基于控制单元的水环境容量分配研究

以常州武南河控制单元的COD容量分配为例,构建“污染源类型-污染源细类-排污单位”3层分配结构,逐层逐类选取多水平指标体系,以各指标初始权重和量化值乘积耦合的方法计算各分配对象的综合权重,并以此为依据进行水环境容量的逐层分配.首层分配结果:生活污染和养殖业承担污染削减的主要任务,COD削减率分别为41.6％和35.5％;次层分配结果:分散养殖削减比例(43.2％)高于集中养殖(31.5％),农村生活污染削减比例(47.3％)高于城镇生活污染(28.5％),各镇(区)种植业污染无需削减,工业污染则主要由纺织染整企业等进行重点削减;末层分配结果:各镇(区)分散养殖、集中养殖、农村生活污染、城镇生活污染的削减比例与次层保持一致,印染企业削减比例高于纺织企业.逐层分配中各分配对象的COD削减比例均低于50％,说明分配结果具有可行性.     

太湖流域平原河网区农业污染研究——以常州市和宜兴市为例

基于全国第一次污染普查数据,结合各类污染物的产排污系数计算了农业污染物(COD、TN和TP)的产生量、排放量和入河量,对比分析了种植业、畜禽养殖业和水产养殖业的污染物排放现状。结果表明,COD、TN和TP排放量分别在种植业、畜禽养殖业及水产养殖业污染物排放总量中所占比例存在明显的差异性,COD和TN排放量占种植业污染物排放总量的比例分别为52%和45%,COD排放量占畜禽养殖业污染物排放总量的比例达91%,COD排放量占水产养殖业污染物排放总量的比例达80%;而不同产业对COD、TN和TP排放量的贡献率也明显不同,水产养殖业和畜禽养殖业对农业COD排放量的贡献率达到80%以上,种植业对农业TN排放量的贡献率接近60%,水产养殖业对农业TP排放量的贡献率接近60%。因此,若要削减有机物,应主要从水产养殖业和畜禽养殖业着手;若要削减氮类污染物,应主要从种植业着手;若要削减磷类污染物,应主要从水产养殖业着手。通过分析研究区农业污染物排放状况,可为农业污染物的削减和控制措施的制定提供一定的参考价值。     

中美农药行业排污许可证政策差异性探讨

排污许可证制度是管控污染物排放的基本环境管理制度,该研究在介绍中美排污许可制度发展以及农药污染特性的基础上,分别从排污许可证管控污染物种类、发放对象、排放限值确定方法和自行监测4个方面对两国农药行业排污许可证的管理内容进行了对比梳理,发现我国现行农药行业排污许可制度可从以下几个方面进一步完善:根据农药行业的污染物排放特征,进一步扩充需要管控的污染物种类;建议区分区域环境质量达标区与未达标区,采用划分控制单元分区管理的模式进行精细化管理;建议排放限值的确定不仅考虑现行生产工艺、排放控制水平等技术要求,还需考虑与区域环境质量相联系;对于污染治理效果好的企业可以采取激励政策,实现成本-效益的双赢。     

水污染物总量初始分配方法

总结目前常用的总量分配方法,基于环境—经济系统综合考虑原则,提出水污染物总量分配方法的新思路,包括采用基尼系数法进行区域分配,采用优化排放绩效法对排污单位分配,并建立了优化排放绩效法的线性规划模型,分析了两种方法与其他常用分配方法的差异,以及在实际应用中需要注意的问题和根据废污水排放去向修订分配方案的方法。     

湘江流域铊污染物水环境容量与总量控制

针对湖南湘江流域含铊工业废水大量排放,引起部分河段地表水铊含量超标的问题,通过对河流相应集水区各涉铊污染源进行调查分析,计算铊污染物入河量,选择模型,按水功能区划要求的水质目标,估算出目标河段铊污染物的水环境容量,并按容量总量管理模式,提出各地区、各污染源铊污染物排放与削减的分配方案.结果显示,湘江干流永州、郴州、衡阳和娄底段尚有一定的环境容量,而株洲、湘潭、长沙和岳阳段容量计算结果为负值,表明该河段铊污染物含量已超过水环境容量;除汨罗江外,湘江一级支流均有剩余的铊环境容量,容量较大的是耒水,其次是洣水和舂陵水;10条涉及铊排放的二级支流,都还有剩余环境容量,容量最多的是西河,其次是永乐江和攸水.铊排放超出环境容量的区域,须进行铊污染物削减,需要削减的地市有永州、衡阳、湘潭、长沙和岳阳,需要削减的行业涉及化工、有色、钢铁、锰业和玻璃行业,削减总量达到每年3.188 t.化工行业排放最大,为每年3.239 t,需要削减的量也最大,为每年2.862 t,占削减总量的89.8%.     

