Corruption in natural resource management: Implications for policy makers

Corruption is the main reason why resource-rich countries perform badly in economic terms. Corruption in resource-rich countries takes two main forms, rent-seeking and patronage. Resource rents induce rent-seeking as individuals compete for a share of the rents rather than use their time and skills more productively. And resource revenues induce patronage as governments pay off supporters to stay in power, resulting in reduced accountability and an inferior allocation of public funds. This paper systematically reviews the literature on natural resources and corruption, and outlines the main policy implications for donors and domestic policy makers. A main conclusion is that priority should be given to policies that address rent-seeking and patronage. In other words, policy in resource-rich countries should be less about macro-economic management and more about institutions to prevent rent-seeking and patronage, and about giving the right incentives to players in the resource sector. Moreover, all policies need to take into account their impact on rent-seeking and patronage, and some current policies may actually be harmful in this respect.     

Collaborative networks and new ways of knowing

To move beyond legal and regulatory gridlock around water issues in the California Bay-Delta, a new inter-agency initiative, commonly known as CALFED, was created in 1994. CALFED has been an ongoing experiment in policy innovation. Part of the change in management practice has involved constructing new arenas that engage multiple perspectives and transform regulatory impasse into provisional steps forward. We examine the construction of so-called boundary objects, which are forums and policy instruments that cross group boundaries and foster integrative deliberation. We compare the design and action of two boundary objects created by CALFED, namely the Environmental Water Account (EWA) and the Water Use Efficiency (WUE) program. We find that the presence of the boundary object, in itself, does little to explain the success of each policy experiment. Rather, the answer lies in the types of network interactions that result, along with the way meaning is coproduced. In fact, rather than create new patterns of interrelationship (e.g., between fish habitat advocates and pump station operators), the boundary object might further embed institutionalized routines. To more deeply understand what makes the new institution an integrative one, we introduce the concept of Ways of Knowing which explains how new knowledge emerges from the network of new relationships.     

The resource curse revisited and revised: A tale of paradoxes and red herrings

We critically evaluate the empirical basis for the so-called resource curse and find that, despite the topic's popularity in economics and political science research, this apparent paradox may be a red herring. The most commonly used measure of “resource abundance” can be more usefully interpreted as a proxy for “resource dependence”—endogenous to underlying structural factors. In multiple estimations that combine resource abundance and dependence, institutional, and constitutional variables, we find that (i) resource abundance, constitutions, and institutions determine resource dependence, (ii) resource dependence does not affect growth, and (iii) resource abundance positively affects growth and institutional quality.     

The design of water markets when instream flows have value

The main objective of this paper is to design and test a decentralized exchange mechanism that generates the location-specific pricing necessary to achieve efficient allocations in the presence of instream flow values. Although a market-oriented approach has the potential to improve upon traditional command and control regulations, questions remain about how these rights-based institutions can be implemented such that the potential gains from liberalized trade can be realized. This article uses laboratory experiments to test three different water market institutions designed to incorporate instream flow values into the allocation mechanism through active participation of an environmental trader. The smart, computer-coordinated market described herein offers the potential to significantly reduce coordination problems and transaction costs associated with finding mutually beneficial trades that satisfy environmental constraints. We find that direct environmental participation in the market can achieve highly efficient and stable outcomes, although the potential does exist for the environmental agent to influence outcomes.     

Institutions for a sustainable development—experiences from EU-countries

This article is based on an international comparative study analysing innovations in national administrative institutions. Results of that research are presented and discussed here. Against the background of the institutionalising process of political institutions the study focused on innovations initiated or introduced by governments or parliaments by example of policies and politics supporting sustainable development. The countries involved in the original study were Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Three general lessons can be drawn: (1) Countries with a long tradition of integrated environmental policy-making are more open to the concept of sustainability. (2) A (institutional) “cure-all” solution does not seem to exist. It seems necessary to diffuse the concept of sustainability into all spheres of politics and society. Reaching this strategic goal requires a specific policy and polity mix. (3) Strong and well-equipped institutions result from specific policies and politics: they play a central role in promoting and intensifying sustainable development. Successful innovations integrating SD into everyday politics and policies are only a very first step though. Further improvements with regard to effective participation and public debate, global orientation of policies and the measurability of achieved progress are necessary.     

