Monitoring, enforcement, and the choice of environmental policy instruments |
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Authors: | C Russell |
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Institution: | (1) Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies, 1207 18th Avenue South, Nashville, Tennessee 37212, USA, |
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Abstract: | How to choose among the dozen policy instruments available to environmental management agencies has been a matter of concern
and debate among environmental economists for the entire life of the profession – nearly four decades. The ability, or lack
of it, to measure the quantities or observe the actions made "enforceable" by particular policy instruments ought clearly
to be central to this choice. However, all too often the monitoring problem has been assumed away. When it is reintroduced
in realistic forms, we find, not surprisingly, that some favorite policy instruments, such as pollution charges, are not applicable
to some important problems, such as runoff pollution from farms; that marginal subsidies, by changing the burden of proof,
may no longer be symmetric with charges; and that the apparent freedom from monitoring requirements of the newly fashionable
instrument involving the public provision of information about firms or products is "paid for" by our inability to say anything
about its performance on other dimensions that are also of interest.
Electronic Publication |
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Keywords: | Policy instruments Pollution charges Marginal subsidies Deposit-refund Informational regulation Enforcement |
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