不确定理论下带惩罚机制的城市污水处理期望收益模型

为了防止政府与污水处理企业在委托代理关系中的“道德风险”,在引入惩罚机制背景下,构建了不确定期望收益模型,以解决城市污水处理问题.基于不确定理论,将模型转化为非线性约束规划,进一步证明了模型可行解的存在性.结合数值算例,对模型进行验证.用控制变量方法,通过对不确定指数、惩罚率、无风险处理量的分析,得出企业签约量与收益、风险成正比,惩罚率与企业签约量、收益成反比,企业无风险处理量与企业签约量、收益成正比.可见,引入惩罚机制能够有效防止企业投机行为,并对降低企业“道德风险”具有显著作用.

Expected return model of urban sewage treatment with penalty mechanism under uncertainty theory

In order to curb the "moral hazard" in the agency relationship between government and sewage treatment enterprises, an uncertain model for the expected return of urban sewage treatment was constructed under the background of penalty mechanisms. Based on uncertain theory, the model was transformed as nonlinear constrained programming, and the existence of feasible solution was proved. The model was verified through numerical example. Then, the analysis of uncertainty index, penalty rate and risk-free treatment volume were carried out by the control variable method. The conclusion is that the contract volume is in the direct proportion to the expected return and the risk, the penalty rate is in the reverse proportion to the contract volume and the expected return, the risk-free treatment volume is in the direct proportion to the contract volume and the expected return. Therefore, the implementation of the penalty mechanism has a significant effect on preventing the speculative behavior and debasing the "moral hazard" of enterprises.