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区域大气污染协同减排补偿机制研究
引用本文:唐湘博,陈晓红.区域大气污染协同减排补偿机制研究[J].中国人口.资源与环境,2017(9):76-82.
作者姓名:唐湘博  陈晓红
作者单位:中南大学商学院,湖南长沙410083;湖南商学院,湖南长沙410205
基金项目:国家自然科学基金重点项目“面向环境管理的嵌入式服务决策理论与平台”(71431006)
摘    要:在环境规制逐步从污染排放控制向环境质量管理转型的背景下,现行的单一行政区属地治理和管理模式对区域性流动性的大气污染已力不从心,导致减排目标与环境质量改善不对应,因此,跨行政区域的合作治理亟需管理手段和机制的创新。本文基于大气环境质量目标视角,构建了区域上层管理部门(如国家或区域)和下层所辖各区的双层博弈模型,明确了大气污染减排成本与减排量的函数关系,利用定量分析方法模拟计算出区域减排总成本最小化状况下的污染协同减排补偿标准及各辖区所承担的污染物减排量,提出对实际减排量低于(超过)责任减排量的辖区给予补偿费的征收(奖励)的管理机制,通过市场调节手段实现区域内大气污染协同减排的目的。在此基础上,以我国大气污染重点防控区(长株潭城市群)为例,采用2004—2015年的统计面版数据,对区域内所辖各区二氧化硫减排量和协同减排补偿标准进行了定量测算。计算结果表明:为达到国家设定的2030年环境空气质量总体目标,长株潭区域二氧化硫协同减排的补偿费标准为1 506元/t,以该补偿标准作为区域层面二氧化硫协同减排调控手段,可在区域污染治理总成本最小化的同时,实现域内各辖区自身利益的最大化。文章最后就区域污染协同减排补偿机制提出了实施思路及保障措施。基于此研究,区域环境管理部门应设立专项的协同减排基金,专门用于区域大气质量的改善和提高:一方面用于激励大气污染实际减排量超出本行政区域责任减排量的辖区,目的是为区域空气质量比预期目标更高、对居民健康产生的正向外部性买单;另一方面用于对历史包袱重、减排压力大、治理能力弱的辖区给予一定的政策倾斜或扶持;同时,区域环境管理部门还应从组织机构、交易平台、法律法规等方面提供保障措施,确保协同减排补偿机制的顺利实施。

关 键 词:双层博弈模型  协同减排  补偿机制  合作治理

Mechanism of regional atmospheric pollution collaborative reduction compensation
TANG Xiang-bo,CHEN Xiao-hong.Mechanism of regional atmospheric pollution collaborative reduction compensation[J].China Polulation.Resources and Environment,2017(9):76-82.
Authors:TANG Xiang-bo  CHEN Xiao-hong
Abstract:Under the background of the transformation of environmental regulation from pollution emission control to environmental quality management,the current single territorial governance and apanage management of regional air pollution has been inadequate,resulting in emission reduction targets does not correspond to environmental quality improvement.Therefore,it is urgent to innovate the management means and mechanism of cooperative governance across the administrative areas.Based on the perspective of atmospheric quality target,we construct a bi-level game model of upper regional management (such as national or regional) and lower subordinate districts,and define the functional relation between emission reduction cost and emissions cuts.Using quantitative analysis,we simulate the collaborative reduction compensation standard and reduction by each area under the condition of minimizing the total cost of regional emission reduction,and impose (or reward) compensation fee for the area whose actual emission reduction is lower (higher) than its emission reduction obligation,in order to achieve regional collaborative reduction by means of market regulation.On this basis,we take one of the key areas of air pollution prevention and control (Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan urban agglomeration) as an example,and calculate SO2 emission reduction and collaborative redluction compensation standard in each city by using the statistical panel data in 2004-2015.Model simulation results show that in order to reach the state-set target of ambient air quality in 2030,the collaborative reduction compensation standard of SO2 in Changsha-Zhuzhou-Xiangtan region is 1 506 Yuan/t.By using this standard as a regulatory measure of regional collaborative emission reduction,it is able to minimize the total cost of emission reduction,while maximizing the interests of each district within this region.At last,we put forward the suggestions.Based on this study,regional environmental authorities should set up a collaborative reduction fund,special for the improvement and enhancement of regional air quality;on the one hand,it can encourage those administrative areas that carries out extra emission reduction (beyond its emission obligation),in order to stimulate improvement of air quality higher than expected and pay for the positive externalities of the residents' health;on the other hand,it can be used to provide policy support for those administrative areas with heavy historical burden,high reduction pressure and weak governance ability.Meanwhile,the regional environmental management authorities should provide measures in aspects such as organization construction,trading platform,laws and regulations,in order to ensure the collaborative emission reduction mechanism implement smoothly.
Keywords:bi-level game model  collaborative emission reduction  compensation mechanism  cooperative governance
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