基于情景分析的长三角城市群机动车污染排放控制研究

机动车污染已成为大气污染的重要来源,对机动车污染排放控制策略的研究已经成为中国空气污染防治最重要的工作之一。选取长三角城市群为研究区域,研究未来长三角城市群机动车污染排放控制措施的减排效果。应用COPERT Ⅳ模型构建1999—2015年长三角城市群机动车污染物CO、NMVOC、NO_x、PM_(2.5)、PM_(10)、CO_2、CH_4、N_2O、NH_3和SO_2排放清单,以2015年为基准年,设置8种减排情景评估2025年各情景下的机动车污染物减排效果,并对新能源车推广情景采用GREET模型从生命周期的角度进行研究。结果表明,长三角城市群1999—2015年间不同机动车污染物排放趋势存在差异,除污染物CO_2和NH_3排放增长趋势显著外,其余污染物排放近年来均呈现下降趋势;与基准情景相比,不同情景设置下的机动车污染物减排效果不同,淘汰高排放车辆情景对污染物NO_x、PM_(2.5)和CH_4削减效果较为显著,削减率分别为14.41%、16.65%和12.49%;实施激进新能源车推广情景对污染物CO、NMVOC、PM_(10)、CO_2、N_2O和NH_3减排效果较为明显,削减率分别为13.66%、20.03%、15.48%、20.56%、18.31%和21.46%;提升燃油品质情景对污染物SO_2减排效果最为明显,削减率为93.64%;激进综合情景综合所有削减控制措施并对污染物CO、NMVOC、NO_x、PM_(2.5)、PM_(10)、CO_2、N_2O和NH_3达到最大的削减效果,表明长三角城市群未来控制机动车污染物排放需结合多种污染减排措施,以达到最佳减排效果。     

多级生态藕塘-表流湿地系统对养猪废水的净化应用研究

在流域水污染治理中,如何廉价高效处理高污染的禽畜养殖废水,尤其是养猪废水的净化排放,已经受到广泛重视。为了拓展小流域养猪废水的有效治理方法和途径,本研究探究了生态藕塘与表流湿地联合配置实际应用于农村养猪废水的净化作用,对丹江口市余家湾小流域余家湾村构建的多级生态藕塘-表流湿地系统各环节水量、水质等进行了连续监测,并分析了各单元及系统在高浓度低流量和低浓度高流量两种相对进水条件下对养猪废水的净化效果,为小流域禽畜养殖废水治理提供参考借鉴。结果表明,各单元对COD_(Mn)、TN、NH_3-N、NO_3~--N、TP及SS均具备良好的削减作用,系统对上述各污染物的削减效果更稳定,优于各单元。在相对高浓度低流量时段,多级生态藕塘对上述各污染物的平均负荷削减率分别为58.63%、97.75%、95.35%、80.88%、96.20%、25.99%;表流湿地的对应削减率分别为-11.55%、46.91%、53.68%、21.90%、35.61%、4.93%;系统的对应削减率分别为52.36%、98.85%、97.97%、85.75%、97.95%和67.81%;各污染物出水质量浓度均值依次为5.17、0.83、0.51、0.13、0.26、6.00 mg·L~(-1),综合水质由进水严重污染转变为出水良好。在相对低浓度高流量时段,多级生态藕塘对上述各污染物的平均负荷削减率分别为19.03%、72.70%、77.45%、55.98%、54.89%、38.10%;表流湿地的对应削减率分别为-2.68%、5.12%、19.95%、28.64%、10.00%、3.04%;系统的对应削减率分别为17.36%、77.42%、82.96%、71.05%、67.22%、75.95%;各污染物出水质量浓度均值依次为6.44、4.25、2.60、0.13、1.62、8.57mg·L~(-1),综合水质由进水重污染转变为出水轻污染。在一定的进水条件下,多级生态藕塘-表流湿地系统对养猪废水有非常良好且稳定的净化作用,可进一步推广应用。     

水质总量控制中几种主要污染监测指标测定法的述评

水域污染物排放总量控制,是对给定水域,按特定污染指标的最高允许负荷总量向各有关的污染源合理分摊污染负荷量,伴随着相应的技术措施,分期地削减允许排放量,直至达到环境容量为止的控制方法。也就是控制和调整各污染源排出的污染物总量不超过环境容量(或接近环境容量的环境目标值)的方法。总量控制的目的就是要达到环境是     

