Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance

This paper explores empirically the impact of enforcement efforts on environmental compliance, focusing on the role of regulator reputation spillover effects. We find that, on the margin, the impact of a fine for water pollutant violations is about a two-thirds reduction in the statewide violation rate in the year following a fine. This large result obtains through the regulator's enhanced reputation; the deterrence impact on other plants in a state is almost as strong as the impact on the sanctioned plant. Focusing only on the response of the sanctioned plant, as in previous studies, may therefore seriously underestimate the efficacy of fines and other sanctions. This paper also examines the relative effectiveness of monitoring and enforcement instruments. Non-monetary sanctions contribute no detected impact on compliance, and the marginal fine induces substantially greater compliance than the marginal inspection.     

‘Optimal’ pollution abatement—whose benefits matter, and how much?

We examine the determinants of environmental regulatory activity (inspections and enforcement actions) and levels of air and water pollution for 409 US pulp and paper mills, using data for 1985–1997. We focus on the benefits to the surrounding population from pollution abatement. Plants with larger benefits emit less pollution, as do those with more kids and elders nearby. Plants in poor areas emit more pollution, though (surprisingly) we find less pollution in minority areas. Out-of-state neighbors seem to count less than in-state ones, although this effect diminishes if the bordering state's Congressional delegation is strongly pro-environment. We use ‘spatially lagged’ instrumental variables to control for the potential endogeneity of which individuals choose to locate near the plant. The results for regulatory activity are noticeably less significant than the emissions results.     

Coercive versus cooperative pollution control: Comparative study of state programs to reduce erosion and sedimentation pollution in urban areas

This article examines coercive and cooperative approaches to implementing state urban erosion and sedimentation pollution control programs. State administrators report serious shortfalls in their ability to control sources of pollution, but comparison of more and less successful programs provides evidence of what states can do to make programs more effective. Key ingredients for a successful state effort include the use of coercion with both the private sector and local government, adequate staffing, application of severe sanctions when violations of state standards are detected, and provision of technical assistance. Many state programs lack one or more of those elements, which explains their inability to adequately control urban erosion and sedimentation pollution.     

Risk aversion and compliance in markets for pollution control

This paper examines the effects of risk aversion on compliance choices in markets for pollution control. A firm's decision to be compliant or not is independent of its manager's risk preference. However, non-compliant firms with risk-averse managers will have lower violations than otherwise identical firms with risk-neutral managers. The violations of non-compliant firms with risk-averse managers are independent of differences in their profit functions and their initial allocations of permits if and only if their managers' utility functions exhibit constant absolute risk aversion. However, firm-level characteristics do impact violation choices when managers have coefficients of absolute risk aversion that are increasing or decreasing in profit levels. Finally, in the equilibrium of a market for emissions rights with widespread non-compliance, risk aversion is associated with higher permit prices, better environmental quality, and lower aggregate violations.     

Connecticut nighttime safety belt use

Problem

Safety belt use in the United States, as measured over daylight hours, has risen steadily over recent years reaching 80% in 2004. Yet, using the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS), safety belt use among fatally injured front seat outboard occupants of passenger vehicles was only between 42% and 46% for the years 1999 to 2003. One possible contributing factor is that safety belt use at night, when crash rates are highest, is lower than during the day.

Method

A full statewide nighttime belt use observation survey was conducted in 2004. This survey was conducted simultaneously with Connecticut's annual full statewide daytime belt use survey. Night belt use observations of drivers and passengers are possible using newly available near military grade night vision goggles and handheld infrared spotlights. Both day and goggle-assisted night observations were conducted at 100 observation sites in Connecticut. Procedures for day and night observations were as nearly identical as possible.

Results

The night belt use rate was 6.4 percentage points lower than the day rate (83.0 vs. 76.6). Consistent with belt use among Connecticut fatalities, day versus night differences were greatest in urban areas. There was evidence that day versus night differences were greater before as compared to after a May 2004 belt use enforcement program.     

论修订后《大气污染防治法》对环境监测的要求

2000年4月再次修订后的《大气污染防治法》对原有法律条款的内容作了重大修改。其重点是抓重点城市的大气污染防治、确定了大气污染物排放总量控制和许可证制度、加强机动车污染防治和城市扬尘的控制力度、强化法律责任等方面。作为环境管理组成部分的环境监测工作，要认真覆行新《大气法》赋予的法律职责，为环境执法提供技术支持。     

浅谈洁净煤在锅炉烟尘排放控制中的作用

洁净煤及其正确使用,是治理锅炉烟尘污染最经济、最快捷的手段,这已被国内外的实践所证明。所有的燃煤锅炉都要依据一定的煤质技术条件制造。这也就是为什么锅炉燃用满足其设计要求的燃料,就不会冒黑烟的原因。各种炉型的洁净煤技术条件及其环保操作方法正是依此制定的。因此,以煤的洁净化适应炉,就可以做到不停炉而治理冬季冒黑烟污染。     

增强执法力度,严惩违法行为——对《水污染防治行动计划》的解读

为了推进环境治理体系建设和实现治理能力现代化,加大全国水环境保护工作开展的力度,国务院颁布了水污染防治纲领性文件《水污染防治行动计划》,其中第六条"严格环境执法监管"第十八款"加大执法力度"以十八届四中全会提出的"依法治国"及新《环保法》为基础,针对环境监管、加强执法等提出排污企业的"红黄牌"管理制度、逐级环境监督执法机制建设及严厉打击环境违法行为等具体措施,以铁腕治污,推进环境执法力度,全面打响水污染防治"攻坚战"。     

Enforcement Lessons from the Vienna Übahn

/ This paper combines a review of recent publications on the effectiveness of environmental enforcement in the United States with new data to address the question of what type of enforcement activity is most productive. Using data on 39 state National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) programs, the measures of effort and cost typically applied to environmental enforcement and inspection activities were tested for relationships with compliance outcomes. No statistically significant relationships were found. In the absence of any improving trend in traditional measures of compliance, this lack suggests all enforcement systems presently used by states are failing. To work, an environmental enforcement system needs to include maintenance and restoration of compliance, real deterrence, mobilization of public opinion, minimal obtrusiveness, conformity with legal search requirements, cost-effectiveness for all parties, effective primary role for skilled inspectors, self-monitoring, compatibility with environmental management systems (e.g., ISO 14000), environmental auditing, robustness in the face of changing strategies by permittees, segregation of technical assistance from enforcement, team orientation, adaptability to multimedia, and, most difficult of all, disconnection from today's timely, appropriate, proportionate standard. These goals can be achieved through a proposed new environmental enforcement approach built on infrequent, random, but thorough inspections leading to fully documented enforcement actions resulting in high penalties. The enforcement system used by the Vienna übahn, or subway, can serve as a model for this type of environmental enforcement system. KEY WORDS: Enforcement; Deterrence; Environmental water quality; Discharge elimination systems