literature on pollution-control innovation has focused on normative comparisons of exogenous regulatory policies in light of the incentives they induce on firms′ R&D efforts. In contrast, in the positive analysis below, both R&D incentives and regulatory policy arise endogenously as functions of market structure and external cost differentials. Incentives for pollution-controlling innovation are found to arise from within the industry in a patent race setting when innovation gives the race winner(s) a cost advantage over the other industry members. This cost advantage is shown to come about when innovating firms successfully use their influence to raise their rivals′ costs by bringing about a policy change forcing industry members to internalize pollution externalities. In contrast, an industry-wide research joint venture (RJV) has incentive to collusively prevent development of innovation unless environmental activists are sufficiently strong. This latter result is illustrated by the case U.S. vs Automobile Manufacturers Association, where the Justice Department found evidence that the "big three" used an RJV to slow the introduction of pollution-control innovation.