人员疏散拥堵问题的博弈分析

从经济学的角度,应用博弈论中经典的"公共地悲剧"理论,分析疏散出口、安全通道等没有排他性所有权的稀缺性资源供给与需求之间的矛盾,提出了人员疏散过程中的博弈数学模型,揭示在理性的疏散人员追求自身收益最大化和没有有效约束与管制的前提条件下,疏散出口等公共资源会被过度使用的现象,即人员疏散过程中的"公共地悲剧"——人员拥堵,并在所提出的博弈模型基础上,从设计与管理的角度,给出一些解决拥堵问题的建议和对策。

Analysis of Evacuation Congestion Based on Game Theory

From the angle of economy,the classical "commons' tragedy model" in game theory is used to analyze the illogicality between the supply and the demand of scarce resources such as evacuation exits and safety doors.The game mathematical model for staff evacuation was proposed so as to reveal the phenomenon of the excess usage of common sources under the condition that people always pursue to maximize their self-interest without any restrictions,namely,the "commons' tragedy" in evacuation congestion.Finally,from the viewpoints of design and management,some suggestions and methods based on the game model are proposed to solve the congestion problems.