Do energy prices affect employment? Decomposed international evidence

This paper analyzes the energy price-employment nexus and contributes to the literature by showing that it is important to decompose the regulatory effect into demand, cost, and factor-shift effects. This is done by means of a cross-country multi-sectoral dataset. The results show that both rising energy prices and shadow prices of energy have no significant effect on net employment when the manufacturing sectors only are analyzed. While finding significant variations across countries, the average employment effects become significantly positive once jobs in the economy as a whole are considered. This change is driven mainly by larger positive cost effects, which more than offset the negative demand effects and reductions in the positive factor-shift effects. Moreover, the paper reveals that the often implemented approach of using a simple regulation regressor, instead of decomposing the employment effect, can result in biased estimates.     

Evaluating CO2 reduction strategies in the US

We constructed a model to simulate emissions of CO₂ from electricity generation in the US and, using the model, we developed 20-year projections of emissions under various regulatory scenarios.     

Estimating soil carbon turnover using radiocarbon data: A case-study for European Russia

Turnover rates of soil carbon for 20 soil types typical for a 3.7 million km² area of European Russia were estimated based on ¹⁴C data. The rates are corrected for bomb radiocarbon which strongly affects the topsoil ¹⁴C balance. The approach is applied for carbon stored in the organic and mineral layers of the upper 1 m of the soil profile. The turnover rates of carbon in the upper 20 cm are relatively high for forest soils (0.16–0.78% year⁻¹), intermediate for tundra soils (0.25% year⁻¹), and low for grassland soils (0.02–0.08% year⁻¹) with the exception of southern Chernozems (0.32% year⁻¹). In the soil layer of 20–100 cm depth, the turnover rates were much lower for all soil types (0.01–0.06% year⁻¹) except for peat bog soils of the southern taiga (0.14% year⁻¹). Combined with a map of soil type distribution and a dataset of several hundred soil carbon profiles, the method provides annual fluxes for the slowest components of soil carbon assuming that the latter is in equilibrium with climate and vegetation cover. The estimated carbon flux from the soil is highest for forest soils (12–147 gC/(m² year)), intermediate for tundra soils (33 gC/(m² year)), and lowest for grassland soils (1–26 gC/(m² year)). The approach does not distinguish active and recalcitrant carbon fractions and this explains the low turnover rates in the top layer. Since changes in soil types will follow changes in climate and land cover, we suggest that pedogenesis is an important factor influencing the future dynamics of soil carbon fluxes. Up to now, both the effect of soil type changes and the clear evidence from ¹⁴C measurements that most soil organic carbon has a millennial time scale, are basically neglected in the global carbon cycle models used for projections of atmospheric CO₂ in 21st century and beyond.     

Strategic implications of counter-geoengineering: Clash or cooperation?

Solar geoengineering has received increasing attention as an option to temporarily stabilize global temperatures. A key concern is that heterogeneous preferences over the optimal amount of cooling combined with low deployment costs may allow the country with the strongest incentive for cooling, the so-called free-driver, to impose a substantial externality on the rest of the world. We analyze whether the threat of counter-geoengineering technologies capable of negating the climatic effects of solar geoengineering can overcome the free-driver problem and tilt the game in favour of international cooperation. Our game-theoretical model of countries with asymmetric preferences allows for a rigorous analysis of the strategic interaction surrounding solar geoengineering and counter-geoengineering. We find that counter-geoengineering prevents the free-driver outcome, but not always with benign effects. The presence of counter-geoengineering leads to either a climate clash where countries engage in a non-cooperative escalation of opposing climate interventions (negative welfare effect), a moratorium treaty where countries commit to abstain from either type of climate intervention (indeterminate welfare effect), or cooperative deployment of solar geoengineering (positive welfare effect). We show that the outcome depends crucially on the degree of asymmetry in temperature preferences between countries.