| 海洋灾害保险市场道德风险防范策略研究 |
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| 引用本文： | 郑慧,王春阳.海洋灾害保险市场道德风险防范策略研究[J].海洋环境科学,2015,34(4):536-539,557. |
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| 作者姓名： | 郑慧 王春阳 |
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| 作者单位： | 1.中国海洋大学 经济学院, 山东 青岛 266100; |
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| 摘 要： | 在海洋灾害保险市场中,高风险投保人容易利用信息不对称,伪装成低风险投保人参与到投保活动中。这种道德风险降低保险公司承保和低风险者支付的意愿,制约海洋灾害保险市场运行。通过引入信号传递机制,明确给出海洋灾害保险各局中人行为策略,并求解灾害保险参与人得益函数,解析其子博弈精炼贝叶斯均衡的实现路径,获得有效控制道德风险的海洋灾害保险定价约束条件,并基于此提出相应的对策建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 海洋灾害保险 道德风险 信号传递 动态博弈 |
| 收稿时间： | 2014-02-20 |
Strategy of moral hazard controlling in marine disaster insurance market |
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| ZHENG Hui,WANG Chun-yang.Strategy of moral hazard controlling in marine disaster insurance market[J].Marine Environmental Science,2015,34(4):536-539,557. |
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| Authors: | ZHENG Hui WANG Chun-yang |
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| Institution: | 1.College of Economy, Ocean University of China, Qingdao 266100, China; |
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| Abstract: | In disaster insurance market, which is similar with policy-oriented agricultural insurance, high-risk applicants tend to disguise as low-risk ones, taking advantage of information asymmetry. Moral hazard decreases insurers' underwriting willingness and insurants' payment willingness, which condition the efficiency of disaster insurance market. The paper provided the behavioral strategys in disaster insurance market according to signal transmission mechanism and solved the profit functions. By analyzing the sub-game refined Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the author offered pricing constraints for disaster insurance under moral risk and the corresponding suggestions. |
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