ASSESSMENT OF GULLY-CONTROL STRUCTURES IN THE RIO NUTRIA WATERSHED,ZUNI RESERVATION,NEW MEXICO1

ABSTRACT: During the latter part of the 19th century and the early part of the 20th century, a major cycle of erosion, arroyo cutting, and gullying occurred in the southwestern United States. Since this erosion cycle began, many projects to control erosion, such as the Civilian Conservation Corps projects in the 1930s, were initiated. However, in the Southwestern United States few studies have documented the effect of these structures in reducing erosion or their effect on gully systems. As part of a watershed rehabilitation project on the Zuni Reservation, New Mexico, 47 structures made either of earth or rocks and 23 rock and brush structures were assessed. Sixty percent of the 47 earth or rock structures have breached and relative to dam height, 65 percent of 47 structures are more than 50 percent silted. Of the 23 rock and brush structures, 22 percent have breached or are close to breaching. Reasons for breaching of all structural types may be piping, scour immediately below the structures, large runoff and large drainage area, poor maintenance, headcutting, and active arroyo deepening and widening. In most cases, documentation does not exist on structure design, the specific purpose for a structure, or when these structures were built.     

Atmospheric transport pathways from the Bilibino nuclear power plant to Alaska

The Bilibino nuclear power plant (68°03′N, 166°20′E, 340 m asl) in northeastern Siberia is the closest Russian nuclear power plant to the USA. We used an isentropic trajectory model to estimate the probability that air in the Bilibino region would be transported to Alaska following a hypothetical accident. This estimate is based on the meteorological data from 1991 to 1995. Our calculations indicate that the probability that air in the Bilibino region will be transported to Alaska is approximately 6–16%, averaged over the entire year. This probability doubles in the summer and early fall with a maximum in August of 12–33%. For the entire year the mean, median, and minimum transport times from the plant to Alaska are 4, 3.5 and 1 d, respectively. Since rapid transport (1–2 d) could bring air parcels containing short-lived radionuclides, these events potentially represent the greatest risk to inhabitants of Alaska.