基于博弈关系的建筑安全投入监管对策研究

鉴于承包商在安全投入上存在与政府安全监管部门的博弈关系,建立了政府安全监管部门与承包商之间的博弈模型,分析博弈模型的基本假设条件、承包商安全投入不足给企业带来的正负效用、企业最佳安全投入和社会最佳安全投入之差等因素对博弈结论的影响,最终得出5个能够影响承包商安全生产投入的政府安全监督管理部门需要关注的因素,并在此基础上,建立激励和约束相结合的监管机制,提出相应的建筑安全长效监管对策。

Study on Supervision Strategies for Construction Safety Investment Based on Game Theory

Considering that there exists game relations between contractor's safety input and government safety supervisory department,this study firstly sets up a game model between the contractor and the government safety supervisory department,and then analyzes the basic assumptions of the game model,the positive and negative effects on enterprise caused by the lacking of contractor's safety input,and the influence of the difference between the best enterprise safety input and the best social safety input on game conclusion.Finally,five factors affecting contractor's safety investment and needing the attention of government safety supervisory department are concluded.On the basis of it,long-term supervision measures and mechanism combining incentive and constraint are proposed for construction safety.