基于水质协议的跨界流域生态补偿标准研究

在完全信息的情况下,分析了如何设计跨界流域生态补偿标准,并讨论了跨界流域生态补偿政策可能存在的时间一致性问题.基于斯坦伯格博弈框架下的分析结果表明,若考虑跨界流域生态补偿标准与环境损害函数是线性的,则跨界流域生态补偿政策是具有时间一致性的环境经济政策,这是由于该政策在设计时,其补偿标准要么仅与环境损害成本有关,或直接与流域内各区域的污染物削减费用有关.在这两种情况下,流域内各区域在执行该政策的时候,没有相应的战略去刺激流域内各区域刻意改变其自身的污染物削减费用函数,从而影响到未来的跨界流域生态补偿政策的实施.随后,利用该方法针对COD指标,模拟了2008年河南省贾鲁河流域跨界流域生态补偿政策,结果发现,当生态补偿标准设置在2714.13元.t-1时,能够实现跨界流域生态补偿政策的目标.在这种情况下,该流域COD排放总量达到了流域COD年允许排放总量的要求;且相比跨界流域生态补偿政策实施前,强制要求流域内各区域单独削减COD达到断面年允许排放量的情况,各区域的COD削减费用均有所下降.

The standard design of cross-border watershed eco-compensation based on water quality agreement between upstream and downstream

This paper analyzed mechanism of cross-border watershed eco-compensation policy and discussed the problem of the policy's time consistency with complete information. Under the framework of Stackelberg Game, the results showed that the policy was time consistency when the form of water eco-compensation standard and the environmental damage function were linear. The time consistency can be attributed either to the association of the eco-compensation standard to the cost of environmental damage or directly to the pollutant reduction cost of all regions in the watershed. After analyzing the time consistency of the policy, this paper used the Jialuhe watershed in Henan province as a case to simulate the cross-border eco-compensation policy. The results revealed that the policy goal could be achieved when the eco-compensation standard set as 2714.13 Yuan·t^-1. In this condition, the amount of COD emissions among the regions involved satisfied the total emission control target of the watershed. Comparing the cross-border watershed eco-compensation policy with the policy of the mandatory pollutant emission control, the cost of COD reduction between regions involved decreased. The policy implication of this research was that at this stage, cross-border watershed eco-compensation is an effective environmental economic policy in China.