基于SD的装配式建筑施工安全监管演化博弈研究*

为了有效减少装配式建筑工程施工安全事故，考虑政府监管部门与施工单位之间存在信息不对称，基于有限理性条件下双方互动关系构建装配式建筑施工安全动态监管演化博弈模型，并分析其稳定策略。采用系统动力学(SD)方法仿真分析在动态监管策略及外部变量调整条件下的演化博弈过程。研究结果表明:政府强弱监管的成本差、施工单位加强安全管理的额外支出等因素变化对系统的稳定性影响较大。政府可以根据施工单位忽视安全管理的主观意愿来动态调整惩罚力度，并依据监管目标的完成情况进一步调整惩罚力度的变化率，从而改善施工安全监管的效率和效果。

Research on evolutionary game of safety supervision for prefabricated building construction based on SD

To reduce the construction safety accidents of prefabricated construction projects effectively,taking into account the information asymmetry between the government supervision department and the construction organization,an evolutionary game model for the construction safety dynamic supervision of prefabricated buildings was constructed based on the interactive relationship between the two parties under the condition of bounded rationality,and the stability strategy was analyzed.The system dynamics (SD) method was used to simulate and analyze the evolutionary game process under the conditions of dynamic supervision strategy and adjustment of external variables.The results showed that the change of the cost difference of the government’s strong and weak supervision,the additional expenditure of construction organization for strengthening safety management and other factors had greater influence on the stability of the system.The government could dynamically adjust the punishment intensity based on the construction organization’s subjective willingness to ignore safety management,and further adjust the rate of change of punishment intensity based on the completion of supervision goals,so as to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of construction safety supervision.