亚洲高能效和环境无害的工业技术部分Ⅰ:技术方案的经济可行性评价

本文描述中国、印度、菲律宾和斯里兰卡能源密集和污染型工业中可以引进的一些技术变革.当选择一种新的高能效和环境无害的工业技术时需要考虑的因素中包括现行技术的状态、前期费用、运行费用、设备效率、企业内部可供利用的技能水平.为了确认一种新技术是经济上可行的,也需要考虑许多外部因素:合理能源定价的存在,是否有适用的环境法规和激励机制到位,总体金融环境,经济体系的透明度等.     

Epidemiology of occupational acute traumatic hand injuries: a literature review

The purpose of this review was to summarize the literature on occupational, acute, traumatic hand injury and suggest directions for future research. In 1996, the leading occupational injury treated in United States' hospital emergency departments was an acute hand injury (e.g. laceration, crush or fracture). These injuries affected 30% of an estimated 3.3 million injured workers (990,000). Cuts and lacerations of the fingers ranked third after back and leg strains in the number of lost workday cases in the USA in 1994. The incidence rate of hand injuries studied in seven manufacturing environments around the world ranged from 4 to 11 per 100 workers per year. Workers aged 24 years or less had the highest risk of hand injury. Men had higher rates of severe hand injury than women.Despite the high frequency and significant amount of lost work time associated with these injuries, they are poorly understood from an etiological perspective. There is only one case-control study of occupational hand injury in the literature. That study suggested an important role for both fixed (age) and transient risk factors (doing an unusual task) at the time of the injury. More analytic epidemiological research is needed to identify potentially modifiable risk or protective factors (e.g. glove use) for acute hand injuries. In this regard, the case-crossover design, a relatively new epidemiological approach using cases as their own controls, could prove an efficient method for determining transient, modifiable risk factors for acute, occupational hand injury.     

State Intervention to Protect Endangered Species: Why History and Bad Luck Matter

Abstract: Illegal exploitation threatens the survival of many species, and anti-poaching legislation ("protection on paper") does not protect species. State enforcement is needed to support and supplement the formal status of endangered species, but state enforcement can be a source of instability leading to the demise of species if ad hoc rules are followed blindly. We demonstrate this with a model of poaching, wildlife, and government wildlife enforcement, but our findings apply more generally. Crucial assumptions of the dynamic model are that both poaching and enforcement effort increase or decrease whenever poaching effort and enforcement are relatively profitable or unprofitable activities, respectively. We found that multiple steady states may characterize the system's equilibrium. Depending on initial populations, the initial extent of state involvement, and random events, animal populations may be severely depleted or unexpectedly built up during transition phases. Our findings highlight the importance of history and luck in protecting endangered species.