Strategic pollution control and capital tax competition

In an analytical model of symmetric countries with mobile capital and local or transboundary pollution we investigate whether competition in emissions taxes (or emissions caps) and capital taxes leads to efficient outcomes when governments act strategically. When they have capital taxes and emissions caps at their disposal, they refrain from taxing capital and set their caps inefficiently lax [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. When they have the option to tax capital and emissions, capital is subsidized [untaxed] and emissions taxes are inefficiently low [efficient] for transboundary [local] pollution. In case of transboundary pollution emissions caps are Pareto-superior to emissions taxes. That holds regardless of whether the environmental policy is applied as stand-alone policy or combined with capital tax competition.     

Double dividend hypothesis, golden rule and welfare distribution

This paper analyzes the double dividend issues within the framework of overlapping generations models. We characterize the necessary conditions for obtaining a double dividend, i.e. an improvement of environmental and non-environmental welfare when the revenue from the pollution tax is recycled into a change in the labor tax rate. We show that, depending on the initial capital stock and on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, conditions may be defined to simultaneously allow (i) the obtaining of a long-term double dividend, (ii) the economy to move closer to the modified golden rule and (iii) in the short term, an improvement in the welfare of the two present generations.     

Green tax reform,endogenous innovation and the growth dividend

We study theoretically and numerically the effects of an environmental tax reform using endogenous growth theory. In the theoretical segment, mobile labor between manufacturing and R&D activities, and elasticity of substitution between labor and energy in manufacturing lower than unity allow for a growth dividend, even if we consider preexisting tax distortions. The scope for innovation is reduced when we consider direct financial investment in the lab, or elastic labor supply. We then apply the core theoretical model to a real growing economy and find that a boost in long-run economic growth following such a carbon policy is a possible outcome. Redistribution of additional carbon tax revenue by lowering capital taxation performs best in terms of effciency measured by aggregate welfare. In terms of equity among social segments the progressive character of lump-sum redistribution fails when we consider very high emissions reduction targets.     

Best policy response to environmental shocks: Applying a stochastic framework

The paper develops a general framework for the analysis of environmental shocks in growing economies. Endogenous capital investments allow identifying the dual role of capital as a buffer against shocks and a source of pollution. We study the effects of recurring natural disasters on optimal growth and efficient environmental policies. Emissions may cause continuous fluctuations, entail discrete and recurring jumps, or trigger so-called “tipping points” with large costs to the economy. Closed-form solutions are provided for all the model variants. We discuss possible applications in environmental economics and identify current research gaps.     

Pollution Permits and Sustainable Growth in a Schumpeterian Model

In Chapter 4 of their book (“Endogenous Growth Theory,” MIT Press, Cambridge, MA (1998)), Aghion and Howitt introduce environmental pollution in an aggregate Schumpeterian model and characterize the optimal path. In this paper, we study the equilibria in a decentralized economy compatible with their model. First, we study the trade-off between environmental quality and growth and identify the channels of transmission of environmental policy into growth performance. Then, we compute the levels of the tools which are used to implement the optimum.     

Pollution and Capital Markets in Developing Countries

It is said that firms in developing countries do not have incentives to invest in pollution control because of weak implementation of environmental regulations. This argument assumes that the regulator is the only agent that can create incentives for pollution control, and ignores that capital markets, if properly informed, may provide the appropriate financial and reputational incentives. We show that capital markets in Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and the Philippines do react to announcements of environmental events, such as those of superior environmental performance or citizens' complaints. A policy implication is that environmental regulators in developing countries may explicitly harness those market forces by introducing structured programs of information release pertaining to firms' environmental performance: public disclosure mechanisms in developing countries may be a useful model to consider given limited government enforcement resources.     

An input-output analysis of environmental preservation

A well-established criterion for determining the growth potential of an economy, the technology of which can be represented by a nonnegative indecomposable square matrix, is examined critically. The concept of growth upon which this criterion is established is shown to be ambiguous since the environmental repercussions of economic activity are completely ignored. Assuming that this economy possesses an antipollution technology which has hitherto been ignored, an alternative criterion to gauge growth potential in the presence of complete environmental preservation is proposed. The magnitude of the uniform rate of profit which must obtain when the economy ignores the environment if a policy of environmental preservation is to be deemed technically feasible is calculated. Finally, a number of factors which would facilitate the implementation of a policy of environmental preservation are discussed.     