Who should do what in environmental management? Twelve principles for allocating responsibilities

In environmental management there is often discussion on the allocation of responsibilities. Such discussions can continue for a long time and can form an obstacle for effective action. In this article twelve normative principles for the allocation of responsibilities are identified, coming from three different sources: the arguments used in discussions on responsibilities, Dutch and European law, and the environmental management literature. The principles are (1) capacity, (2) lowest social costs, (3) causation, (4) interest, (5) scale, (6) subsidiarity, (7) structural integration, (8) separation, (9) solidarity, (10) transparency, (11) stability (but not standstill), and (12) acquired rights. These principles point to fundamental tensions in environmental management and sometimes conflict with each other. At the same time they may help to resolve conflicts by providing common points of reference that are independent from the often conflicting interests of the discussants.     

Monitoring Parks Through Remote Sensing: Studies in Nepal and Honduras

The effectiveness of parks as management regimes is hotly contested. Much of the current discussion centered around comparisons of management regimes can be traced to a dearth of cross-site quantitative evaluations. Remote sensing provides a particularly effective tool for this purpose, yet analysis of remotely sensed data requires fieldwork to interpret human activities and the socioeconomic and political contexts that relate to land cover change. This paper examines the effect of establishment of the Celaque National Park, Honduras, and the Royal Chitwan National Park buffer zone, Nepal, on limiting deforestation. In Celaque, the park itself has been largely successful in maintaining forest cover. However, recent changes in land use patterns have led to increasing pressure on the park boundaries, exacerbated by the lack of involvement of local residents. In the Royal Chitwan National Park, in contrast, participatory approaches towards co-management have been implemented over the past decade in the park buffer zone. With significant incomes derived from ecotourism, complete protection of the buffer zone forest has been adopted, leading to significant regrowth of tree cover. However, local decision-making power is limited, and buffer zone management has largely proven successful due to the investment and support provided by international donor agencies. These two case studies demonstrate the utility of remote sensing and Geographical Information Systems analysis in providing a spatiotemporal perspective for assessing management policies. They also demonstrate the importance of fieldwork to provide a nuanced understanding of the socioeconomic and institutional conditions affecting the outcomes of forest management regimes.     

Forest Cover Change,Physiography, Local Economy,and Institutions in a Mountain Watershed in Nepal

This study assessed changes in forest cover in a mountain watershed in central Nepal between 1976 and 2000 by comparing classified satellite images coupled by GIS analyses, and examined the association of forest change with major physiographic, economic, and local forest governance parameters. The results showed an increase in forested area (forest plus shrublands) by 7.6% during 1976–2000. Forest dynamism (changes including improvement, deterioration, gain, and loss) was highest in low-elevation, south-facing and less-steep slopes that were closer to roads. Proportionately the highest net improvement and gain to forested area also took place in those locations. Forest degradation occurred at twice the rate of improvement in high elevation areas (> 2300 m). Forests located in urban and semiurban areas (i.e., a market-oriented economy) experienced a proportionately higher amount of net improvement and gain than forests in rural areas (i.e., a subsistence economy). Among the three governance arrangements, proportionately the highest net improvement and gain took place in semigovernment forests (forested area legally under the forest department but with de facto control and claim of ownership by local communities and/or municipality) followed by formalized community forests (including leasehold). Government forests, which were mostly found in the southern high mountains and had virtually open access, remained relatively stable during the study period. Over 50% of the watershed forests have not come under community-based management despite favorable policy and more than two decades of government intervention with continuous donor support. The findings indicate that the present one size fits all approach of community forest handover policy in Nepal needs rethinking to accommodate biophysical and socioeconomic variations across the country.     

The evolution of community water governance in Uchira, Tanzania: The implications for equality of access, sustainability and effectiveness

Community participation, ownership and cost sharing are key components of Tanzania's water policy, in common with the broad international consensus on water governance. However these policy goals are difficult to achieve, beset with paradoxes and their benefits may be overstated, both in terms of efficiency of resource management and equality of outcomes. This article draws on longitudinal ethnographic research of a village water supply in Tanzania to explore two issues: the contested nature of community ownership and the complex evolution of a ‘community‐owned’ institution. The evidence from the Uchira Water Users Association leads us to question some of the simplistic assumptions made concerning the capacity of local communities to manage service delivery and to balance equity and sustainability principles. The limitations of ‘bottom‐up’ and demand led approaches need to be recognised without discrediting their potential for challenging inequalities. The article concludes with a consideration of some of the tensions in community‐driven development, which raises some important questions about the role of the State and external agencies in setting and enforcing equity criteria in community‐managed initiatives.