Building Safety indicators: Part 2 – Application,practices and results

Petroleum exploration and production in the Barents Sea is a controversial topic. The Goliat field outside the northern coast of Norway will be the first offshore oil development in this region, with planned production start in 2013–2014. Avoiding major accidents at Goliat is critical; not only to reduce the risks to human lives and the environment, but also to gain political acceptance. Providing early warnings of major accidents for Goliat is one of the main objectives of the research project ‘Building Safety’. The objective of this paper is to describe the development of early warnings in the form of indicators. In addition, the paper includes an overview of current status of early warnings of accidents in other major hazard industries; the nuclear power industry, the chemical process industry, and aviation. Experiences from these industries, including lessons learned from recent major accidents, have been used as important input to the development of early warning indicators.     

Multilevel learning from accidents – Case studies in transport

Substantial efforts have been devoted to accident investigations, but do we gain a reasonable benefit from these efforts? The current study explores multilevel (individual, company, sector/trade, authorities) learning from major accidents and serious incidents. Specifically, this involves identifying a set of learning criteria, i.e. factors or indicators that potentially support and contribute to multilevel learning processes. Identifying such criteria is based on: (i) the accident investigation process, (ii) the follow-up efforts, and (iii) contextual aspects. Three Norwegian accident investigations in transportation (aviation, marine, rail) represent the empirical foundation for the study. Learning criteria were derived by both document analyses from the accidents (e.g. investigation reports) and literature reviews on organizational learning. These were the basis for a workshop regarding learning from accidents, with participants from the aviation, marine, and rail sector. Key results from this workshop are presented and discussed. The study concludes by presenting a set of criteria for learning from accidents.     

The critical re-action: Learning from accidents

How do organizations react and learn from accidents? The current paper deals with the justified necessity of acting upon, and learning from accidents. The aim is to discuss organizational dynamics and interplay, evoked and put into (re)action ‘after the fact’.The paper is part of an interview study that was designed to invite individuals to reflect back, and search for patterns in terms of how they interpret the learning impact of an accident, not just in terms of changes within their own organization that can be traced back to accidents, but for the sector as a whole. A presumption for this study was the importance to look at organizational interaction, i.e. how organizations act, affect, and speak with each other. In all 30 people from the rail and marine sector were interviewed with regard to (1) revealed changes in the aftermath of the accident, and (2) conditions for learning from accidents. Thematically, the interviews had two major accidents in Norway as a background theme: The high-speed craft MS Sleipner-accident (1999) and the railway accident at Åsta (2000).The paper reports and discusses key findings from the study, with a specific focus on the interplay between actors and parallel processes in the aftermaths of an accident.     

Accident investigation in the Norwegian petroleum industry - Common features and future challenges

In their regulations, the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) states that the companies responsible for oil and gas exploration and production activities in Norway shall record and investigate accidents and serious incidents. This paper introduces a general model for the accident investigation process in the Norwegian petroleum industry, and presents some results derived from a comparative study of causal factors identified in offshore accident investigation reports from 2002 to 2006. The paper also offers a discussion of the improvement potential in the use of investigation methods. Finally, a discussion of future challenges in accident investigations is provided.