Household incidence of pollution control policies: A robust welfare analysis using general equilibrium effects

This study assesses the incidence of pollution control policies on households. In contrast to previous studies, we employ an integrated framework combining a multisector general equilibrium model with a stochastic dominance analysis using household-level data. We consider three policy instruments in a domestic emission trading system: (i) an output-based allocation (OBA) of permits; (ii) the use of the proceeds of permit sales to reduce payroll taxes (RPT); (iii) and the use of these proceeds to reduce consumption taxes instead (UCS). The general equilibrium results suggest that the return to capital is more negatively affected than the wage rate in all simulations, since polluting industries are capital intensive. Abstracting from pollution externalities, the dominance analysis suggests that all three policies have a normatively robust negative (positive) impact on welfare (poverty). Formal dominance tests indicate that RPT first-order welfare dominates OBA over all values of household incomes. UCS also first-order poverty dominates RPT for any choice of poverty line below $CAN 18,600, and poverty dominates for any poverty line (and thus welfare dominates) at the second order. Finally, while the three pollution control policies do not have a numerically large impact on inequality (in comparison to the base run), statistical tests indicate that inequality increases significantly more with OBA and RPT than with UCS.     

Models-as-usual for unusual risks? On the value of catastrophic climate change

We study the role of intertemporal preference representations in a model of economic growth, stock pollutant and endogenous risk of catastrophic collapse. We contrast two polar instances of risk-sensitive preferences: the traditional “discounted utility” model, which imposes a positive rate of pure time preference and risk neutrality with respect to intertemporal utility, and multiplicatively separable preferences, which display risk aversion in that dimension but no pure time preferences. We show that both representations of preferences can rationalize the same economy when there is no collapse risk associated with pollution. Once we introduce a collapse risk whose hazard rate depends on the pollution stock, multiplicatively separable preferences are associated with a much higher value of catastrophic risk reduction, and a more stringent policy response. A relatively high discount rate may thus be compatible with large emissions abatement in the face of a low probability large impact event, reflecting preferences for catastrophic risk reduction.     

Optimal investment in pollution control capital in a neoclassical growth context

A neoclassical growth model is employed to study the optimal division of investment between pollution control capital and directly productive capital while simultaneously treating the saving rate as a policy variable to be varied to the optimal. The model treats pollution as a flow positively related to aggregate output, negatively related to the stock of pollution control capital, and having a negative effect on utility. Under the assumptions chosen, the optimal policy is an unbalanced one of specializing investment first in directly productive capital and subsequently in pollution control capital.     

Domestic politics and the formation of international environmental agreements

We investigate the effect of domestic politics on international environmental policy by incorporating into a classic stage game of coalition formation the phenomenon of lobbying by special-interest groups. In doing so, we contribute to the theory of international environmental agreements, which has overwhelmingly assumed that governments make decisions based on a single set of public-interest motivations. Our results suggest that lobbying on emissions may affect the size of the stable coalition in counterintuitive ways. In particular, a powerful business lobby may increase the government's incentives to sign an agreement, by providing it with strong bargaining power with respect to that lobby at the emission stage. This would result in lower total emissions when the number of countries involved is not too large. We also show that things change radically when lobbying bears directly on the membership decisions, suggesting that both the object and timing of lobbying matter for the way in which membership decisions, emissions and welfare are affected.     

Economic growth and environmental pollution under the max-min principle

This paper first analyzes the interactions between capital accumulation and environmental pollution under the program of sustained constant utility, which depends on per capita consumption and pollution, over all generations. Then the optimal program of economic growth is discussed. The implications of the constant-utility criterion (or the max-min principle) are compared with those of the utilitarian criterion which has been widely adopted in environmental pollution literature. Subsequently, the analysis incorporates pollution-abatement investment and exhaustible resources. We conclude that the max-min principle works fairly satisfactorily in this world.     

重金属对水生生物的生态毒理效应及生物耐受机制研究进展

近年来,随着国民经济的快速发展,重金属以其特有的性质而被大量的应用于生产生活当中,同时也由于各种原因造成了水体重金属污染现象。水体重金属污染不仅对水生生物的生长和繁殖造成了严重的威胁,同时也威胁到人类的健康。因此,重金属污染具有潜在的生态与健康风险。本文主要概括介绍了重金属对水生植物、动物、微生物的生态毒理效应以及水生生物对重金属的各种耐受机制,展望了重金属对水生生物生态毒理效应的未来研究重点和方向。     

A cultural model of private provision and the environment

This paper analyses an overlapping generations model of environmental externalities and capital accumulation where private contributions to environmental quality are motivated by a desire to socialize others into environmental attitudes. In this framework, the formation of environmental preferences is the result of a cultural transmission process depending on the extent of private contributions. In the short run, we show that three equilibria may arise: a first one where all green agents contribute to the environment, a second one where nobody contributes to the environment and a third interior one. We show that the capital-accumulation process and the change in preferences that occur in this economy lead the interior equilibrium to be selected, in which some, but not all, green agents contribute to the environment. The model thus provides an economic rationale for the gap between the number of people who care about the environment and the number who adopt pro-environmental behaviours. We also show that the fraction of contributors rises with capital, so that we explain the negative relationship between this gap and country income. Last, we show that this gap is particularly detrimental for welfare, and analyse the impact of a number of public policies.     

