The role of emotions in judging the moral acceptability of risks |
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| Institution: | 1. Department of Philosophy and History, KTH-Royal Institute of Technology, Brinellvägen 32, 100 44 Stockholm, Sweden;2. Unit of Work Environment Toxicology, Institute of Environmental Medicine, Karolinska Institute, 171 77 Stockholm, Sweden;3. IVL – Swedish Environment Research Institute, Box 210 60, SE-100 31 Stockholm, Sweden;4. Department of Health Systems Engineering, KTH-Royal Institute of Technology, Alfred Nobels Allé 8, SE-141 52 Huddinge, Sweden;1. Chair on System Science and the Energy Challenge, Fondation Electricite de France (EDF), CentraleSupélec, Université Paris-Saclay, Grande Voie des Vignes, 92290 Chatenay-Malabry, France;2. Energy Department, Politecnico di Milano, Milano, Italy;1. Hellenic Institute for Occupational Health and Safety, 143 Liosion, 10445 Athens, Greece;2. Finnish Institute of Occupational Health, Finland;1. Aalto University, School of Engineering, Department of Applied Mechanics, Marine Technology, Research Group on Maritime Risk and Safety, P.O. Box 12200, FI-00076 AALTO, Finland;2. KU Leuven, Campus Brussels, Faculty of Economics and Organizational Sciences, Center for Economics and Corporate Sustainability, Warmoesberg 26, 1000 Brussels, Belgium;3. UAntwerpen, City Campus, Faculty of Applied Economic Sciences, Prinsstraat 13, 2000 Antwerp, Belgium;4. TU Delft, Safety and Security Science Group, Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management, Jaffalaan 5, 2628 BX Delft, The Netherlands |
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| Abstract: | This paper argues that we need emotions in order to make a rational decision as to the moral acceptability of technological risks.Empirical research has shown that people rely on emotions in making judgments concerning risks. However, this does not as yet answer the following normative question and the main question of this paper: do we need emotions in order to be able to judge whether a risk is morally acceptable? This question has direct practical implications: should engineers, scientists and policy makers involved in developing risk regulation take the emotions of the public seriously or not?In answer to these questions, rationalists would argue that the emotions of the public should be ignored because they are irrational. On the other hand, subjectivists would argue that even though emotions are irrational, they should be a part of the decision making process because they show us our preferences. In contrast to both of these approaches, this paper defends a cognitive theory of emotions according to which emotions are necessary to make a rational practical decision. Emotions are an indispensable normative guide in judging the moral acceptability of technological risks. |
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