Nash Implementation of a Proportional Solution to International Pollution Control Problems |
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Authors: | Johan Eyckmans |
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Institution: | Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Naamsestraat 69, B-3000, Leuven, Belgium |
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Abstract: | For a very general class of pollution control models involving strictly quasi-concave utility functions over consumption and environmental quality and strictly convex emission abatement cost functions, a proportional cost sharing mechanism is presented inspired by the ratio equilibrium introduced by7. It is shown that the proportional solution yields a cost efficient allocation of abatement efforts and that the resulting utility imputation always lies in the stand alone core of the cost sharing game. In order to decentralize the proportional cost sharing equilibrium, a financial compensation mechanism implementing the proportional solution in complete information Nash equilibrium is presented. |
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