Environmental policies and productivity growth: Evidence across industries and firms

This paper investigates the impact of changes in environmental policy stringency on industry- and firm-level productivity growth in a panel of OECD countries. To test the strong version of the Porter Hypothesis (PH), we extend a neo-Schumpeterian productivity model to allow for effects of environmental policies. We use a new environmental policy stringency (EPS) index and let the effect of countries׳ environmental policies vary with the pollution intensity of the industry and with the countries’ and firms’ technological advancement. A tightening of environmental policy is associated with a short-term increase in industry-level productivity growth in the most technologically-advanced countries. This effect diminishes with the distance to the global productivity frontier, eventually becoming insignificant. For the average firm, no evidence of PH is found. However, the most productive firms see a temporary boost in productivity growth, while the less productive ones experience a productivity slowdown.     

Competing land uses and fossil fuel,and optimal energy conversion rates during the transition toward a green economy under a pollution stock constraint

We study the transition to a carbon-free economy in a model with a polluting non-renewable resource and a clean renewable resource. Transforming primary energy into ready-to-use energy services is costly and more efficient energy transformation rates are more costly to achieve. Renewable energy competes with food production for land and the food productivity of land can be improved at some cost. To avoid catastrophic climate damages, the pollution stock is mandated to stay below a given cap. When the economy is not constrained by the cap, the efficiency of energy transformation increases steadily until the transition toward the ultimate green economy; when renewable energy is exploited, its land use rises at the expense of food production; food productivity increases together with the land rent but food production drops; the food and energy prices increase and renewables substitute for non-renewable energy. During the constrained phase, the economy follows a constant path of prices, quantities, efficiency rates, food productivity and land rent, a phenomenon we call the ‘ceiling efficiency paradox’.     

‘Effortless Perfection:’ Do Chinese cities manipulate air pollution data?

This paper uses unique data on daily air pollution concentrations over the period 2001–2010 to test for manipulation in self-reported data by Chinese cities. First, we employ a discontinuity test to detect evidence consistent with data manipulation. Then, we propose a panel matching approach to identify the conditions under which irregularities may occur. We find that about 50% of cities reported dubious PM₁₀ pollution levels that led to a discontinuity at the cut-off. Suspicious data reporting tends to occur on days when the anomaly is least detectable. Our findings indicate that the official daily air pollution data are not well behaved, which provides suggestive evidence of manipulation.     

Valuation of natural capital under uncertain substitutability

Natural capital is complex to value notably because of the high uncertainties surrounding the substitutability of its future ecosystem services. We examine a Lucas economy in which a consumption good is produced by combining different inputs, one of them being an ecosystem service that is partially substitutable with other inputs. The growth rate of these inputs and the elasticity of substitution evolve in a stochastic way. We characterize the socially efficient ecological discount rates that should be used to value future ecosystem services at different time horizons. We show that the inverse of the elasticity of substitution can be interpreted as the CCAPM beta of natural capital. We also show that any increase in risk of this beta reduces the ecological discount rate. If our collective beliefs about the elasticity of substitution of ecosystem services are Gaussian, the ecological discount rates go to minus infinity for finite maturities. In that case, a marginal increase in natural capital has an infinite value. We provide a realistic calibration of the model that is coherent with observed asset prices by using the model of extreme events of Barro (2006). The bliss maturity for infinite discount factors is less than 100 years in this calibration.     

Income inequality and willingness to pay for environmental public goods

We study how the distribution of income among members of society, and income inequality in particular, affects social willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental public goods. We find that social WTP for environmental goods decreases (increases) with income inequality if and only if environmental goods and manufactured goods are substitutes (complements). We derive adjustment factors for benefit transfer to control for differences in income distributions between a study site and a policy site. For illustration, we quantify how social WTP for environmental public goods depends on the respective income distributions for empirical case studies in Sweden and the World at large. We find that the adjustment for income inequality can be substantial.     

Environmental regulation as a double-edged sword for housing markets: Evidence from the NOx Budget Trading Program

We investigate the effects of environmental regulations on housing markets using a quasi-experimental setting—the NO_x Budget Trading Program (NBP). Hedonic theory predicts that house prices should rise as pollution levels decrease. However, environmental regulations may also affect labor markets, and thus housing demand. Employing a difference-in-differences framework, we find that house prices shifted up in the regulated areas with low manufacturing intensity, whereas in the areas with high manufacturing intensity, housing markets were weakened. We also find that in high-manufacturing-intensity areas, loan application volume declined, rejection rate augmented, and the probability of loan default increased.