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基于博弈模型的水价策略与节水策略分析
引用本文:陈浩,彭桥.基于博弈模型的水价策略与节水策略分析[J].中国环境管理,2019,11(5):74-81.
作者姓名:陈浩  彭桥
作者单位:北京师范大学经济与资源管理研究院, 北京 100089;城市绿色发展科技战略研究北京市重点实验室, 北京 100089,北京师范大学经济与资源管理研究院, 北京 100089;城市绿色发展科技战略研究北京市重点实验室, 北京 100089
摘    要:在当前水资源浪费、用水效率较低的背景下,仍然有许多地区继续实行低水价政策,本文认为这是供水企业与用水企业以及政府水务部门相互博弈的结果。通过构建一个供水企业与用水企业的博弈模型,并采用演化博弈分析方法分析动态演化的结果,本文发现当前采用低水价的主要原因在于:供水企业制定水价时要同时考虑私人收益与公共节水收益,而高水价对经济产生的冲击成本不足以弥补高水价产生的公共节水收益与私人收益,从而导致有些地区供水企业不敢提高水价,一直采用低水价策略。进一步地,本文采用不完全信息动态博弈方法分析供水企业与政府关于水价的议定过程,发现提高水价对经济的冲击越大,且节水技术投入成本越大而节水的公共收益越小时,政府水务部门同意低水价的概率越大;反之,则同意高水价的概率越大。从博弈论的角度系统地分析了低水价产生的决策过程,可对提高水价、促进节约用水具有一定的指导意义。

关 键 词:演化博弈  不完全信息动态博弈  水价策略  节水

Analysis of Water Price Strategy and Water-Saving Strategy Based on Game Model
CHEN Hao and PENG Qiao.Analysis of Water Price Strategy and Water-Saving Strategy Based on Game Model[J].Chinese Journal of Environmental Management,2019,11(5):74-81.
Authors:CHEN Hao and PENG Qiao
Institution:School of Economics and Resource Management, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100089, China;Beijing Key Laboratory of Study on SCI-TECH Strategy Urban Green Development, Beijing 100089, China and School of Economics and Resource Management, Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100089, China;Beijing Key Laboratory of Study on SCI-TECH Strategy Urban Green Development, Beijing 100089, China
Abstract:In the background of the current water resource waste and low efficiency of water use, many water supply enterprise in some areas still continue to implement low water price policy, this paper argues that it is the result of the game among water supply enterprises, water use enterprises and the government department about water. This paper builds a game model of water supply enterprises and water use enterprises, and uses the evolutionary game methods to analyze the results of dynamic evolution, and finds that the main reason for the current low water price is:when water supply enterprises set water price, they would consider both private income and public water-saving income. However, the impact cost of high water price on the economy is not enough to make up for the public water-saving income and private income generated by high water price. As a result, water supply enterprises in some areas do not raise water price and always adopt the strategy of low water price.Moreover, the process of water price negotiation between water supply enterprises and the government is further analyzed by using incomplete information dynamic game method. It is found that the higher the water price is, the greater the impact on the economy, the higher the investment cost of water-saving technology and the smaller the public benefit of water-saving, the higher the probability of the government water department agreeing to the lower water price is.This paper systematically analyzes the decision-making process of low water price from the perspective of game theory, which has certain guiding significance for improving water price and promoting water conservation.
Keywords:evolutionary game  incomplete information dynamic game  water pricing strategy  water saving
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