太湖流域农村生活污水产排污系数测算

选取太湖流域典型地区9户农户(高、中、低收入水平各3户)作为研究对象,采用现场监测及入户调查的方法对农户生活污水各类污染物产排污系数进行系统定量研究。结果表明,收入水平对农户总生活污水中TN、NH4+-N、TP产污系数无显著影响,但对污水量、COD产污系数及总生活污水中各类污染物排污系数影响显著,均表现为高收入农户中收入农户低收入农户。厕所污水对污水污染总负荷贡献率极高,COD占67%以上,TN、NH4+-N、TP占84%以上,因此,厕所污水的利用与处理率是影响污染物排污系数的主导因素,而农业收入水平及化粪池类型则对这2种因素影响显著。     

因子分析法在化学物质生态危害评价中的应用

运用因子分析法对61种环境优先污染物的环境行为和生物毒性等7项指标进行分析,筛选出3个或4个主因子,3因子分别定义为生物毒性、分配性和降解性因子,4因子分别定义为生物毒性、蓄积性、吸附性和降解因子;选取3因子模型对61种环境优先污染物和12种新化学物质进行生态危害评价,以主因子对总信息量的贡献率为权重求得各化学物质生态危害的分值,依据综合得分得到新化学物质相对于该61种环境优先污染物的生态危害综合排序,以评价新化学物质的生态危害性.结果表明,预测结果与实际情况基本相符.     

博弈论在环境保护中的应用

阐述了博弈论的基本理论在环境保护中的应用,分析结果指出应结合市场机制和政府政策改变博弈方的收益,使博弈达到有利于环境保护的纳什均衡,提高环境保护效率;并探讨了博弈论在环境保护中应用的关键技术与策略。     

Achieving air pollutant emission reduction targets with minimum abatement costs: An enterprise-level allocation method with constraints of fairness and feasibility

• Quantification of efficiency and fairness of abatement allocation are optimized. • Allocation results are refined to the different abatement measures of enterprises. • Optimized allocation results reduce abatement costs and tap the abatement space. • Abatement suggestions are given to enterprises with different abatement quotas. For achieving air pollutant emission reduction targets, total pollutant amount control is being continuously promoted in China. However, the traditional pattern of pollutant emission reduction allocation regardless of economic cost often results in unreasonable emission reduction pathways, and industrial enterprises as the main implementers have to pay excessively high costs. Therefore, this study adopted economic efficiency as its main consideration, used specific emission reduction measures (ERMs) of industrial enterprises as minimum allocation units, and constructed an enterprise-level pollutant emission reduction allocation (EPERA) model with minimization of the total abatement cost (TAC) as the objective function, and fairness and feasibility as constraints for emission reduction allocation. Taking City M in China as an example, the EPERA model was used to construct a Pareto optimal frontier and obtain the optimal trade-off result. Results showed that under basic and strict emission reduction regulations, the TAC of the optimal trade-off point was reduced by 46.40% and 45.77%, respectively, in comparison with that achieved when only considering fairness, and the Gini coefficient was 0.26 and 0.31, respectively. The abatement target was attained with controllable cost and relatively fair and reasonable allocation. In addition, enterprises allocated different emission reduction quotas under different ERMs had specific characteristics that required targeted optimization of technology and equipment to enable them to achieve optimal emission reduction effects for the same abatement cost.     

Nash Implementation of a Proportional Solution to International Pollution Control Problems

For a very general class of pollution control models involving strictly quasi-concave utility functions over consumption and environmental quality and strictly convex emission abatement cost functions, a proportional cost sharing mechanism is presented inspired by the ratio equilibrium introduced by7. It is shown that the proportional solution yields a cost efficient allocation of abatement efforts and that the resulting utility imputation always lies in the stand alone core of the cost sharing game. In order to decentralize the proportional cost sharing equilibrium, a financial compensation mechanism implementing the proportional solution in complete information Nash equilibrium is presented.     

A laboratory study of auctions for reducing non-point source pollution

Non-point source pollution, such as nutrient runoff to waterways from agricultural production, is an environmental problem that typically involves asymmetric information. Land use changes to reduce pollution incur opportunity costs that are privately known to landholders, but these changes provide environmental benefits that may be more accurately estimated by regulators. This paper reports a testbed laboratory experiment in which landholder/sellers in sealed-offer auctions compete to obtain part of a fixed budget allocated by the regulator to subsidize abatement. In one treatment the regulator reveals to landholders the environmental benefits estimated for their projects, and in another treatment the regulator conceals the potential projects’ “environmental quality.” The results show that sellers’ offers misrepresent their costs more for high-quality projects when quality is revealed, so total abatement is lower and seller profits are higher when landholders know their projects’ environmental benefits. This suggests that concealing this information may improve regulatory efficiency.     

