城市生活垃圾分类回收治理激励监督机制研究

考虑政府政策激励监督对城市生活垃圾分类回收治理的影响，构建政府监管-企业处理-居民参与的演化博弈模型，借助演化博弈理论分析4种不同情境下城市生活垃圾分类回收治理的演化稳定策略，并借助数值仿真分析了政府激励监督对各方策略选择的影响.研究发现：居民进行垃圾分类获得的收益大于参与分类的成本两倍及以上时，才会主动参与垃圾分类，否则不会主动参与分类，同时居民对政府正向激励补贴的变化比企业更为敏感.政府实施较高的负向激励力度时可有效约束企业行为，但过高的监管成本会造成垃圾回收治理的管理困境.

Incentive and supervision mechanism of municipal solid waste separation and recycling

In practice, the incentive and supervision policy of government departments may have an influence on the classification and recycling governance behavior of urban garbage. In order to analyze the influence mechanism, an evolutionary game model was proposed, in which the government supervision, enterprise treatment and citizen participation were incorporated. Using this evolutionary game model, the evolutionary and stable strategies of the classification and recycling governance of urban household garbage were derived under four different scenarios. In addition, the influence of government incentive supervision on the strategy selection of all parties was analyzed by numerical analysis. The results showed that the key to promoting residents' active participation was to increase the incremental income of garbage classification. Moreover, the residents had better sensitivity to the change of government's positive incentive subsidy than enterprises. The higher negative incentives implemented by government could restrict the enterprise operations effectively. Nevertheless, excessive regulatory costs can lead to management dilemmas of garbage recycling garbage recycling.