双积分政策下异质汽车制造商的产量博弈均衡

文章通过对双积分政策下汽车制造商的产量博弈均衡进行建模分析,研究了双积分政策对企业层面异质制造商的产量决策和利润的影响,以及对产业层面新能源汽车和燃油汽车总产量及总产值的影响。研究结果表明:(1)新能源汽车产业向均衡演进过程中,新能源汽车制造商仍具有一定的发展潜力,但未来发展的中坚力量依靠优势燃油汽车制造商,劣势燃油汽车制造商可能会通过提高燃油经济性发展为优势燃油汽车制造商,从而提高优势燃油汽车制造商的燃油汽车总产量,降低劣势燃油汽车制造商的燃油汽车总产量。(2)双积分政策参数对异质制造商产量决策和利润的影响不同:新能源汽车制造商能够从中受益,而劣势燃油汽车制造商面临危机,转危为安的可能方式包括降低平均燃料消耗量和积极探索新能源汽车生产的可能性。对于优势燃油汽车制造商来说,双积分政策的收紧可能导致其转向燃油汽车市场,规制NEV积分价格上限有利于引导优势燃油汽车制造商转向新能源汽车市场。(3)促进新能源汽车规模增长的参数,可能导致总产值下降,政策调整应将规模增长和产值增长作为双目标,避免单一目标可能导致的市场波动。(4)随着双积分政策的收紧,可预见的新能源汽车积分比例要求提高以及平均燃料消耗量标准趋严,将刺激新能源汽车积分需求提升,缓解新能源汽车积分供需失衡问题。考虑到目前NEV积分价格处于低位,合理降低新能源乘用车车型积分有助于限制NEV积分供给。

Production game equilibrium of heterogeneous automobile manufacturers under dual-credit policy

This article studies the influence of dual-credit policy on the production decision and profit of heterogeneous automobilemanufacturers at the enterprise level,as well as on the total output and total output value of new energy vehicles and fuel vehicles at theindustry level,by modeling the production game equilibrium of heterogeneous automobile manufacturers under the dual-credit policy.The main conclusions are as follows:(1) In the process of the evolution of the new energy vehicle industry,the new energy vehicle manu-facturers still have certain development potential,but the backbone of the future development depends on the dominant fuel vehiclemanufacturers.Dominated fuel vehicle manufacturers may become dominant fuel vehicle manufacturers by improving fuel economy,thus increasing the total production of dominant fuel vehicle manufacturers and reducing the total production of dominated fuel vehiclemanufacturers.(2) Dual-credit policy parameters have different effects on the production decisions and profits of heterogeneous manu-facturers.The new energy vehicle manufacturers can benefit from it,while the dominated fuel vehicle manufacturers are faced with acrisis.The possible ways to turn the crisis around include reducing the average fuel consumption and actively exploring the possibilitiesof new energy vehicle production.For the dominant fuel vehicle manufacturers,the tightening of the dual-credit policy may lead them toswitch to the fuel vehicle market.Regulating the upper limit of NEV credit price is beneficial to guide them to turn to the new energy ve-hicle market.(3) The parameters that promote the scale growth of new energy vehicles may lead to a decline in total output value.Policyadjustments should take the scale growth and output value growth as dual goals to avoid market fluctuations that may result from a sin-gle target.(4) With the tightening of the dual-credit policy,the foreseeable increase in the proportion of new energy vehicle credit re-quirement and the tightening of the corporate average fuel consumption standard will stimulate the increase in the demand for new ener-gy vehicle credits and alleviate the imbalance between the supply and demand of new energy vehicle credits.Considering the relativelylow price of NEV credits at present,a reasonable reduction of new energy passenger vehicle credits is helpful to reduce the NEV creditsupply.