Sharing Rules for Common-Pool Resources When Self-Insurance is Available

When a group of users who share a common-pool resource through a system of licenses is exposed to the risk of shortage, there is a need to establish a sharing rule. Such sharing rule is likely to impact the individual decisions to self-insure, i.e., to rely on a secure but costly resource instead of the free but uncertain common-pool resource. We determine the optimal sharing rule and the optimal diversification between the common-pool resource and the safe resource as a function of the agents’ individual characteristics, the distribution of the common-pool resource availability, and the cost of the safe resource. We find that, for a group of agents with heterogenous risk preferences, a perfectly informed regulator can obtain the optimal diversification level by imposing a rationing rule which shares the resource between agents proportionally to their relative risk tolerance. We illustrate and interpret our results in the context of water management in France.     

Traps in and of our minds: relationships between human logic,dialectical traps and social-ecological traps

Social-ecological traps are theorized to be present when human actions affect feedbacks and drivers in social-ecological systems, which, in turn, lead to regime shifts that may alter ecosystem capacity to generate services on which human wellbeing depends, and this, in turn, triggers societal responses, where actors and institutions interact with ecological dynamics and unwittingly lock development into a vulnerable pathway. The key dynamic in this theorization seems to be that human action often predicates or initiates the series of cascading affects that determine the presence of, and, perhaps, the effectiveness of, social-ecological traps. However, what drives human action in this context? What logic, assumptions, decisions, world views, and other processes are implicated in this configuration? This paper first briefly reviews ecological identity and the problems of anthropocentricism, human exceptionalism, and human exemptionalism and introduces the term ecological disenfranchisement. Building upon this, the author invokes Horn’s logic and dialectical traps as a lens for understanding human roles and the prevalence of issues with ecological identities, within social ecological traps. Drilling further down, the paper illustrates these traps with short vignettes, in each case, attempting to link the human logical traps with larger system dynamics. Finally, the author proposes a chain of reasoning to serve as an example of how the presence of human logic traps (or entrapment) in a number of different spheres has an impact upon the larger system, and, perhaps, even predicts entrapment of the larger system. Future efforts to either understand social-ecological traps or navigate away or out of them must first take stock of the human logical traps that actors within the systems are influenced by, and that influence the large system(s).This paper argues that failing to account for human traps within will render most efforts to avoid or escape social-ecological traps futile.     

A New Rationale for Not Picking Low-Hanging Fruits: the Separation of Ownership and Control

Recent attempts at explaining the energy-efficiency gap rely on considerations related to organizational and behavioral/cognitive failures. In this paper, we build on the strategic delegation literature to advance a complementary explanation. We show that strategic market interaction may encourage business owners to instill a bias against energy efficiency in managerial compensation contracts. Since managers respond to financial incentives, their decisions will reflect this bias, resulting in a lack of investment.

     

An environmental game with coupling constraints

We consider a game where players face environmental constraints. We derive and compare noncooperative, cooperative and umbrella scenarios. In the latter, the players couple their environmental constraints and implement Rosen’s normalized equilibrium. It is shown that the cooperative outcome can be generated as a normalized equilibrium and that the results obtained in the literature do not necessarily generalize to this constrained setting.     

Community-led reforestation: cultivating the potential of virtuous cycles to confer resilience in disaster disrupted social–ecological systems

Human relationships with trees can result in widespread citizen-led reforestation projects that catalyze social–biological-reinforcing feedback loops and set in motion virtuous cycles that restore perturbed social–ecological systems. These virtuous cycles confer resilience in such systems that counterbalance the tendency for vicious cycles to be triggered by destructive behavior and neglect. Given this argument, we ask: how do we cultivate the potential for virtuous cycles to confer resilience in social–ecological systems? To answer this question, we review feedback mechanisms and identify virtuous cycles catalyzed via ecological restoration to highlight their importance to the resilience of social–ecological systems. We then conceptualize these cycles with a causal map (also known as a causal loop diagram) illustrating an example where restoration activities and civic ecology practices contributed to feedbacks and virtuous cycles. Following from this example, we discuss approaches for recognizing and investing in virtuous cycles that accompany social–ecological systems and outline approaches for managing such cycles.