Incentives and prices in an emissions trading scheme with updating

Emissions trading schemes where allocations are based on updated baseline emissions give firms less incentive to reduce emissions for a given quota (or allowance) price. Nevertheless, according to Böhringer and Lange [On the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission allowances, Europ. Econ. Rev. 49 (2005) 2041–2055], such allocation schemes are cost-effective if the system is closed and allocation rules are identical across firms. In this paper, we show that the cost-effective solution may be infeasible if marginal abatement costs grow too fast. Moreover, if a price cap or banking/borrowing is introduced, the abatement profile is no longer the same as in the case with an auction (or lump-sum allocation). In addition, we show that with allocation based on updated emissions, the quota price will always exceed marginal abatement costs, possibly misguiding policy makers and investors about abatement costs. Numerical simulations indicate that the quota price most likely will be several times higher than marginal abatement costs, unless a significant share of allowances is auctioned.     

Environmental policy with upstream pollution abatement technology firms

This paper examines how the existence of an upstream abatement technology sector affects optimal environmental policy. We explore whether the policy should be especially stringent in order to spur a successful export industry based on abatement technology. Furthermore, we investigate if a stringent policy can be used to increase competition in the upstream sector. Our point of departure is a three-stage game between a government in a country with a polluting downstream industry, and a limited number of upstream firms supplying abatement technologies. The government moves first, and may use its environmental policy strategically to influence the behavior of the upstream technology firms. We find that an especially stringent environmental policy towards the polluting downstream sector may be well founded, as it increases competition between the technology suppliers, leading to lower abatement costs. However, to our surprise, an especially stringent environmental policy is not a particularly good industrial policy with respect to developing successful new export sectors based on abatement technology.     

Plant vintage, technology, and environmental regulation

We use data on productivity and pollution abatement costs at individual pulp and paper mills to test whether the impact of environmental regulation on productivity differs by plant vintage and technology. Plants with higher pollution abatement costs have significantly lower productivity levels. This relationship differs greatly based on a plant's technology, with productivity at integrated mills being greatly affected by abatement costs, while the impact at non-integrated mills is negligible. Plant vintage does not seem to matter, with older and newer plants showing similar impacts. Reported abatement costs appear to substantially understate the true costs of abatement. Accounting for the impact of technology differences makes some difference in the estimated overall impact of environmental regulation.     

Cost-effective unilateral climate policy design: Size matters

Given the bleak prospects for a global agreement on mitigating climate change, pressure for unilateral abatement is increasing. A major challenge is emissions leakage. Border carbon adjustments and output-based allocation of emissions allowances can increase effectiveness of unilateral action but introduce distortions of their own. We assess antileakage measures as a function of abatement coalition size. We first develop a partial equilibrium analytical framework to see how these instruments affect emissions within and outside the coalition. We then employ a computable general equilibrium model of international trade and energy use to assess the strategies as the coalition grows. We find that full border adjustments rank first in global cost-effectiveness, followed by import tariffs and output-based rebates. The differences across measures and their overall appeal decline as the abatement coalition grows. In terms of cost, the coalition countries prefer border carbon adjustments; countries outside the coalition prefer output-based rebates.     

Can decentralized planning really achieve first-best in the presence of environmental spillovers?

It is generally accepted that decentralized policy choice in the presence of interjurisdictional spillovers is inefficient. Strikingly, Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) find that in a model with heterogenous jurisdictions, interjurisdictional capital flows, and interjurisdictional environmental damage spillovers, decentralized planning outcomes are equivalent to that under a centralized planner. We first show the critical importance of two key assumptions (no retirement of capital, fixed environmental damages per unit of capital) in obtaining this result. Second, we consider a more general model allowing for capital retirement and abatement activities and show that the outcome of a decentralized market generally differs from the solution of a centralized planner?s social welfare-maximizing problem.     

International environmental agreements with consistent conjectures

We introduce consistent conjectures into Barrett (1994) canonical model of international environmental agreements. The existing literature assumes inconsistent Nash conjectures, despite the fact that policymakers recognize that abatement levels are strategic substitutes and increases in abatement generate carbon leakage. With consistent conjectures much of the conventional wisdom is reversed. The non-cooperative abatement level is below the Nash equilibrium. The difference between Nash and consistent conjectures is greatest when benefits are large and costs are small. We find that large coalitions cannot form. However, small coalitions can result in substantial increases in abatement relative to the non-cooperative outcome.