SMART-SREC: A stochastic model of the New Jersey solar renewable energy certificate market

Markets for solar renewable energy certificates (SRECs) are gaining in prominence in many states, stimulating growth of the US solar industry. However, SREC market prices have been extremely volatile, causing high risk to participants and potentially less investment in solar power generation. Such concerns necessitate the development of realistic, flexible and tractable models of SREC prices that capture the behavior of participants given the rules that govern the market. We propose an original stochastic model called SMART-SREC to fill this role, building on established ideas from the carbon pricing literature, and including a feedback mechanism for generation response to prices. We calibrate the model to the New Jersey market and backtest it, analyzing parameter sensitivity and demonstrating its ability to reproduce historical dynamics. Finally, we run simulations to investigate the role and impact of regulatory parameters, thus providing insight into the crucial role played by market design.     

公钥基础设施(PKI)应用中的信任问题与安全解决方案

详细论述受信证书链的替换原理、方法和过程,及其引发的用户错误受信问题。通过分析得到安全证书链的长度为小于3,但由于实际应用的业务需要和安全性需要,证书链的长度通常至少为3。最后针对上述问题给出了一种安全解决方案,通过结合存储用户个人证书的USBKEY硬件设备,采用物理信任点代替逻辑信任点来防止受信证书的替换,为用户构建安全可靠的网络信任环境。     

基于WEB的全国环境监测人员持证上岗考试系统研究

密切结合环境监测人员持证上岗考核工作需要,设计了基于Web的持证上岗考试系统.系统采用B/S结构,面向多层次用户,形成了集人员管理和多个工作环节为一体的有效工作平台,实现了理论考试的模块化规范管理,极大地提高了工作效率和质量,具有较高的应用价值.     

一种用于Ad hoc网络安全的新型混合式CA服务体系

由于Adhoc网络的无线分布和自组织特性 ,使得网络安全显得更为脆弱 ;同时由于Adhoc网络的无中心和计算性能受限特性 ,使得安全体系难以布设。笔者分析了传统CA体系和分布式CA体系各自的优缺点 ,提出了一种用于Adhoc网络的新型混合式CA服务体系。该混合式CA服务体系把证书颁发和证书管理分开 ,一方面具有了传统CA体系的安全性 ,另一方面减轻了Adhoc网络的计算负荷。同时对分布式证书管理中的证书撤销、证书验证、表的维护和更新作了详细的分析 ,并利用可信度系数α对证书的可信性进行描述 ,增加了分布式证书管理的可靠性和灵活性。     

陕西省环境监测人员持证上岗考核工作研究

环境监测人员持证上岗是环境监测质量管理的基础和重要手段,本文从考核流程、考核内容、考核纪律、总体情况、存在的问题、今后工作的设想等方面详细介绍了陕西省环境监测人员持证上岗考核工作,对目前面临的问题提出了建议,对今后的考核工作提出了设想,目的在于把环境监测人员持证上岗考核制度真正做好、做实,确保监测人员具备符合要求的能力,进一步提高环境监测质量管理水平.     

The political economy of certificates for land use in Germany – experimental evidence

Certificate trading schemes have been discussed as a cost-efficient means of reducing urban land consumption in Germany by capping and reallocating permissions to conduct building projects. However, in contrast to the established cap & trade systems for emissions, reputation-seeking politicians would be in charge of buying and trading certificates – an aspect not considered to date. We thus present a laboratory experiment that captures politicians’ incentives connected to electoral cycles in a cap & trade scheme for land consumption, whereby tradable certificates are auctioned and grandfathered in equal shares. We find the cap & trade system to be efficient at large; yet, there are several politically relevant distortions that are aggravated by self-serving incentives. We thus identify potential problems to a cap & trade system for urban land consumption that could substantially reduce both its assumed superior efficiency and its political feasibility.