碳交易政策下的物流与制造业联动减排随机演化博弈

考虑外部环境的不确定性，构建由地方政府、制造商与物流企业构建的三方随机演化模型，对模型的稳定性进行讨论得到稳态条件，结合数值仿真方法对博弈主体策略演化进行研究.结果表明：规制成本与上级政府的倒查机制是影响地方政府策略选择的重要因素，较高的碳交易价格将促进博弈系统向（积极规制，绿色生产，绿色运输）理想策略集演化，理想策略集下初始策略选择概率的改变一定程度上影响了主体演化的速率，即便制造商在博弈初期的绿色生产策略选择概率为0.1，仍能以最快的演化速率向绿色生产稳定策略收敛.联动发展下制造商的绿色生产策略将带动物流企业选择绿色运输策略，物流企业对碳交易价格与碳配额的敏感性要大于制造商，物流企业向绿色运输演化速率与碳配额成负相关，与碳交易价格成正相关.碳交易财政收入的增加促进了地方政府的积极规制行为，但当财政收入系数增加至0.3时可能导致物流企业的策略选择不稳定.伴随着随机干扰强度的升高，制造商保持了最高的稳定性，在情形一、二中的波动幅度分别为0.4667~1与0.5618~1，而物流企业的策略选择波动性最强，在情形一、二中得波动幅度分别为0.3856~1与0.4616~1，且在演化初期长期处在不稳定状态.

A stochastic evolutionary game of logistics and manufacturing linkage emission reduction under carbon trading policy

This study considers the uncertainty of the external environment; constructs a stochastic game model, which consists of government, manufacturers, and logistics enterprises; discusses the stability of the model to obtain the steady-state conditions; and investigates the strategic evolution of the game subject with the numerical simulation method. The cost of regulation and the reverse check mechanism of the upper government are important factors affecting the strategy choice of the local government, and a higher carbon trading price will promote the evolution of the game system to the ideal set of strategies (active regulation, green production, green transportation), the change of the initial strategy selection probability in the ideal strategy set affects the evolution rate of the subject to some extent, even if the manufacturer's green production strategy selection probability at the beginning of the game is 0.1, it still converges to the green production stabilization strategy with the fastest evolution rate. The green production strategy of manufacturers under the linkage development will drive logistics enterprises to choose a green transportation strategy. The sensitivity of logistics enterprises to carbon trading price and carbon quota is greater than that of manufacturers, and the evolution rate of logistics enterprises to green transportation is negatively related to carbon quota and positively related to carbon trading price. The increase in fiscal revenue from carbon trading promotes positive regulatory behavior of local governments but may lead to unstable strategy choices of logistics firms when the fiscal revenue coefficient increases to 0.3. Along with the increase in the intensity of random disturbances, manufacturers maintain the highest stability, with fluctuations of 0.4667~1 and 0.5618~1 in scenarios 1 and 2, respectively, while the strategy choice of logistics companies is the most volatile, with fluctuations of 0.3856~1 and 0.4616~1 in scenarios 1and 2, respectively, and is in an unstable state for a long time at the beginning of the evolution.