Positive framing does not solve the tragedy of the commons |
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| Institution: | 1. Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, United Kingdom;2. The Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research, Norway;3. The Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Postboks 1095 Blindern, 0317, Oslo, Norway;4. Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group, Sub-Department of Economics, Wageningen University, P.O. Box 8130, 6700 EW, Wageningen, the Netherlands;5. Centre for Ecological and Evolutionary Synthesis (CEES), Department of Biosciences, University of Oslo, Norway;1. Department of Psychological Medicine, King’s College London, London, UK;2. School of Cancer and Pharmaceutical Sciences, King’s College London, London, UK;3. NIHR Health Protection Research Unit in Emergency Preparedness and Response, King’s College London, London, UK;1. Department of Anesthesiology and Critical Care Medicine, University of Pennsylvania Perelman School of Medicine, Philadelphia;2. ChenMed, Miami, Fla;3. Pharmacy Procurement & Formulary Services, Department of Pharmacy and Therapeutics, The Geisinger Health System, Danville, Pa;4. Critical Care Medicine, The Geisinger Health System, Danville, Pa;5. Department of Medicine, Temple University School of Medicine, Philadelphia, Pa;1. University Paris 1, Paris School of Economics, France;2. Tilburg Sustainability Centre, Tilburg University, Netherlands |
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| Abstract: | We investigate whether positive framing increases cooperation in three social dilemmas with slightly different properties: a linear public goods (PG) game, a non-linear PG game, and a common pool resource (CPR) game. Results from our laboratory experiments show that contributions to a linear PG are higher if the externality is framed positively, rather than negatively, corroborating earlier findings by Andreoni (1995). By contrast, we find no such framing effects in the non-linear PG game or the CPR game. In these games, the best response in the material payoffs is to contribute less if others contribute more, counteracting effects of pro-social preferences. Positive framing therefore does not help to solve the tragedy of the commons. |
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| Keywords: | Public goods experiment Common pool experiment Framing Externality Strategic complements Strategic substitutes Rivalry C92 C72 D70 |
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