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根据现代企业理论探讨煤炭企业安全管理问题
引用本文:李红霞,田水承,冯长根.根据现代企业理论探讨煤炭企业安全管理问题[J].中国安全科学学报,1999,9(5):32-36.
作者姓名:李红霞  田水承  冯长根
作者单位:1. 西安市雁塔路,西安矿业学院管理系,710054,西安交通大学管理学院
2. 北京理工大学爆炸与安全科学国家重点实验室
摘    要:煤炭行业属于高危险性行业,降低其事故发生率,提高安全生产水平是煤炭工作者孜孜以求的目标。笔者应用委托——代理理论对煤炭安全管理问题进行探讨,分析了安全投入与安全水平、安全投入与安全报酬、事故赔偿与安全水平等之间的关系,提出了煤炭企业改善安全现状的管理对策及建议,并认为事故赔偿金过低,不足以对企业形成足够的压力,不利于企业主动提高安全水平,应加大惩罚力度,提高惩罚成本和惩处率。

关 键 词:安全管理  安全水平  委托—代理  监督  安全投入

Probe into the Safety Management of Coal Enterprises According to Modern Firm Theory
Li Hongxia,Tian Shuicheng,Feng Changgen.Probe into the Safety Management of Coal Enterprises According to Modern Firm Theory[J].China Safety Science Journal,1999,9(5):32-36.
Authors:Li Hongxia  Tian Shuicheng  Feng Changgen
Abstract:Coal industry is an industry of high risk.To lower the prevalence of accident and to raise the safety level are the target that safety researchers assiduously seek for. By the principal agent theory, the correlation between safety input and safety level,safety input and saety input and safety remuneration as well as accident compensation and safety level is explored.Some countermeasures and suggestions are put forward.It is considered that if the accident compensation is too low,it could not exert enough pressure to the coal mine to actively raise the safety level.The results of this study indicate that to increase the severity of the penalty and to increase penalty cost are absolutely necessary.
Keywords:Safety management  Safety level  Principal-agent  Safety input  Supervision
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