首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
     检索      

地方煤矿安全生产政府监管的失效及对策
引用本文:徐金燕.地方煤矿安全生产政府监管的失效及对策[J].中国安全科学学报,2009,19(12).
作者姓名:徐金燕
作者单位:湖南科技大学管理学院,湘潭,411201
基金项目:湖南省资源型企业经营管理研究基地开放基金资助 
摘    要:在分析地方煤矿安全生产形势的基础上,探讨加强政府监管的必要性,指出政府监管的失效是矿难事故发生的深层次原因。基于公共选择的"经济人"假设理论,从地方煤矿监管中涉及的中央政府、地方政府、煤矿企业和煤矿工人等多方利益主体的博弈角度分析政府监管失效的根本原因;根据地方煤矿安全政府监管的实情,提出构建多方利益主体的政府监管体系、运行机制和具体路径选择。该研究成果对提高政府监管执行力,减少地方煤矿事故频发具有一定的理论指导和实践参考价值。

关 键 词:地方煤矿  安全生产  政府监管  失效  利益博弈

The Deficiencies in Government Regulation of Local Coal Mine Work Safety and Its Countermeasures
XU Jin-yan.The Deficiencies in Government Regulation of Local Coal Mine Work Safety and Its Countermeasures[J].China Safety Science Journal,2009,19(12).
Authors:XU Jin-yan
Abstract:Based on the analysis of local coal mine work safety situation, the need to strengthen government regulation is discussed. It is pointed out that the failure of government regulation is the deep-seated cause for coal mine safety accidents. Based on the "economic man" hypothesis of public choice, the root causes for the failure of government regulation are analyzed from the game angle of the local coal mine supervision involving central government, local government, coal companies, mine workers and other multi-stakeholder. According to the facts of local government regulation of coal mine safety, the idea to build a multi-stakeholder government regulation system and its operating mechanism and specific routing is proposed. This is helpful to improve the executing ability of government regulation and reduce local coal mine accidents.
Keywords:local coal mine  work safety  government regulation  ineffectiveness  interests game
本文献已被 万方数据 等数据库收录!
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号