中小企业劳资双方职业安全保障博弈研究

为寻求打破中小企业(SMEs)职业安全供求双低均衡状态的途径,提高SMEs职业安全保障水平,采用动态博弈方法分析SMEs劳资双方职业安全行为选择。首先,构建职业安全保障博弈模型,并进行均衡策略分析。其次,将安全管制因素引入博弈模型进行对比分析。结果表明:"低风险工资,加盟"是该模型的纯策略纳什均衡;政府安全管制因素的引入对自然选择概率和员工加盟企业的概率产生有益影响,对企业隐瞒概率的影响取决于对被隐瞒员工进行的补偿。通过提高隐瞒成本、安全投入产出比、低风险工资、员工职业伤害认知和安全管制力度等可以提高SMEs职业安全保障水平。

Game Analysis of Occupational Safety in Small and Medium-sized Enterprises

In order to find a way to break the double low equilibrium of supply and demand of occupational safety in SMEs and enhance occupational safety supply level,occupational safety behavior selection made by SMEs employees and that by SMEs employers were analyzed using a dynamic game method.First,a game model of occupational safety supply was built and equilibrium strategies were analyzed.Then,safety regulation factors were introduced into the game model,and the equilibrium strategies with and without safety regulation factors were compared.The results show that ’low risk wage,to join’ is one pure equilibrium strategy of game model,that safety regulation factor have beneficial effects on the probability of natural selection and the probability of employees’ joining enterprise,that the effect of safety regulation factors on the concealment probability depends on compensating to the deceived employees,and that to encourage SMEs to improve occupational safety,the concealment cost,safety input-output ratio,low-risk wage,occupational injury awareness and safety regulation efforts should be raised.