| 基于外部性理论私人参与基础设施融资的行为博弈分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 李玮,郭汉丁,乔婉贞,秦广蕾.基于外部性理论私人参与基础设施融资的行为博弈分析[J].资源开发与市场,2020(2):139-142,192. |
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| 作者姓名： | 李玮 郭汉丁 乔婉贞 秦广蕾 |
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| 作者单位： | 天津城建大学经济与管理学院 |
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| 基金项目： | 国家自然科学基金项目“市场治理视角下既有建筑绿色改造多主体动力演化与耦合机理研究”(编号:71872122);教育部哲学社会科学研究后期项目“既有建筑节能改造市场发展机理与政策体系优化研究——基于主体行为策略视角”(编号:16JHQ031);天津市高等学校创新团队“建筑工业化与绿色发展”资助项目(编号:TD13-5006) |
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| 摘 要： | 基于外部性理论,分别建立在无政府政策干预条件下和政府经济激励政策条件下的潜在私人群体参与基础设施融资的演化博弈模型,对其行为的动态演化过程进行分析,并探究博弈结果的稳定性。研究表明:私人群体参与基础设施融资的行为策略选择受基础设施外部性、参与融资所获得的收益和政府激励政策影响,提出政府应提高经济激励额度以弱化基础设施外部性的建议。
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| 关 键 词： | 外部性 基础设施 融资 演化博弈 |
Behavioral Game Analysis of Private Participation in Infrastructure Financing Based on Externality Theory |
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| LI Wei,GUO Han-ding,QIAO Wan-zhen,QIN Guang-lei.Behavioral Game Analysis of Private Participation in Infrastructure Financing Based on Externality Theory[J].Resource Development & Market,2020(2):139-142,192. |
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| Authors: | LI Wei GUO Han-ding QIAO Wan-zhen QIN Guang-lei |
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| Institution: | (School of Economics and Management,Tianjin Chengjian University,Tianjin 300384,China) |
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| Abstract: | Based on the externality theory,the evolutionary game model of potential private groups participating in infrastructure financing under the conditions of government policy non-intervention and government economic incentives was established,and the dynamic evolution process of its behavior was analyzed,and the stability of the game results was explored. The results showed that the choice of behavioral strate gies for private participation in infrastructure financing was influenced by infrastructure externalities,the benefits of participating in financing,and government incentives. This paper proposed that the government should increase the amount of economic incentives to weaken the externali ties of infrastructure. |
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| Keywords: | externality infrastructure financing evolutionary game |
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