Does risk of intraspecific interactions induce shifts in prey-size preference in aquatic predators?

Interactions between foragers may seriously affect individual foraging efficiency. In a laboratory study of handling time, prey value and prey-size preference in northern pike and signal crayfish, we show that risk of intraspecific interactions between predators does not affect handling time or value of prey. However, the presence of agonistic intraspecific interactors shifts prey-size preference in these predators. Neither northern pike nor signal crayfish foraging alone show a prey-size preference, while pike foraging among conspecifics prefer small prey, and crayfish foraging in groups prefer large prey. We ascribe the different outcomes in prey preference to differences in susceptibility to interactions: northern pike under risk avoid large prey to avoid long handling times and the associated risk of interactions, while signal crayfish foraging among conspecifics may defend themselves and their prey during handling, and thus select prey to maximise investment. In addition, the value of pike prey (roach) is low for very small prey, maximises for small prey, and then decreases monotonically for larger prey, while crayfish prey (pond snail) value is low for very small prey, has a maximum at small prey, but does not decrease as much for larger prey. Therefore, a large and easily detected snail prey provides a crayfish with as much value as a small prey. We conclude that interaction risk and predator density affect prey-size preference differently in these aquatic predators, and therefore has different potential effects on prey-size structure and population and community dynamics. Received: 4 October 1999 / Revised: 20 March 2000 / Accepted: 27 May 2000     

Incentives for Biological Conservation: Costa Rica's Private Wildlife Refuge Program

Abstract: The alarming pace of tropical biodiversity loss requires development of innovative approaches for in situ biodiversity conservation. Incentive-based approaches have emerged as one possible option. We interviewed 68 private nature reserve owners to learn more about one of Costa Rica's incentive programs. The interview group included all reserve owners participating in the government's Private Wildlife Refuge Program (n = 22) and a control group of nonparticipating owners (n = 46). Quantitative and qualitative data led to seven main conclusions on the use of incentive programs: (1) a developing country can expand and enhance its formal park system through conservation incentives; (2) insufficient promotion, and resulting information gaps, can prevent an incentive program from realizing its full potential; (3) landowners enter a program not only in response to the intended incentive package, but also for several powerful and hidden incentives such as publicity and marketing purposes; (4) underutilization of official incentives by participants, in part due to sporadic delivery of incentives by the government, can undermine program effectiveness; (5) biodiversity protection goals can be accomplished by means of a wide range of incentives; (6) programs that require only a short-term commitment by landowners can still lead to long-term biodiversity protection; and (  7) a program can produce unanticipated negative consequences at the national level, including putting conservation at odds with social justice. These and other lessons on the use of incentives should be of interest wherever biodiversity is threatened, wherever new conservation partners are being sought, and wherever incentive-based approaches are being considered.