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Pierre-André Jouvet Philippe Michel Gilles Rotillon 《Environmental Modeling and Assessment》2010,15(1):1-11
We are interested in the impact of pollution permits on wages and profits. We analyze important consequences of introducing
a market of pollution permits. A fundamental issue concerns the initial allocation of such permits: should they be allocated
freely by grandfathering or be auctioned. The international symmetric case allows us to capture the essence of the problem
on income factor. We show that allocating permits to factors in proportion of their contribution to production leads to an
efficient (neoclassical) distribution. Considering the international asymmetric case, we show that a permit market does not
modify the competitive world equilibrium without permits when the total allocation is large enough. When it is not, if allocation
of permits is not proportional to the emissions in the world without permits, there is a reduction factor of emissions that
results from the equilibrium allocation of capital. 相似文献
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Crettez Bertrand Jouvet Pierre-Andre Julien Ludovic A. 《Environmental Modeling and Assessment》2021,26(6):999-1013
We introduce a competitive pollution permit market in a two-sector oligopoly equilibrium model. In this model, one commodity is inelastically supplied by one competitive trader and another one is produced by a finite set of oligopolists, using the first commodity as an input. The production of the second commodity is a polluting activity. We study both the competitive and oligopoly equilibria. We provide some conditions under which a supply subsidy given to the oligopolists that is financed by a tax on the competitive agent is Pareto-improving.
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