耕地生态补偿相关利益群体博弈分析与解决路径

对宏观层面中央政府与地方政府、地方政府与地方政府和微观层面农民与市民之间博弈分析,找出促使均衡结果合理化方案,采用的研究方法是博弈论与条件价值法(CVM)。结果表明:①博弈结果难以达成(保护,补偿)协议,实现社会福利最大化,必须依靠中央政府作为媒介进行协商,采取管制与激励相结合的制度安排。②激励的实现通过微观层面利益主体受偿意愿与支付意愿而定,支付不够补偿,中央财政补贴,支付盈余则上缴中央财政,以湖北为例,农民每亩耕地应得到174元补偿,市民每户居民应支付246.6元,中央政府每亩耕地给予农民148.5元补偿。③宏观层面依据微观层面需求意愿与支付意愿的赤字或者盈余,确定区域之间应支付补偿或者获得补偿。研究成果能为区域内部和区域之间耕地生态补偿标准提供依据,为尽快制定耕地生态补偿机制及政策、实现利益群体福利均衡提供借鉴与参考。

The Game Theory Analysis and Solution Path on the Stakeholders Involved in Farmland Ecological Compensation

The purpose of this paper is to find out rationalization scenario to promote balance result,by macro-level among the central government and local government,local government and local government and by micro-level between farmers and citizens.The contingent value method(CVM)and game theory are employed.The results show that:(1) the game result is difficult to reach(protection,compensation) agreement,so in order to maximize social welfare,we must rely on the central government as a medium of consultation through the combination of control and incentive arrangements.(2)Incentives are fulfilled through willingness to pay and willingness to accept of the micro-level interests.If willingness to pay is less than compensation,the central financial departments will subsidize,otherwise,surplus will turn to the central government.Taking Hubei Province as an example,farmers will gain 174 Yuan(RMB) per mu of cultivated land compensation,per household in the rural area should pay 246.6 Yuan(RMB) and the central government should give farmers 148.5 Yuan(RMB) per mu of cultivated land compensation.(3) Based on deficit or surplus at the macro level and micro level,regions can determine to pay or receive compensation.It is concluded that the game of stakeholders and the incentive system will be able to provide the basis of ecological compensation standard for internal and trans-regional cultivated land,and provide reference for development of ecological compensation mechanism and policies and welfare balance of interest groups.