Linking the EU emissions trading scheme: economic implications of allowance allocation and global carbon constraints

We investigate the role of domestic allowance allocation and global emissions constraints for the carbon-market impacts of linking the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) internationally. Employing a quantitative simulation model of the global carbon market, we find that the economic benefits from connecting the European ETS to emerging non-EU schemes strongly depend on the regional allowance allocation of the linking participants: In a world of moderate carbon constraints, an economically efficient regional allowance allocation induces a much stronger fall in total compliance costs than a sub-optimal (i.e. too high) domestic allocation of emissions permits. However, a more efficient (i.e. stricter) allocation shifts abatement efforts and compliance costs to energy-intensive industries which are covered by the domestic ETS. We further find that committing to ambitious global emissions reduction targets (compatible with stabilizing CO₂ concentrations at 450 ppm) induces much stronger regional abatement efforts and substantially higher compliance costs for the abating regions. In such an ambitious climate policy regime, an efficient domestic allocation of allowances is even more important from an economic perspective: Here, linking emissions trading schemes diminishes the associated compliance costs on the largest scale.

Foresty offsets in emissions trading systems: a link between systems?

An important aspect in the linking of different emissions trading schemes is the degree to which these systems allow (or ban) external offset project categories. The EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) currently allows the use of credits from energy and industry projects developed under the Kyoto Protocol’s Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) but excludes the use of carbon credits from forestry projects for compliance in the EU ETS. Forestry credits generated by the CDM have a limited lifetime and expire at the end of a project’s crediting period, or earlier if the carbon stock for which the credits have been issued ceases to exist. According to the recently adopted amendment of the EU ETS Directive forestry credits will remain to be excluded until 2020. The present article reviews how the New South Wales Greenhouse Gas Abatement Scheme (Australia), the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (US) and the voluntary scheme of the Chicago Climate Exchange integrate forestry offsets into the respective system and how they deal with the risk of losing stored and credited biomass. By comparing the results of different scenarios this article shows how differences in the treatment of forestry offsets could impact the efforts to link various emission trading systems in future.

Linking Russia with the European and global greenhouse gas emissions trading markets: three paths for greening the Russian assigned amount under the Kyoto Protocol

This article examines possibilities for linkage between the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) and Russia, with a view to enhancing cooperation on a broader scale than the project-based approaches that have been tested thus far. Three paths for possible EU-Russia linkage are presented by which the Russian Assigned Amount under the Kyoto Protocol can be greened in order to stimulate emissions trading: 1. Joint implementation—reductions earned via individual projects in Russia; 2. Greened allowances or green investment schemes; and 3. Linked cap-and-trade systems, in which a Russian domestic emissions trading system would link with the European Union Emissions Trading System. The authors conclude that the third option, emissions trading through linked domestic emissions trading systems, offers the best opportunities at the lowest transaction costs. The authors discuss useful innovative instruments like call options and slip level arrangements on government-to-government and business-to-business levels.

碳排放交易制度下城市减排的机会成本研究——基于中国碳排放试点城市的实证检验

作为全球气候治理的重要手段,碳排放交易制度受到了广泛的关注与讨论。基于此,本文采用我国2010-2016年城市面板数据,运用非参数方法构建方向性环境距离函数测算了2009-2015年城市减排的机会成本,计算结果显示,试点地区与非试点地区的碳排放的机会成本整体表现为上升的趋势,且试点地区的碳排放的机会成本总体低于非试点地区。在测算城市减排机会成本的基础上,运用双重差分法来检验碳排放交易制度的有效性。经检验发现：碳排放交易制度有利于降低城市减排的机会成本,然而由于碳排放交易制度还存在碳排放权初始分配制度缺失、碳排放交易制度的定价机制扭曲等问题,因此其对降低城市减排的机会成本作用较小,并且进一步通过对政策时间趋势的分析得出政策效应随时间推移而逐渐减弱。     

美国加州南海岸区域清洁空气激励市场项目概况及进展

目前中国一些地区正在试点探索实施区域性排污交易项目。美国是世界上最早将排污交易理论付诸实践的国家,作为该国最早的区域性大气污染物排污交易计划之一,加州"区域清洁空气激励市场"项目自1994年开始运行。这一排污交易项目不仅实现了氮氧化物与硫氧化物减排目标,而且形成了相对健全的排污交易规则。"区域清洁空气激励市场"的总量控制机制、初始分配和交易规则与排污交易市场运行经验,对中国地方性排污交易项目设计具有重要的借鉴意义。     

