Incentives and prices in an emissions trading scheme with updating

Emissions trading schemes where allocations are based on updated baseline emissions give firms less incentive to reduce emissions for a given quota (or allowance) price. Nevertheless, according to Böhringer and Lange [On the design of optimal grandfathering schemes for emission allowances, Europ. Econ. Rev. 49 (2005) 2041–2055], such allocation schemes are cost-effective if the system is closed and allocation rules are identical across firms. In this paper, we show that the cost-effective solution may be infeasible if marginal abatement costs grow too fast. Moreover, if a price cap or banking/borrowing is introduced, the abatement profile is no longer the same as in the case with an auction (or lump-sum allocation). In addition, we show that with allocation based on updated emissions, the quota price will always exceed marginal abatement costs, possibly misguiding policy makers and investors about abatement costs. Numerical simulations indicate that the quota price most likely will be several times higher than marginal abatement costs, unless a significant share of allowances is auctioned.     

Rent dissipation and efficient rationalization in for-hire recreational fishing

Recreational fisheries are increasingly important in fisheries management; for some species, recreational take rivals or exceeds the amount harvested by commercial fishermen. Most recreational fisheries are regulated with gear restrictions, bag limits, and time/area closures, but there is increasing interest in the market-based solutions employed in commercial fisheries — this despite the lack of an adequate bioeconomic theory of the joint commercial/recreational aspects of many recreational fisheries. This paper integrates a detailed production specification with traditional bioeconomic tools in order to better understand the implications of rationalization schemes targeted at the charter sector. While confirming some of the qualitative conclusions of the commercial fisheries literature on open access and regulated open access our model also generates rich and novel predictions with respect to input choices, the number of vessels and congestion externalities. We devise a system of instruments that generate efficient outcomes and extensively discuss issues associated with their real-world implementation.     

Environmental Market Failures: Are There Any Local Market-Based Corrective Mechanisms for Global Problems?

The paper reviews various policy tools that have been discussed in the literature, including legal, administrative and fiscal (tax) schemes, as well as tradeable emission permits, and concludes that none of them are really suitable for dealing with global problems. An alternative is suggested, namely the use of tradeable individual consumption quotas for traded commodities at the national level, to be extended later to the global level by trading quotas among nations (assuming agreement can be reached on the basis for determining quotas). This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

流域环境保护与均衡发展的矛盾及其对策探析

为寻找可兼顾发展与环保、效率与公平、能调动上下游双向积极性的制度安排或系统解决方案,尝试提出了“水系工业排放配额制”的方法,即将水系所能承载的最大工业排放量作为配额,公平分配到流域单元,并允许其交易;企业可在投资治污抑或购买排放配额之间进行自由选择,环境脆弱的流域单元也可向外转让其“闲置”的排放配额,这样其因承担源头保护义务而被迫放弃的部分工业发展权就从配额交易中得到了补偿,并可将此补偿用于发展生态适宜产业,鉴于流域环境保护与均衡发展矛盾的复杂性及工业排放控制的难度,方案的实施宜循序渐进．     

基于“权额分立”理念的碳排放权性质与相关概念审视

碳排放交易是推动碳减排,实现碳达峰、碳中和的重要政策工具。为提高碳排放交易市场的规范化管理与运营,生态环境部加快了推动碳排放交易市场法治化的步伐。然而《碳排放权交易管理办法（试行）》中用碳排放额度来解释碳排放权,直接影响了学界对碳排放权的性质定位。碳排放权和碳排放配额在碳排放交易机制中所发挥的功能并不相同,有必要确立“权额分立”的理念对碳排放权的性质进行重新检视。在“权额分立”理念下,剥离碳排放配额的碳排放权仅作为一种行政许可权存在,碳排放配额则具有物权性质,两者互不影响。作为行政许可权的碳排放权不具有可交易性,因此,在规范文件中以“碳排放交易”取代“碳排放权交易”较为稳妥;另在碳排放权的概念界定中也应当与碳排放配额相区分。