基于博弈论的非点源污染控制模型探讨

随着对工业和城市生活污水等点源污染治理能力的不断增强,农业非点源污染对水质环境的影响日益凸现.相对于点源污染,非点源污染发生的不确定时间、不确定途径、不确定量等特点给治理政策的制定带来很大难度.本文从著名的公地悲剧现象出发,着力从市场博弈及政府监督博弈两个模型分析非点源污染制造者之间的博弈格局,并提出以“集体表现”的形式对非点源污染进行管理和控制.市场博弈模型中以一定的排污削减目标为前提,确定以成本最优的原则进行点源-非点源排污权交易是可行且有效率的；而政府监督博弈模型的结果显示:合理的环境补贴和惩罚机制、政府对自身声誉及公众形象的重视及维护对非点源污染治理起正向促进作用.

Modeling Nonpoint Source Pollution Control from the View of Game Theory

With the increasing ability to deal with point source pollution,such as industrial and urban life sewage,the impact of agricultural non-point source pollution on water quality environment has become more and more apparent.Compared with point source pollution,non-point source pollution occurs at an uncertain time,in an uncertain way and with uncertain quantity,which brings much more difficulties to the making of some relevant control policies.Beginning with the famous phenomenon of the Tragedy of Commons,thi...