中国排污权交易体系模式及选择研究

实行污染物排污权交易是中国环境管理科学转变的必然。本文对最早且成功实施了排污权交易的美国交易模式进行了研究,分析了ERCs模式、EA模式、DERs模式的特点和优劣,并根据中国的实际和环境管理特点,提出逐步实行兼有行政管理和经济刺激的优点、具有现实应用可能和可操作性的排污削减信用模式(ERCs)的结果。     

不同情境下中国碳排放权交易市场的风险度量

以深圳、湖北、广东、上海及北京5个碳交易中心2015～2020年的日交易数据为基础,设置了Ave、Med、Max、Min4种交易情境,采用TGARCH-VaR模型对不同情境下的碳排放权交易市场风险进行了研究.结果表明,不同情境下碳排放交易市场风险存在差异,各情境的市场稳定性、政策响应度均存在一定规律:Ave情境碳现货收...     

碳交易背景下中国华北地区碳代谢格局变化

碳排放权交易市场作为推进美丽中国建设、实现降碳减污绿色发展的重要手段,成为当前研究的热点问题.为探究碳交易背景下华北地区试点区域及非试点区域碳代谢过程,以城市碳代谢理论为依据,采取投入产出分析和生态网络分析相结合的研究方法.结果表明,北京和天津作为早期交易试点区域,区域从2012年后呈现直接碳排放量稳步下降、隐含碳排放量缓慢增加趋势.试点产业部门直接排放量与隐含排放量变化趋势一致,其中煤炭开采和洗选业、石油和天然气开采业和非金属矿物制品业减排效应明显,而排放量较高的电力、热力的生产和供应业表现为增加趋势.部门隐含碳排放强度与隐含碳排放量变化趋势相似证实部门隐含增加值在交易过程中并未增加.高碳排放部门的隐含碳排放量主要由长度小于6的代谢路径所贡献,因此应重点关注部门间较短路径传递的商品或服务的“清洁化”.在交易政策实施以前,区域产业部门间跨区域贸易较少,表现为低碳排放产品交换;2012年以后,随着京津冀城市群协同发展以及华北地区不断构筑的区域经济发展新格局,促使区域间跨区域和跨部门贸易增加.以碳排放权交易制度为背景,构建识别系统内关键参与者及关键路径的方法体系,可为区域性政策实施及可持续发展提供科学的发展建议.     

二氧化碳捕集利用与封存项目纳入碳市场的现状、挑战与对策

二氧化碳捕集、利用与封存（CCUS）被认为是燃煤和燃气电厂以及钢铁、水泥和石化等行业实现碳中和的重要技术选项,而碳市场则是重要的市场化减排机制,提高两者的衔接水平,对于我国“双碳”目标的实现具有重要意义。通过总结国际上CCUS项目与碳市场衔接的成功经验,可以为我国CCUS项目与碳市场衔接提供相关借鉴。本文系统梳理了国内外CCUS项目纳入碳市场的立法、激励政策、CCUS减排核算方法学研究情况,识别出我国在CCUS项目与碳市场衔接方面尚存在法律支撑不足、缺乏激励政策以及CCUS项目碳减排核算方法不准确等一系列问题,最后提出多项建议以推动我国CCUS项目与碳市场的衔接：①完善碳市场监管和法律体系,促进CCUS与碳市场衔接;②研判CCUS优先领域,分阶段促进不同行业CCUS项目纳入碳交易市场;③强化政策激励,打通CCUS与碳市场衔接的投融资与成本疏导路径;④分阶段完善碳交易市场建设,充分发挥碳市场金融属性促进CCUS与碳交易市场衔接;⑤建立完善的监测、报告和核查（MRV）标准体系和证书制度,保证CCUS项目减排量核证的准确性和规范性。     

Enforcement and price controls in emissions trading

This paper examines how enforcement affects the structure and performance of emissions trading programs with price controls under uncertainty about firms' abatement costs. The analysis highlights how an enforcement strategy can cause abatement-cost risk to be transmitted to enforcement costs via the price of permits. When this occurs, accommodating the effect of abatement-cost risk with an optimal policy results in higher expected emissions and lower expected permit price than their second-best optimal values. However, it is possible to design an enforcement strategy that shields enforcement costs from abatement-cost risk by tying sanctions directly to permit prices. This enforcement strategy stabilizes enforcement effort, the optimal permit supply and price controls are independent of enforcement costs, and the policy produces the second-best optimal outcome.