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高危企业社会保险投资与员工忠诚度的博弈分析
引用本文:颜会芳,田水承,李红霞.高危企业社会保险投资与员工忠诚度的博弈分析[J].中国安全科学学报,2009,19(3).
作者姓名:颜会芳  田水承  李红霞
作者单位:1. 西安科技大学能源学院,西安,710054;中国人寿股份有限公司西安分公司,西安,7100013
2. 西安科技大学能源学院,西安,710054
3. 西安科技大学管理学院,西安,710054
摘    要:运用经济博弈论方法,研究高危企业社会保险投资与员工忠诚度问题,建立博弈模型,得出混合策略纳什均衡解,并对影响企业社会保险投资概率和员工忠诚度大小的因素进行分析,得出以下结论:企业对于员工社会保险投资力度越大,或对于不忠诚员工的惩罚力度越大,或对于忠诚员工的奖励越高,越有助于员工忠诚企业。同时指出:企业对员工采取"一刀切"的做法,会挫伤忠诚员工爱企强企的积极性;启发企业实行公平分配机制,来提高员工忠诚度和企业效益,要从积极的态度出发,以人为本,加大保险投资力度,为员工提供安全和生活保障;只有使双方的"非合作博弈"逐步过渡到"合作博弈",才能调动和爱护员工的爱岗敬业积极性。

关 键 词:社会保险  投资  博弈论  纳什均衡  合作博弈  非合作博弈

Game Analysis between Social Insurance Investment and Employee's Loyalty in High-dangerous Enterprises
YAN Hui-fang,TIAN Shui-cheng,LI Hong-xia.Game Analysis between Social Insurance Investment and Employee's Loyalty in High-dangerous Enterprises[J].China Safety Science Journal,2009,19(3).
Authors:YAN Hui-fang  TIAN Shui-cheng  LI Hong-xia
Abstract:By using economic game theory,a game model reflecting the relation between social insurance investment and employee's loyalty was established,and the mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium solution was obtained.Meanwhile,the factors influencing the probability of social insurance investment and employee's loyalty were also analyzed.It is concluded that the bigger the investment on employee's social insurance is,or the more severe the punishment to un-loyal employees is,or the higher the reward to loyal employees is,the more helpful it is to the loyalty of employees.The way of treating employees with no flexibility will damage employee's positivity,enforcing a fair distribution system and "people-oriented" life guarantee system will improve employee's loyalty.In a word,only making the "non-cooperative game" between employees and enterprises gradually transfer to "cooperative game",can the employee's positivity and loyalty be mobilized.
Keywords:social insurance  investment  game theory  Nash equilibrium  cooperative game  non-cooperative game
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