经济增长激励、官员异质性与城市工业污染：以长三角地区为例

地方政府尤其是地方官员的决策行为对于一个城市工业污染的程度及其变化有着不可忽略的影响。首先探讨了地方官员的个体差异及其行为特征对城市工业污染的影响机理；然后以长三角地区为例，通过建立地方官员特征指标与城市工业污染间关系的计量模型，运用2005~2014年的相关统计数据，实证检验了地方官员异质性（主要体现为年龄、任期和晋升来源等方面的差异）对城市工业污染的具体影响。结果发现，地方官员的年龄、任期和晋升来源等因素对于城市工业污染有着不同程度的影响：（1）地方官员年龄增加对城市工业污染的影响表现为先增后减的倒U型变化趋势；（2）地方官员任期增加对城市工业污染的影响呈先减后增的趋势；（3）本地晋升官员相对于外地晋升官员，其执政下的城市工业污染程度会有所缓减。最后就有效管控城市工业污染，从完善地方官员晋升机制、健全地方官员环境考核制度等方面提出了相关政策建议

Economic Growth Incentive,Local Officials' Characteristics and Urban Industrial Pollution: A Case Study of the Yangtze River Delta

The decision making behavior of local governments, especially local officials, has a non negligible impact on urban industrial pollution. This paper discussed the relationship between local officials’ characteristics and urban industrial pollution. Yangtze River Delta area is selected as the research area to tested the effect of local officials’ characteristics (Age, Tenure and Promotion) on urban industrial pollution using the relevant data from 2005 to 2014. The results show that the factors such as age, tenure and promotion of local officials had different effects on urban industrial pollution: (1) With the increase of officials age, industrial pollution increased first and then decreased. (2) Officials prefer to reduce industrial pollution in the early years of the administration. However, over time, the industrial pollution will be aggravated. (3) Compared to officials th〖JP〗at transferred from other cities, the intensity of urban industrial pollution under locally officials administration will be slowed down. For effective control of urban industrial pollution,we put forward some policy suggestions from the aspects of improving the promotion mechanism of local officials and improving the environmental assessment system of local officials